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introduc tion: culture and freedom

from barbie to harry p ot ter, the Beatles to Beyoncé, Hollywood
to Bollywood, and Viagra to life-saving AIDS medications, intellectual
property now dominates our culture and rules our economy and welfare.
Our children grow up in a world of copyrighted characters surrounded
by trademarked goods. With the advent of the World Trade Organization
and its legal obligations, intellectual property also increasingly aﬀects
people across the globe, from Brazil to Bangladesh. Yet the full cultural
and economic consequences of intellectual property policies are often
hidden. We focus instead on the fruits of innovation—more iPods, more
bestsellers, more blockbuster drugs—without concern for what is being
produced, by whom, and for whose beneﬁt.
But make no mistake: intellectual property laws have profound eﬀects
on human capabilities, what Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum deﬁne
as what people “are actually able to do and be.”1 The most obvious example
is law’s regulation of access to basic necessities, such as textbooks and essential medicines. But the connections run deeper still. Intellectual property incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to innovate drugs that sell—
hence we are ﬂooded with cures for erectile dysfunction and baldness, but
still have no cure for the diseases that aﬄict millions of the poor, from malaria to tuberculosis, because these people are too poor to save their lives.
Intellectual property laws aﬀect our ability to think, learn, share, sing,
1
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dance, tell stories, joke, borrow ideas, inspire and be inspired, reply, critique, and pay homage. In short, intellectual property laws do much more
than “incentivize innovation,” as the common perception goes. Intellectual property bears fundamentally on the basic activities that make for a
full and joyful life. Furthermore, in a global Knowledge Economy, intellectual property distributes wealth and power and aﬀects global justice.
Take the example of one Solomon Linda. A black migrant worker
living in a squalid Johannesburg hostel in 1939, Linda composed a song
based on his own childhood experiences protecting cattle from lions in
the jungle. The song borrowed the syncopation of American jazz from
across the Atlantic and mixed it with an a cappella melody to create what
would become Africa’s ﬁrst recorded pop hit. Linda’s song soon crossed
the Atlantic and was reborn, ﬁrst as “Wimoweh” and later as “The Lion
Sleeps Tonight.” It would go on to be recorded over 170 times, eventually
ﬁnding its way into Disney’s immensely popular ﬁlm and Broadway production The Lion King. But while the song eventually produced millions
of dollars for Disney and others, Linda died destitute, suﬀering from a
curable kidney disease at the age of ﬁfty-three. One of Linda’s children
died of malnutrition and another died of AIDS.
Linda’s story illustrates how intellectual property laws have eﬀects
that extend well beyond incentives for creation. Law regulates recognition (or here, misrecognition) of the contributions of diverse people to
our global culture, and distributes the material rewards of innovation.
A misrecognition of Linda’s contribution led to his inability to pay for
food and drugs that could have saved his and his children’s lives; conversely, recognizing Linda’s cultural contribution would have given him
the agency to provide for himself and his family. Intellectual property
governs the ﬂow of free culture, allowing Solomon to remix American
jazz with his own South African music, and yet also raises issues of fair
culture. Solomon’s creation was left to the laws of the jungle, free to be
exploited by Westerners with more knowledge and power. Finally, Linda’s
song reveals the power of culture as a vehicle for mutual understanding,
shared meaning, and sociability. “The Lion Sleeps Tonight” is praised as
a song “the whole world knows.”2
This book highlights the broad social and economic dimensions of
innovation and cultural exchange in a global context of sharp inequalities
in power and knowledge. I argue that law must facilitate the ability of all
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citizens, rich or poor, brown or white, man or woman, straight or gay, to
participate in making knowledge of our world and to beneﬁt materially
from their cultural production. Democratic cultural production promotes
not only economic development from market exchanges in a Knowledge
Age, but also human development. Enhancing one’s capacity to participate
in cultural production and critique engenders autonomy and equality,
learning, critical thinking, sharing, sociability, and mutual recognition
and understanding. This book is a call for intellectual property law and
legal decision makers to expressly recognize and contend with the plural
values at stake in cultural production and exchange.

from goods to a good life
In this book I will show that intellectual property laws shaped only by
the narrow economic view that predominates today results in a crabbed
understanding of culture and law’s role in promoting culture. Current law
takes as its mandate the production of more cultural goods, from R2D2
to iPads, to be exchanged in the global marketplace. To date, even the
most trenchant critiques of the excesses of this law take this normative
goal as given. The inﬂuential “public domain movement” led by scholars
critiquing the exponential growth of intellectual property laws at the
turn of the century focused their ire on the counterproductive eﬀects
of too much property on this ultimate goal—intellectual productivity.
Too many property rights, they argued, will more likely stiﬂe innovation
than promote it.
But copyright and patent laws do more than incentivize the creation of
more goods. They fundamentally aﬀect human capabilities and the ability
to live a good life. As we will see, the impact of these laws goes far beyond
gross domestic product. At the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the legal
regime of intellectual property has insinuated itself more deeply into our
lives and more deeply into the framework of international law than at any
other period of time in history, aﬀecting our ability to do a broad range
of activities, including to create and contest culture and to produce and
distribute life-saving drugs. Indeed, now that full compliance with the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement
is required in all but the world’s very least developed countries, intellectual
property has become literally a question of life or death.
Intellectual property’s march into all corners of our lives and to the
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most destitute corners of the world has paradoxically exposed the fragility of its economic foundations while amplifying its social and cultural
eﬀects. Global actors have responded to these eﬀects. During the Doha
Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in 2001, the
WTO declared that intellectual property, while important, should not
stand in the way of “WTO members’ right to protect public health and,
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”3 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) responded to the dramatic social
and economic eﬀects of intellectual property on developing countries,
in particular, by adopting in 2007 a “development agenda” that would
reorient the organization’s policymaking from promoting eﬃciency to
“development.” The WIPO pledged “to approach intellectual property
enforcement in the context of broader societal interests and especially
development- oriented concerns,” stating that intellectual property law
and policy must be created and carried out in “a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare.”4
Despite these real-world changes, in the United States, intellectual
property scholars insist on explaining this ﬁeld only through the narrow
lens of a particular economic vision. Giving evidence to Amartya Sen’s
observation that “[t]heories have lives of their own, quite deﬁantly of the
phenomenal world that can be actually observed,” by and large, American legal scholars continue to understand intellectual property solely as
a tool to solve an economic “public goods” problem: nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable goods such as music and scientiﬁc knowledge will be too
easy to copy and share—and thus there will not be an incentive to create
them in the ﬁrst place—without a monopoly right in these creations for
a limited period of time.5
But intellectual property today is more than simply a tool for incentivizing creative production. Intellectual property laws bear considerably on
central features of human ﬂourishing, from the developing world’s access
to food, textbooks, and essential medicines; to the ability of citizens everywhere to participate democratically in political and cultural discourse; to
the capacity to earn a livelihood from one’s intellectual contributions to
our global culture. This book calls for a deeper understanding of intellectual property and its broader social, cultural, and economic eﬀects, one
that acknowledges that regulation of cultural production and exchange
has a profound impact on human freedom.

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 4

2/10/12 2:23 PM

intr oduc tion

5

In the pages that follow, I argue that we must recognize culture not
just as products, but as critical processes of creative and social interaction
that promote our humanity. Cultural participation is an end in itself and
cultural participation has intrinsic value. Singing, dancing, and sharing stories together; utilizing our intellect to make new knowledge of
the world—these are fundamentally what human freedom is for. At the
same time, cultural participation is a critical means for fostering cultural
change and exchange. Individuals take values, norms, images, and ideas
from the world around them—near and far, past and present—and recast
them to tell their own stories and remake culture. Yet a decade on into the
twenty-ﬁrst century, much of the cultural forms that are familiar and dear
to us are in private hands, wrapped up as intellectual property in the form
of copyrights (in books, music, art, and ﬁ lm), patents (in scientiﬁc innovation), and trademarks (in commercial brands). The law of intellectual
property—what it allows; what it prevents; who makes the decisions; and
crucially, who pays or receives the money—thus is central to our ability
to talk back to or talk through our culture. Cultural exchanges cultivate
humanity in other important ways. Exchanging stories and knowledge
with one another both confers recognition on diverse others and fosters
mutual understanding.
Today we readily understand how ownership of property in land is
central to our ability to control our own destinies; at the same time, we
regulate property relations to reﬂect the kinds of interactions we deem
just. Modern property law “governs human interaction to ensure that
people relate to each other with respect and dignity,”6 for example, by implying into every leasehold a warranty of habitability, prohibiting racially
restrictive covenants, and guaranteeing equal access to places of public
accommodation. As Joseph Singer reminds us, real property law both
reﬂects and shapes our free and democratic society.7
This book seeks to bring our attention to the increasingly important
ways that intellectual property law frames a free and democratic society
and just global social relations. As I will show, intellectual property laws
that regulate the ability to produce, share, and enjoy culture are central
to our ability to cultivate ourselves and our communities.

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 5

2/10/12 2:23 PM

6

introduc tion

three views of culture
“Culture” is a word on everybody’s lips in intellectual property scholarship. James Boyle has spurred a “cultural environmentalism” movement
to counter the privatization of our intellectual heritage. Larry Lessig has
warned that legal code and computer code together are morphing our once
“free culture” into a “permission culture.” Yochai Benkler has explored
how commons-based methods of production “provide more opportunities
for participating in the creation of culture.” And Jack Balkin has said that
interpreters of the First Amendment and intellectual property ought to
be concerned with “cultural democracy.” All of these scholars seek to protect our cultural commons and the processes of cultural innovation. Yet
there is resistance in the academy to the elaboration of a cultural theory
of intellectual property that would stand beside and help illuminate the
dominant economic account of our law, and none of these theorists has
oﬀered such an account. This book takes up that task.
Before elaborating, I should brieﬂy distinguish my view of culture
from two common perceptions of culture: culture as tradition and culture
as commodity. (I consider these distinctions in detail in Chapter 2.) For
well over a century the dominant anthropological conception of culture
was of static tradition handed down from above, rotely reproduced from
generation to generation. Culture as tradition takes, in Michel Foucault’s
words, “the spectator’s posture” toward the present—that of “the ﬂâneur,
the idle . . . satisﬁed to . . . build up a storehouse of memories.”8 But this
view of culture has been rejected both positively and normatively by modern theorists from ﬁelds as wide-ranging as anthropology to philosophy.
The view of culture as commodity has particular resonance in intellectual property law. On the one hand, mass culture has a democratizing
eﬀect, increasing access to cultural works by the public. At the same time,
however, architectures of commodity culture, from technology to law,
have enforced autocratic cultural authority. As told in Jürgen Habermas’s
inﬂuential account The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
culture by the end of the twentieth century was transformed into static
commodities handed down to the masses with little if any opportunity to
meaningfully engage with the imposed culture. During the late twentieth
century, social theorists from Habermas to Foucault came to focus on the
constraints of culture on human freedom.
In short, neither the tradition nor commodity views of culture, which
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conceive culture as something that is given and passively consumed, are
fully in tune with modern Enlightenment values, which emphasize innovation as critical thinking and engagement, not mere passive enjoyment
of goods handed down by others.
This book begins the project of developing a third theory of culture
that would better reﬂect and shape a free and democratic society and the
demands of global justice. Anthropology, cultural studies, philosophy,
and development economics oﬀer rich views of culture and its eﬀects on
human freedom and development. Notably these views are inﬂuencing,
and are being inﬂuenced by, transnational actors working on intellectual
property issues, from multilateral agencies such as WIPO, the WTO, and
the World Health Organization (WHO) to a civil society movement for
“Access to Knowledge.” Yet they have not fully challenged the dominance
of the single-minded economic account of this law at home in the United
States.
The capabilities approach associated with Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum supplies the normative vision animating this book. I rely
on both Nussbaum’s elaboration of a list of central human capabilities
that law should promote, as well as Sen’s description of development as
freedom, to elaborate the plural values at stake in modern intellectual
property conﬂicts.
Today there is growing recognition that culture is a key component
of human development. Surely this includes the production and just distribution of essential cultural goods, from medicines to biotechnology
to educational materials, art, and literature. All of these are critical to
enabling a fulﬁlling life, bearing direct relation to what Nussbaum identiﬁes as “central human capabilities,” from the capability to live “a human life of normal length,” to “being able to use the senses, to imagine,
think, and reason . . . in a ‘truly human’ way . . . cultivated by adequate
education.”9 In adapting Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to intellectual
property law, I seek to elaborate the connections between the cultural
sphere, intellectual property, and the expansion of human capabilities.
Where traditional intellectual property scholarship focuses on knowledge
products, a cultural approach takes a broader view of cultural freedom
and equality as vital to promoting not only health and education, but also
a whole host of central human capabilities, including:
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• Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with
experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice
(religious, literary, musical, and so forth)
• Supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be
crucial in the development of emotions
• Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life
• Being able to engage in various forms of social interaction
• Being able to laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities
• Being able to hold property, and having property rights on an
equal basis with others
• In work, being able to work as a human being exercising practical
reason, and to enter into meaningful relationships of mutual
recognition with other workers.10
Margaret Jane Radin brought theories of human ﬂourishing to bear on
real property law (including Nussbaum’s own theories), highlighting this
law’s role in promoting personhood. Today, Nussbaum and Sen’s theory
of human capabilities may usefully help us begin to reorient intellectual
property law, as well.
In these pages, I suggest that culture is better understood by considering three central features: participation, livelihood, and shared meaning.
This view of culture as a participatory community is more in line with the
values of a free a democratic society and, as I shall argue, is the view of
culture that modern intellectual property laws ought to promote.
Participation
What Foucault famously described as the “author-function” describes
how power and knowledge are controlled by a select few. The juridical
category of “author” serves to legitimate and insulate cultural authority
from the proliferation of alternate meanings.11 But today this vision of
cultural authority is yielding to a more dialogic process, in which ordinary
individuals wield the power and claim the authority to produce knowledge
of the world, from journalism to music, art, and science. This democratization is taking place through a conﬂuence of innovations, from blogs
to customer reviews; to YouTube, MySpace, and peer-to-peer ﬁ le sharing;
to open-source collaboration. Participatory culture democratizes cultural
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meaning-making: cultural meaning derives less exclusively from traditional authorities and more from the people themselves. And as examples
from Ethiopia to India to South Africa in the proceeding pages illustrate,
participatory culture extends well beyond the United States. More and
more, individuals and communities around the world seek to engage in
global processes of meaning-making.
Of course, the rise of participatory culture does not mean that we
should reorient law to promote it. There are certainly normative beneﬁts to stable cultural meaning and authority. Trademark law is built on
this premise, reasoning that without stable meanings, marks would lose
their ability to signal to consumers the source of the product. Copyright
and patent, too, are premised on the notion that protecting authors and
inventors produces better art and science. Indeed, in a recent book, The
Cult of the Amateur, Andrew Keen suggests that by embracing cultural
democracy we would be giving up on cultural quality.12
But while we have elaborated reasons for privileging stable cultural
meanings, the case for cultural democracy—that is, dissent and change
within culture—has been more elusive. This book begins to elaborate
the beneﬁts of democratic culture, a culture in which all people have
the capacity to participate. I use the phrase working through culture to
describe the myriad ways in which individuals exercise their human
capabilities—from critical thinking to learning, sharing, playing, and
engaging in meaningful work—within the cultural domain, and not just
outside of it. The normative beneﬁts of active engagement in rather than
passive acceptance of culture are legion: from producing greater and more
diverse cultural content, to fostering engaged democratic citizens, to promoting learning through emulation and pretend play, to engendering
mutual recognition and understanding among diverse peoples. In addition, participatory culture has signiﬁcant economic value, especially for
marginalized communities historically left out of the processes of cultural
production.
Livelihood
A twenty-ﬁrst-century theory of culture cannot ignore the important issues of development and global justice. Culture plays a critical role in
development, in particular in countries’ ability to meet the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, which include the eradication of global poverty,
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universal education, gender equality, child and maternal health, progress
in ﬁghting HIV/AIDS, and environmental sustainability.
To promote development as freedom, in Sen’s words, intellectual property law should seek to enhance people’s capacity to participate in cultural production and shared communities of meaning. Furthermore, we
must recognize that cultural production is both an end and a means of
development. Recognition of Australian aboriginal artists, African musicians, and Ethiopian farmers as producers of cultural meaning, for
example, could potentially direct signiﬁcant revenues into these countries. As Sen has written, “cultural liberty is important not only in the
cultural sphere, but in the successes and failures in social, political, and
economic spheres. The diﬀerent dimensions of human life have strong
interrelations.”13 Here, working through culture has yet another meaning.
In the Knowledge Age, cultural work is a promising means of economic
development. Concerns about the commodiﬁcation of culture notwithstanding, working through culture can oﬀer an antidote to alienation by
providing recognition and remuneration for meaningful work.
Shared Meaning
Finally, growth and diversiﬁcation in cultural production may promote
mutual recognition and understanding across diverse cultures. As media
scholars observe, the phenomenally popular new websites of the early part
of this new century, from Facebook to YouTube to Flickr, are not necessarily about high-quality content but “social connections.”14 Shared meaning
goes to the very heart of what makes culture tick; culture evokes communal responses to and aﬀection for common musical and literary referents.
The communal nature of the new Participation Age cannot be overstated.
As President Obama stated in his Inaugural Address, today’s electronic
networks not only “feed our commerce,” but also “bind us together.”15
Put simply, a global culture in which all peoples have an opportunity
to be creators is surely a means to economic development, but it is also
much more. The cultural sphere of life encompasses those joys that make
a human life truly worth living. As child psychologists observe, “When
young children are free from illness, malnutrition, neglect, and abuse,
they turn their considerable energies to play.” 16 This is the crux of Sen’s
insight that economic development goals must go beyond raising GDP to
ask what is required to ensure that people can live fulﬁ lling lives.
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Cultural exchanges are not merely monetary transactions involving
static goods. Individuals make cultural goods to share with others parts of
themselves—their history, their music, their stories. Cultural activity promotes self-development and mutual understanding, potentially realizing
G. W. F. Hegel’s twin goals of “individual self-realization and reciprocal
recognition.” Serious study of the processes of cultural production and
exchange governed by modern intellectual property laws must recognize
the special ways in which culture can promote mutual recognition and
understanding. As John Dewey eloquently put it, “the art characteristic
of a civilization is the means for entering sympathetically into the deepest elements in the experience of remote and foreign civilizations.”17 By
pointing out the common human characteristics that bind us all, culture
promotes shared meaning not only among those who look and think alike,
but also among far-ﬂung peoples.

beyond efficienc y
Intellectual property scholars today focus on a single goal: eﬃciency. But
in this book, I elaborate the connections between cultural production and
plural values, from freedom to equality, democracy, development, and
mutual recognition and understanding. Freedom to participate in cultural
life stands at the very core of liberty. As Salman Rushdie has stated, “Those
who do not have power over the story that dominates their lives, power
to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and change it as times
change, truly are powerless, because they cannot think new thoughts.”18
Cultural liberty also has important implications for equality. The liberty to
contest hegemonic discourses has particularly profound possibilities for
women and other minorities who have not traditionally had power over
the stories that dominate their lives. Drawing on the insights of Charles
Taylor’s “politics of recognition,” I will show with various real-world examples how democratizing the capacity to make and contest culture can
distribute power to shape meaning and enhance the capacity to contest
hegemonic meanings—so long as copyright and trademark laws do not
stand in the way.
Active engagement in the cultural sphere can also be a school for
engendering the central traits of democratic citizenship, from critical
thinking to creativity to sharing and sociability. I have already alluded to how
democratic participation in making culture is linked to economic develop-
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ment; I will also consider how recognizing diverse others as authors and
inventors promotes mutual recognition and mutual understanding.

the public domain
This book aﬃ rms the important observation of scholars of the public
domain that creativity is a social and reiterative process. I elaborate on
their descriptive claims for a robust public domain by developing further
the normative importance of cultural participation. Cultural sharing promotes our humanity.
At the same time, some public domain advocates may ﬁnd discomforting my calls to democratize who we recognize as authors and inventors. In subsequent chapters, I argue that histories of colonialism and
cultural and racial stereotypes have often led us to overlook the knowledge
contributions of the poor. While I do not advocate for new sui generis
intellectual property rights for indigenous peoples or the poor, I point
out how poor people’s knowledge—even when qualifying as novel and
nonobvious, or as original and ﬁ xed—often gets freely appropriated by
creators in the developed world because the works are presumed to be
ancient or folk culture. I argue that a more democratic culture, that is,
one in which more and more of the world’s people are engaged in cultural
production and exchange, requires ﬁrst the simple recognition that each
of us has a story to tell and knowledge to share.
the l ady with a mouse
I write this book about culture and freedom at a moment of profound
cultural change around the world. While culture has always been something invented rather than discovered, cultural reform until now has
largely been the work of artists or an elite vanguard. Today the tools for
authoring our own lives and creating our own communities are increasingly coming into the ordinary person’s grasp, and on a truly global scale.
Immanuel Kant iterated his Enlightenment imperative “Sapere
Aude!” (Think for oneself!)19 long before the emergence of the Internet
and the tools of digital technology known as “Web 2.0” dramatically enhanced our ability to rip, mix, and contest our given culture from the
bottom up. By and large, late into the twentieth century, Enlightenment,
where it emerged at all, had come mostly to the political sphere. The
cultural sphere, in contrast, remained largely in the control of traditional
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authorities, from media moguls to religious mullahs, backed by the force
of law, if not God. Indeed, while much of the world embraced democracy
in the political realm, the cultural sphere grew less democratic. As told in
Habermas’s foundational work The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, culture by the end of the twentieth century was transformed into
static commodities handed down to the masses with little if any opportunity to meaningfully engage with them.
But today we see signs that Enlightenment may ﬁnally go the next
mile, as social movements and new technologies usher in critical modes
of being within culture. The twenty-ﬁrst century has ushered in a Participation Age that is turning on their head our centuries-old conceptions of
culture as tradition or as static, canned commodities. The convergence of
social movements with digital technology and the Internet has enabled
the rise of a democratic culture in which more and more people claim a
right and ability to participate not just in the political sphere, but in the
domains of culture as well. Individuals, traditionally the consumers of
“take-it- or-leave it” culture, make “bespoke” culture—that is, a culture
tailored for their own use. On the Internet, Netizens are a part of not
only the Information Age—in which consumers passively receive culture
protected by intellectual property—but also a Participation Age of remix
culture, YouTube, MySpace, blogs, podcasts, wikis, and peer-to-peer ﬁle
sharing.
This new generation views intellectual properties as the raw materials for its own creative acts, blurring the lines that have long separated
producers from consumers. Witness a disc jockey named “Dangermouse”
who mashes up the Beatles’ White Album and hip-hop artist Jay-Z’s Black
Album to create the award-winning Grey Album. Witness girl fans of Harry
Potter who post stories at www.fanﬁction.net to retell life at Hogwarts
from Hermione’s perspective. Witness Nintendo’s Wii game console,
which allows players to personalize their “Mii” avatars—from gender and
skin color down to the shape of their eyes—before setting oﬀ on their adventures. The enhanced ability to write oneself into the traditional script
oﬀers a powerful new take on Legos and action ﬁgures. Our children now
have the virtual building blocks to render cultural universes their own.
Indeed, the whimsical painting Lady with a Mouse may serve as a
useful allegory for modern culture. Rendered by the Indian artist Mohan Sivanand, it depicts a slender Indian woman sitting at a computer.
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While the image of an “Indian woman” has typically been used in art as
a standard-bearer of tradition, the presence of the computer in the image
reminds us that the rise of YouTube, MySpace, and a read-write culture
forces a reconsideration of such old notions. The “lady” in the painting
is no passive receptacle of tradition. Far from it, in this context, with
technology as a leitmotif of modernity, she is poised with the power to
make culture herself. Is she writing a blog? Posting a video to YouTube?
Connecting with a virtual community on Facebook? The Lady with a
Mouse reminds us that culture is made, not inherited. We are moving
away from culture as Mickey Mouse—the immutable, prefab product of
a corporation—to culture empowered by a computer mouse.

reduc tionism, fac tionalism, narcissism
Talk of inventing oneself, if taken literally, can surely give pause. As Zadie
Smith warns: “When a human being becomes a set of data on a website
like Facebook, he or she is reduced. Everything shrinks. Individual character. Friendships. Language. Sensibility.” 20 The fear is that “inventing
ourselves” may indeed produce a society of products, but not people.
Others such as Cass Sunstein lament that the Internet is leading to communities that are highly factionalized and oﬀer little exposure to opposing
viewpoints.21 In a related point, Andrew Keen argues that the world of participatory culture on YouTube and Facebook is atomistic and narcissistic.22
These are important concerns, and I agree we must protect against
reductionism, factionalism, and narcissism. At the same time, I am emboldened by examples as far-ﬂung as open-source collaboration, fan ﬁction, and YouTube, which show us that what we are witnessing is often
not a rejection of culture and community by individuals sloughing oﬀ
their communal skins, but rather the emergence of autonomous and democratic participation within communities of shared meaning. Despite their
aﬃliation and shared norms, robust debate within cultural communities
remains, especially on the Internet, where, as the media critic of the New
York Times observes, “the only authentic response to a YouTube video is
another YouTube video.”23 Shared meaning does not imply obedient acceptance of cultural traditions. Much of the cultural creativity on YouTube
and the Internet I will describe reveals individuals not as subjects but
as citizens, taking up their responsibility to participate and engage in
reasoned argument and critique within cultural domains.
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Lady with a Mouse—painting by Mohan Sivanand, photograph by Sam Sellers.
(Courtesy of Mohan Sivanand)

intellec tual propert y a s a tool , not a right
Let me clarify that in my view, intellectual property remains a tool, not a
right. Mine is a complex consequentialist approach that seeks to expand
the purpose of this law beyond incentives and eﬃciency to promoting
the broad range of values we hold dear in the twenty-ﬁrst century. As
mentioned earlier, my book dovetails with the broad contemporary move-
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ment in international intellectual property circles to reconsider this law
as a tool for promoting human development and not GDP or eﬃciency
alone. But my goals are also fundamentally connected to our own domestic law. If the goal of American utilitarian intellectual property law
is to promote culture, we must pay heed to what vision of culture we are
promoting.
An important question arises: if intellectual property remains a tool,
is it too blunt a tool to promote the broad canvas of values we place under
the rubric of human development? Henry Smith’s persuasive query to
scholars advocating a social relations approach to property law applies
well in the intellectual property context, too. Perhaps, as Smith suggests,
“talking about ultimate ends is more glamorous than asking the more
engineering-like question of how to serve them.”24 But to this I reply that
the simple elegance of economic analysis has both masked problematic
assumptions behind its numbers and failed to give clear empirical support for current laws—a point that, as I show in the next chapter, even
the father of economic analysis of law, Richard Posner, concedes.

from ip to ip
“IP” is the well-recognized shorthand for an intellectual property law
focused on the production of culture as stuﬀ, whereas “iP” is a shorthand
for a new vision of culture that recognizes culture as a community that
individuals make together, if not brick by brick, then video by video. The
interdisciplinary, pluralist vision of intellectual property developed herein
prioritizes people and participation in creative global markets and recognizes that intellectual property laws aﬀect human capability, distributive
justice, and global social relations. My reinterpretation of intellectual
property applies to suburban American fan-ﬁction authors and African
coﬀee farmers alike: all seek a greater capacity for accessing and crafting
new knowledge of the world. In turn, these cultural capabilities structure
our social relations, as new creators seek to access global markets to attain
recognition for their creativity, share meaning with others, and ultimately
to be fairly remunerated for their contributions to our global culture.
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toward a more comprehensive, interdisciplinary
approach
In Chapter 1, “Beyond Incentives,” I present the limits of the current
incentives approach as a comprehensive theory of intellectual property.
I show that the narrow economic account of intellectual property can
neither fully explain nor guide resolution of some of the most troubling
intellectual property conﬂicts of our day, from the rise of user-generated
content on the Internet, to biopiracy, to the expansion of intellectual property rights to the developing world. This chapter calls for a reorientation in
intellectual property law and policy away from a singular focus on ex ante
incentives to a consideration of law’s broad social and economic eﬀects.
The next two chapters begin to theorize a cultural approach to intellectual property that would stand beside and complement the current
economic approach. Chapter 2, “Bespoke Culture,” compares two conceptions of culture, culture as tradition and culture as commodity, with a new
vision of culture as participatory community emergent in the new millennium. Liberal democratic theory has largely ignored the cultural sphere,
privileging freedom and equality in the political sphere but allowing for
fewer rights to contest or remake cultural norms and community. In this
chapter I pull from interdisciplinary theory—from the cultural theory of
Pierre Bourdieu, to the philosophy of Habermas and Foucault, to the art
criticism of Dewey—to highlight the eﬀect of freedom in the cultural
sphere on society, politics, and the economy. Our vision of culture matters.
Armed with a fuller understanding of the descriptive and prescriptive
superiority of a participatory vision of culture, we may more proﬁtably
critique and remake intellectual property law with careful attention to
just what kind of culture this law ought to promote.
I turn to the links between cultural democracy and development in
Chapter 3, “Fair Culture.” At the turn of the millennium, the Participation Age and the goal of poverty eradication have dovetailed. As a recent
U.N. Human Development Report has noted, in a Knowledge Age in
which wealth derives from cultural production and exchange in global
markets, “cultural freedom is not just a human right, but also a key to
development.”25 The concept of fair culture yokes together meaning and
livelihood. But in this chapter I consider the impediments to cultural
participation by the poor, which range from unequal capacity and lack of
capital to stereotypes and biases that lead to misrecognition and exploita-

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 17

2/10/12 2:23 PM

18

intr oduc tion

tion. This chapter considers strategies for stimulating cultural production in the developing world, and for recognizing the ongoing innovation
and authorship of those in the developing world, from coﬀee farmers in
Ethiopia to the auteurs of Bollywood ﬁlms.
Chapter 4, “Everyone’s a Superhero,” elaborates the connections
among culture, freedom, and equality through a close study of fan-ﬁction
communities on the Internet. The stereotypes of popular culture insinuate themselves deeply into our lives, coloring our views on occupations
and roles. From stories featuring Hermione Granger as the lead heroine,
to Harry Potter in Kolkata, to Star Trek same-sex romances, fan- created
ﬁction reimagines our cultural landscape, granting liberty and agency to
those denied it in the popular mythology. Lacking the global distribution
channels of traditional media, diverse authors now ﬁ nd an alternative
in the World Wide Web, which brings their work to the world. I argue
that fan ﬁction that challenges the hegemony of the original ought to
be considered fair use where the writer is commenting on either the absence or negative portrayal of girls, women, or minorities in the original
work. Alice Randall’s unauthorized parody of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone
with the Wind—cheekily titled The Wind Done Gone—is a case in point.
Randall’s book, which retells the story of the Civil War from the perspective of a black slave woman on Scarlett O’Hara’s plantation, seeks to upend
the highly inﬂuential yet racist portrayals of blacks in Mitchell’s iconic
work. Scholars raise three principal critiques to such unlicensed use: (1)
Why not write your own story rather than borrowing another’s? (2) Even
if you must borrow, why not license it? and (3) Won’t recoding popular
icons destabilize culture? Relying on a cultural theory that prizes participation in, rather than separation from, culture as a response to cultural
hegemony, I reply to these objections.
I turn from the local to the global in Chapter 5, asking, “Can Intellectual Property Help the Poor?” Many have critiqued the rapid expansion of
intellectual property rights into the developing world as impediments to
development, and in Chapter 7 I explore the pernicious eﬀects of strong
intellectual property rights on access to life-saving medicines for the
global poor. In this chapter, however, I ask whether intellectual property
law must do more to recognize the innovations of the poor. While the
poor are often presumed to be the bearers of “traditional knowledge”
rather than the innovations that are the subject of modern patents and
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trademarks, I argue that poor people’s knowledge is much more dynamic
than the term traditional knowledge recognizes. I consider the impediments to our understanding poor people’s knowledge (a term I prefer to
traditional knowledge) as creative work deserving of ex ante intellectual
property rights, and argue that the poor wish to be seen as creators of
their own destiny and to be treated fairly in world trade.
I turn from innovators to authors in Chapter 6, “Bollywood/Hollywood,” where I consider cultural exchanges involving ﬁlms between the
East and West. Acknowledging that a free ﬂow of culture is not always a
fair ﬂow of culture, I consider a recent spate of copyright suits by Hollywood against Bollywood that accuse the latter of ruthlessly copying movie
themes and scenes from American ﬁlms. But claims of cultural appropriation go far back, and travel in multiple directions. The revered American
director Steven Spielberg has been accused of copying the idea for E.T.:
The Extra-Terrestrial from legendary Indian ﬁlmmaker Satyajit Ray’s 1962
script for The Alien. Disney’s The Lion King bears striking similarities to
Osamu Tezuka’s Japanese anime series, Kimba the White Lion. Neither
Ray nor Tezuka’s studio sued the American ﬁlmmakers, and this chapter
is by no means an attempt to rekindle any particular legal case. Rather,
I use these examples to consider copyright’s role in promoting cultural
exchange, mutual recognition among global authors, and mutual understanding through the sharing of diverse cultural works.
The ﬁnal chapter, “An Issue of Life or Death,” reiterates that there
is much more at stake in intellectual property law than the production
of more technological gadgets or literary characters. Life itself hangs in
the balance, and the example of AIDS patients in sub-Saharan Africa
drives home the point that the simplistic incentives/access trope that
dominates contemporary intellectual property analysis is an inadequate
framework for addressing local and global intellectual property conﬂicts
in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The problem of poor people’s access to medicines is a prime example of the failure of the narrow incentives model,
since patents provide little incentive for the production of medicines that
would treat the poor. In this chapter, I propose that just as the New Jersey
Supreme Court in State v. Shack declared that “property rights promote
human values,” intellectual property rights should give way to the human
values of freedom and equality as well. While this subject may seem
distant from the topic of cultural participation addressed in earlier chap-
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ters, the connection between the ability to live a full and healthy life and
cultural participation is far from tangential. Intellectual property rights
and the freedoms they can promote are interrelated—patents govern the
ability to live a healthy life, which in turn enables human beings to fully
contribute to making our culture.
Today intellectual property law has grown and expanded to every
corner of the earth. The law has come of age, but we will need a social
enlightenment in intellectual property law similar to the one we witnessed in real property law during the last century in order to recognize the plural social, cultural, and economic eﬀects of a legal regime
that governs the global production, enjoyment, and exchange of culture.
Intellectual property laws aﬀect fundamental values, from freedom to
eﬃciency, from democracy to development, from dignity to distributive
justice. Our laws ought to promote these plural values, including but
beyond eﬃciency alone.
If intellectual property is to serve humankind, we need to better
understand the process of cultural creation. Economists point out that
these processes may be impeded by too little or too much property. Social
and cultural theory can illuminate how individuals and society grow and
change through cultural exchanges. In sum, this is not just the domain
of economists who study innovation; it has long been the domain of
musicologists, anthropologists, sociologists, literary critics, philosophers,
and others in the cultural study business. This book makes the case for
broadening our methodological approaches to intellectual property to
include perspectives from ﬁelds including but beyond economics, such
as development economics, anthropology, cultural studies, and philosophy. In the pages that follow, I elaborate how these ﬁelds can enrich
our understanding of the deep connections between culture and human
freedom.
While speciﬁc doctrinal reforms may follow from my critique, that
is not my project here. In these pages I urge a broader vision of law’s effects on culture and freedom. But I believe that a radical revision of the
law is not necessary to eﬀectuate the plural values at stake in cultural
production, for two reasons. First, intellectual property law has historically incorporated plural values—from fairness to free speech to the importance of promoting diverse speakers and creators. But these plural
values have increasingly been swallowed up by a single-minded law and
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economic rhetoric focused on eﬃciency alone. In part, my project is to
resurrect these plural values. Even so, my theory is also surely inﬂuenced by new normative visions of equality, development, and human
capability—understandings that have not yet fully inﬂuenced intellectual
property law.
In short, where traditional accounts of intellectual property understand this law as a mere instrument to incentivize eﬃcient production,
this book maps a network of cultural, social, and technological regimes
that are making and remaking intellectual property law in the new century. Indeed, the New York Times writes that conﬂicts around intellectual
property just may well be “the ﬁrst new social movement of the century.”26
Call it the ripping, mixing, and burning of law.

modern man invents himself
Born in India in the 1920s, my grandmother Sita was the youngest of ﬁve
sisters. All of her elder sisters married in their teens; none was educated
beyond secondary school. But by the time my grandmother came of age,
her father saw that her possibilities could be far greater. A visionary in
his own right, my great-grandfather encouraged my grandmother to seek
an education. Sita attended St. Mary’s College in Madras, where she was
elected student body president and became a champion tennis player.
Later, she was accepted to Banaras Hindu University, often called the
“Harvard of India,” where she earned a master’s degree in physics. When
her peers were willingly led into arranged marriages, Sita deﬁed one of
the most entrenched of Indian cultural traditions and married for love.
Later in life, my grandmother, who would eventually become a professor
of physics and mother of six, would quip: “In this dynamic world, one
cannot be static.”
This is a book about intellectual property. But I do not share this
story because my grandmother, a professor of physics, was an inventor
of things—that is, the traditional subject of intellectual property. Rather,
I share it because my grandmother was the inventor of her own life. To
paraphrase Foucault, modern man invents himself.27 My grandmother
was born two decades before Indian Independence, as ideas of freedom,
democracy, and equality were taking root, challenging traditional culture
and customs. While the masses may have believed that culture was composed of ﬁ xed traditions to be passed down, unchanged, from generation

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 21

2/10/12 2:23 PM

22

intr oduc tion

to generation, reformers like my grandmother saw culture as something
invented by individuals themselves. She saw diverse options within Indian
culture and chose for herself the path she would take. In the modern
parlance, she did not take culture as given, but “ripped and mixed” it to
create something new.
Intellectual property is the law of innovation, both in science and in
the arts. But it is not only about authoring books or inventing tools. Intellectual property law is also about authoring our own lives and inventing
our own communities. The capacity to critically engage “given” cultural
norms lies at the heart of social change and freedom itself. This book
functions both as critique and as foundation. It critiques the dominant
modern understanding of intellectual property, a view that portrays innovation as a simple function of monetary reward, and speciﬁes the goal
as the creation of more—more products, more movies, more books—in
an eﬀort to oﬀer a foundation for a broader vision of intellectual property’s
role in society. Intellectual property is the law not only of innovation, but
also of culture, and its change and exchange. An intellectual property law
beﬁtting this new participatory century, then, must lift its gaze beyond the
narrow goal of incentivizing the creation of more intellectual products to
facilitating critical and autonomous participation in the cultural sphere.
Modernity is not simply technology. A modern intellectual property law
must promote our capacity to author our own lives.
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m o r e t h a n a q ua r t er - c en t ur y ago, property scholars interrupted the hegemony of a law and economics discourse focused exclusively on eﬃciency to introduce broader theories about property and social relations. As the New Jersey Supreme Court declared in 1971 in the
historic case of State v. Shack, “[p]roperty rights serve human values.”
Modern property law was to balance plural values beyond eﬃciency to
consider personhood, health, dignity, liberty, equality, and distributive
justice.
In contrast, at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century intellectual property
scholarship remains moored to a singular economic account. In the modern day, intellectual property is understood almost exclusively as being
about incentives.1 Its theory is utilitarian, but with the maximand simply
creative output: law’s goal is to promote the invention of more machines,
from the Blackberry to the iPod, and more intellectual products, from
Mickey Mouse to R2D2. Scholars and legislators struggle to calibrate
the optimal length of copyright and patent terms to promote eﬃcient innovation. Even critiques of the recent expansion of intellectual property
law’s breadth, scope, and duration adopt the same language. Progressive
law and economics scholars argue that too much intellectual property
law can impede innovation, locking up the building blocks necessary for
further innovation.
23
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We did not always understand copyrights, patents, trademarks, and
trade secrets this way. Copyright law emerged out of the Enlightenment
in England in the early eighteenth century, when the granting of limited
rights to authors broke the perpetual monopoly in intellectual works
held by printers, encouraging the creation of new works and their broad
dissemination to a more democratically engaged public. Patent law has always sought to encourage access to knowledge, requiring owners to share
knowledge of their inventions in exchange for limited monopoly rights,
rather than protecting the knowledge as a trade secret. And trademark
law originated in theories of unfair competition and consumer protection, not property law.
But over the last few decades law and economics scholars have reimagined intellectual property law, portraying it as solely an instrumental
mechanism to incentivize creativity (copyright), invention (patents), and
industry (trademarks). Because information is assumed by its nature to
be nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, the concern is that free-riding will
eliminate any incentive to produce information. The insertion of property
rights, the theory goes, incentivizes the production of information, which
will then inure to society’s beneﬁt through the market mechanism, with
those willing and able to pay being permitted to consume the information. Others might free ride, but only where high transaction costs would
make marketplace exchanges unlikely. In short, market failure is cited as
the raison d’être for intellectual property, explaining copyright, patent,
and even trademark.
But intellectual property today is more than simply a tool for incentivizing creative production in the form of more things, from Bratz dolls to
PCs. Intellectual property laws bear considerably on the ability of humankind to ﬂourish, aﬀecting everything from the developing world’s access
to food, textbooks, and essential medicines, to the ability of citizens everywhere to democratically participate in political and cultural discourse, to
the equal opportunity to earn a livelihood from one’s intellectual contributions toward making a better world. Today, the legal regime of intellectual
property has inserted itself more deeply into our lives and more deeply
into the framework of international law.
Despite these real-world changes, intellectual property scholars continue to understand intellectual property solely as a tool to solve an eco-
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nomic “public goods” problem: nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods
such as music and scientiﬁc knowledge will be too easy to copy and
share—thus wiping out any incentive to create them in the ﬁrst place—
unless a monopoly right in the ideas is provided for a limited period of
time. The dominance of this singular, narrow economic discourse has
rarely been challenged.
Yet in case after case today, we see that traditional law and economic
analyses fail to capture fully the struggles at the heart of local and global intellectual property law conﬂicts. In the handful of cases that follow—ranging from high technology to low, from ﬁrst world to third—we will see that
the proponents of that school have failed to persuade the U.S. Supreme
Court, let alone activists in the developing world. Indeed perhaps one of
the most remarkable facts about William Landes’s and Richard Posner’s
seminal text The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, hailed as
“the most important book ever written about intellectual property,” is that
it ﬁnds that much of intellectual property law’s expansion at the end of the
last century cannot be justiﬁed by economic reasoning. They conclude devastatingly that “no public-interest explanation for the evolution of intellectual property law over this period seems plausible.”2 Their book is as much
of a wake-up call for reform of intellectual property law as it is a massive
undertaking to rationalize this law within an economic framework.
But where Posner and Landes would correct the descriptive disconnect
by mooring intellectual property law more ﬁrmly to economic analysis,
I argue that a more multidimensional account of this law is necessary.
Pundits declare that “[i]ntellectual property has come of age,” 3 but it is
increasingly apparent that current intellectual property law is not mature
enough to face the diverse and changing world in which we now live.
I oﬀer three critiques of the narrow intellectual-property-as-incentives
understanding: (1) it fails descriptively as a comprehensive account of
extant legal doctrine, (2) it fails prescriptively as the exclusive basis for
deciding the important intellectual property conﬂicts of the day, and (3)
it fails to capture fully the dynamics of cultural creation and circulation.
One prominent example of the disconnect between intellectual property theory and practice is Eldred v. Ashcroft, the ﬁrst copyright case to
go before the Supreme Court in the new century. At issue in Eldred was
the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
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1998, in which Congress extended the already lengthy copyright term by
another twenty years. The ﬁrst copyright term established in 1790 lasted
fourteen years from the time of publication, with the option to renew for
another fourteen years. In contrast, with the 1998 extension, the copyright
term was extended to last for the life of the author plus seventy years. Thus
today copyright in a work will often last well over a century. Consumer
rights advocates argued that the extension was unconstitutional, violating the U.S. Copyright Clause’s provision that copyrights last “for limited
times,” and that the extension trampled on First Amendment rights to use
cultural works in speech. But the Supreme Court approved the extension
over these objections. Notably, the Court reached this conclusion despite
the objections of illustrious economists, including ﬁve Nobel laureates,
who wrote as amici curiae that “[t]he term extension for existing works
makes no signiﬁcant contribution to an author’s economic incentive to create.”4 The Court upheld the act nonetheless, citing fairness and cultural
restoration explanations.
Economic analysis also did not fare well in the other recent, landmark
copyright case to come before the Court, Metro- Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster.5 In that case, the Court considered whether the makers
of a peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing software could be held secondarily liable for
copyright infringement. Again, the Supreme Court refused an invitation
to rewrite copyright law according to popular law and economic rationales.
Consider the backdrop against which the Court decided the case: a brief
of illustrious law professors and economists—including, in a rare moment of agreement, Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow and Gary Becker—
urged a purely economic approach. In answering whether peer-to-peer
ﬁ le-sharing services such as Grokster should be secondarily liable for
copyright infringement committed by users of its software, amici sought
to make trial courts economic cost accountants, imposing liability on the
basis of whether the intellectual property holder or the alleged secondary infringer is the cheaper enforcer of the intellectual property holder’s
rights. Arrow and company urged that the Court adopt a test inquiring
“whether the indirectly liable party at low cost could have discouraged
the infringing uses, and whether the complaining copyright holder at
low cost could have pursued the direct infringers rather than litigating
on indirect liability theories.” 6
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But where the law and economics scholars argued in favor of imposing liability on Grokster on the basis of eﬃciency, the Supreme Court
chose to impose liability for what it saw as moral wrongdoing. Justice
Souter’s opinion for a unanimous Court adopted the common law approach to fault-based liability, which turns not on cost-beneﬁt analysis
but on the basic principle of fair business practices. The Court ultimately
held that Grokster could be accountable because it had demonstrated a
bad intent to encourage and proﬁt from illicit copying by users. The Court
cited common law precedent, concluding that “[t]here is a deﬁnite tendency to impose greater responsibility upon a defendant whose conduct
was intended to do harm, or was morally wrong.” The Court adopted
an inducement theory that ultimately premised liability on “purposeful,
culpable expression and conduct.” Where an economic approach might
predicate liability on least-cost avoiders or on the eﬀects of infringement
on creators’ incentives—but certainly not on the bad mind of the actors—
the Court focused on moral culpability.
A brief in favor of Grokster written by Harvard law professors would
have simply reaﬃ rmed the prevailing secondary liability approach articulated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. In Sony,
the Court refused to impose secondary liability on the makers of the
VCR, worried that liability would harm the incentives for innovation. That
standard, the Harvard professors argued, “has proven to be an eﬀective
means of balancing the interests of copyright owners with the equally
important need to preserve incentives for technological innovation.”7 The
Harvard brief pressed the Court to conclude that since Grokster’s technology permitted “substantial non-infringing uses,” it should be immune
from secondary liability.
But the Court declined to ground its ruling on either economic theory.
It acknowledged the validity of both economic approaches, recognizing
indirect liability as a practical option when direct enforcement is infeasible
and recognizing the need to limit liability so as to not thwart future innovation. But the Court decided this momentous case on other grounds,
invoking morality and fairness. To be sure, the Court in Grokster ignored
many other cultural values at stake in the case. Lacking a language for
recognizing participatory culture, for example, the Court failed to note
the social beneﬁts of peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing technology, which allows
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individuals to share information widely without paying for server space
or high bandwidth connections. But simply by embracing basic values of
morality and fairness, the Court oﬀers an analysis that suggests that for
all of its uniqueness, intellectual property law is also common law, teeming with plural values including, but not limited to, incentives. Indeed,
a recent article in the Harvard Law Review puts further into question
the centrality of the incentives rationale in copyright law. In the article,
Shyam Balganesh shows that despite copyright’s lip service to incentives,
not a single doctrine in this law actually focuses on the way in which market
incentives inﬂuence creators.8
The problem of overreaching rights is by no means limited to copyright. In the patent ﬁeld there has been uproar over the introduction
of patents on methods for doing business in cyberspace—for example,
Amazon.com’s infamous “One-Click” patent. For decades courts had been
reluctant to recognize patents in “business methods” such as the use
of grocery carts at supermarkets; the natural competitive advantage of
introducing better business methods was considered enough incentive
—a patent, overkill. But in 1998 in the case of State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clearly embraced such patents, opening the ﬂoodgates to businessmethod patents related to e- commerce in particular. These patents are
controversial, because many ﬁnd it hard to justify a twenty-year exclusive
monopoly as necessary to incentivize improvements in means for servicing e-commerce consumers. Yet as recently as 2010 the Supreme Court
aﬃrmed the continued availability of business method patents in Bilski
v. Kappos.10
Another important patent case of the twenty-ﬁrst century, eBay v.
MercExchange, involved the question of whether injunctions should automatically issue in the face of patent infringement.11 The main argument
for automatic injunctions turned on the idea of “patent exceptionalism”;
although injunctions are equitable remedies that generally require careful
weighing of the equities, some argued that this familiar consideration
was not required in patent cases. The Court in eBay rejected this notion,
not merely on grounds of eﬃciency but rather, by acknowledging the
need to take the basic value of fairness into consideration in patent cases.
The Court aﬃrmed that the equitable standards that apply elsewhere in
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the law apply in patent law, too. In short, despite its preeminent position
in legal scholarship, the narrow understanding of intellectual property as
incentives is not, in fact, driving the most important legal decisions in
the ﬁeld.
Meanwhile, rapid-ﬁre technological advances and new forms of creative output, from YouTube and MySpace to the advent of open-source
collaborative networks, garage bands, remix culture, and the World Wide
Web itself, undermine utilitarian intellectual property law’s very premise:
that intellectual property rights are necessary to incentivize creation.12
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature focused on explaining the
existence of “IP without IP”—that is, intellectual production in the absence of intellectual property rights, from the innovation of French chefs
to the creativity of stand-up comedians and fashion houses.13
There are normative concerns as well. The dominant law- andeconomics approach in this ﬁeld would rely on the market to spur creation—but this leads to the appalling conclusion that drugs for baldness
must be more important than drugs for malaria because the former enjoy
a multi-billion- dollar market, while those who need the latter are too
poor to oﬀer much to save their own lives. Understanding intellectual
property as incentive-to-create reduces to the claim that the ability to pay,
as evidenced in the marketplace, should determine the production and
distribution of knowledge and culture. A central feature of this account as
it has taken hold in intellectual property law is its focus on the market as
the vehicle for solving distributional problems. Willingness to pay determines access to the fruits of this information regime. After the property
right is established, the government’s role is limited to protecting that
property right, and to intervening only in cases of further market failures.
A central failure of intellectual property as incentives is its neglect of
distribution. As I have argued, utility in the intellectual property context
is deﬁned simply as the maximization of creative output. The goal then
becomes creating the greatest number of cultural artifacts to be trickled
down to the greatest number of people. The utilitarian approach to intellectual property does not ask: Who makes the goods? Who proﬁts, and
at whose expense? Is high-tech production up in India but without signiﬁcant beneﬁt to women or the poor? Martha Nussbaum describes this
as “the problem of respect for the separate person.” A utilitarian calculus
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that presumes overall welfare in the aggregate “doesn’t tell us where the
top and the bottom are,” Nussbaum observes. “[I]t doesn’t tell us ‘who
has got the money, and whether any of it is mine.’” Analyses based on
the well-being of the aggregate do not confront distinctions between the
developed and developing worlds, the urban and the rural, and women
and men, or among blacks, Asians, Latinos, and whites.
To be sure, this account in legal scholarship diﬀers from the understanding of utilitarianism among moral philosophers and even among
economists themselves. Rather than presuming the goodness of maximizing creative output, utilitarians would begin with individual preferences and build the theory from there. Focusing on individual preferences
would require us to consider impacts on people who have no ability to
pay for intellectual goods. But given that my goal is to reinterpret intellectual property law, I will concentrate my energies on the utilitarianism
expressed by today’s intellectual property scholars.
Before I turn to my cultural critique, it may be useful to review the
existing critical intellectual property landscape. To date, most intellectual property scholars have sought to rationalize intellectual property
law within the framework of economics. Some, let us call them Intellectual Property Originalists, argue that intellectual property was narrowly
construed at the time of the nation’s founding as an instrumental tool,
grudgingly accepted as necessary for incentivizing innovation. They are
Originalists in the sense that they are elaborating their understanding
of the founders’ constitutional mandate in the domain described by the
phrase “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Scholars
such as James Boyle, Mark Lemley, and Larry Lessig read this clause as
limiting copyright and patent to the narrow goal of incentivizing production.14 By conﬁning intellectual property to this goal, they hope to ﬁght its
creeping extension. Boyle and Lessig’s nonproﬁt organization, the Creative
Commons, even oﬀers a Founders’ Copyright—a license for fourteen
years with a one-time option to renew.15
Originalists emphasize an “incentives/access tradeoﬀ ” at the core of
intellectual property law. Intellectual property rights are necessary incentives to promote creative activity, but if they go too far they may impede
access to knowledge. For most critics of intellectual property law today,
these two values—incentives and access—are the two that matter; other
values are typically subsumed by these two broad categories of intellec-
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tual property law’s central values. Questions about productivity implicate
“incentives,” while concerns as diverse as the fair use of copyrighted
materials to the distribution of drugs to the poor are issues of “access.”
In sum, the prevailing vision is an incentive vision. Intellectual property
is to conform to this single purpose. For some, like the Originalists, this
leads to a narrow view of the extent of intellectual property rights. They
worry that broader rights harm downstream production. New innovation
always occurs on the back of older innovation. Thus the focus of contemporary scholars is the length of the copyright or patent term and the scope
of these rights, to be determined entirely on the basis of incentives for
present and future innovation. Others see the incentive theory as justifying broad intellectual property rights. The intellectual property holder of
a broader right can always negotiate with downstream users, at least in
the absence of overwhelming transaction costs, which presumably have
been reduced because of technology. By and large, the ﬁght is over the
proper economic analysis to incentivize production or sometimes more
broadly, as in the work of Landes and Posner, to correct market failure in
information production.16
My goal here is to move intellectual property beyond this struggle.
This is not to say that getting the economics of innovation right is not important. But it is not all that is important in setting the metes and bounds
of intellectual property. The ﬁght over intellectual property should consider values beyond simply the value of incentivizing production. While
many will view this as radical, upsetting the simple elegance of a singleminded legal domain, I am far from the ﬁrst to propose a broader account
of intellectual property. Neil Netanel, Jack Balkin, and David Lange would
have us keep First Amendment values foremost in mind when analyzing
intellectual property conﬂicts. Richard Epstein has argued for intellectual
property scholars to consider more closely this law’s similarities to real
property law. And William Fisher more than a decade ago made the prescient call for reorienting intellectual property law to promote a good life.17
I suggest that intellectual property law must adopt broader social
and cultural analysis. The fundamental failure in the economic story of
intellectual property has to do with information’s role in cultural life and
human ﬂourishing. It is odd that the area of law most closely focused on
Dickens, Rowling, Star Trek, Lost, Gershwin, and Prince is indiﬀerent to
understanding these creative works and their relationship to society, and
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to that part of the academy that seeks to understand these relations. The
disciplines of cultural studies, sociology, science and technology studies,
and development studies oﬀer theories of cultural production and human
ﬂourishing, but their insights have been largely ignored for the elegant
simplicity of the economic narrative.18 In this chapter and throughout this
book, I will try to bring development and cultural theory to bear on local
and global conﬂicts related to intellectual property. Culture is not just a
set of “inputs” necessary for further innovation. Culture is the sphere
in which individuals participate, create, share ideas, and enjoy life with
others. Cultural works engender empathy for the other and foster mutual
understanding. In short, culture plays a critical—and in the Knowledge
Age, an increasingly important—role in promoting freedom in the social,
political, and economic spheres of life. Thus rather than narrowly viewing intellectual property as incentives-for- creation—that is, as merely
economic or technology policy—we must understand intellectual property
as social and cultural policy. Increasingly in the Knowledge Age, intellectual property laws come to bear on giant-sized values, from democracy
and development to freedom and equality.
I want to be careful to avoid falling prey to Hume’s is-ought fallacy.
In the examples that follow, I show the complexity of values that appear to
be at stake in local and global intellectual property conﬂicts, and seek to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the utilitarian intellectual property story
as a descriptive matter. This alone does not tell us what our normative
values should be, yet in discussing these cases, we can begin to see that
the very recognition of the disparate social and cultural eﬀects of our
global intellectual property policy becomes a rallying cry to take these
eﬀects into account.
Before proceeding let me clarify that my critique, which among other
ideas builds on Amartya Sen’s broad conception of development as freedom, does not reject economics. Far from it, it adopts a broad economic
view that recognizes more fully the rich interconnections between economics and culture, and the eﬀect of freedom in the cultural domain on
overall individual well-being.
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from youtube to fandom to remix: working
through culture
The Harry Potter stories have captivated the world, even reviving interest
in reading. Penned by J. K. Rowling, they glorify the exploits of an English boy who is to save humanity and the enchanted world—with a little
help from his friends. In the oﬄine world, Rowling’s multipart series has
come to an end, but the familiar characters of Harry, Ron, Hermione,
and their gang live on in the ether, where young and old recast familiar
people and places from this lore to tell new stories. A thirteen-year-old,
Heather Lawver, began editing an online, real-world version of the ﬁctional Daily Prophet newspaper for the wizarding world in the Harry Potter series. Many girl fans bring Harry’s sidekick, Hermione, to the front
and center of the action in their own stories. In India an author penned
Harry Potter in Kolkata, turning his own street corner into a site of magic.
The book was quickly pulled after Indian lawyers for Rowling and Warner Bros. (producer of the Harry Potter ﬁlms) issued a cease-and-desist
letter to the work’s Indian publisher. Meanwhile, Rowling has abided
literally hundreds of thousands of other fan-ﬁction stories based on her
characters.
Current copyright theory takes a narrow view of fair use. From YouTube videos to fan works to digital mash-ups of music, the dominant
approach of the last quarter century focuses on market failure. Law views
unauthorized imitations of original copyrighted expression—from songs
to characters, settings, and plots—as theft. In the absence of an express
license for use, statutorily authorized fair use is limited to a narrow set
of circumstances where market failure prohibits private bargains from
being struck. A classic case for fair use under this rationale is parody of
the copyrighted work. Consider the case of the rap group 2 Live Crew,
which sought a license from Roy Orbison to lampoon his song “Oh,
Pretty Woman” with the lyrics “bald headed woman” and other insulting
phrases. Not surprisingly, Orbison denied permission. The group 2 Live
Crew went ahead and made their song anyway, and Orbison’s publisher
brought suit. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the rap group’s version
was a fair use because it parodied Orbison’s song. Although there are
many reasons for privileging parody as fair use19 —the First Amendment
comes immediately to mind—many legal scholars have explained the
Court’s rationale in terms of market failure.20 In Posner’s words, “ne-
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gotiating for a parody license” is a “high-transaction- cost negotiation.”
The logic is simple: few are ready to license a right to be made fun of.
Posner contrasts parody, where the copyrighted work is “the target not
the weapon” of the infringing use, with satire, where the copyrighted
work is the weapon, used to make fun of some other thing—society, or
a politician. In the heat of the U.S. presidential election during summer
2008, for example, John McCain used in a campaign ad—without permission—the Frankie Valli song “Can’t Take My Eyes Oﬀ of You” to make fun
of the press’s infatuation with his rival Barack Obama. Few would argue
that the McCain ad is less socially valuable than 2 Live Crew’s spoof. But
under the market failure rationale for fair use, social value is not the key
determinant. As Posner asks, if the copyrighted work is not the butt of
the joke, “why should the owner of the original be reluctant to license the
parody?”21 “Only if the parodist is seeking to ridicule the original work,”
Posner reasons, “is a market transaction infeasible and an involuntary
taking therefore justiﬁable.”22
To be sure, fair use is a ﬂexible doctrine that requires careful weighing of many factors on a case-by- case basis. But by and large, this view
of thinking about fair use as justiﬁed only in instances of market failure
has prevailed in theory and practice, and serves as the current backdrop
against which users nevertheless continue to interact with copyrighted
materials on and oﬀ the Internet, often at their own peril. The fact is, even
though much user-generated content is noncommercial, and consciously
so, it may be illegal under current copyright law and policy, where the
default rule is to get a license. Girls writing themselves into the Potter
stories are “pirates” taking the property of Rowling and Warner Bros.,
unwelcome in copyright law’s fair use “safe harbor.”
In his important book Convergence Culture, Henry Jenkins calls it a
“paradoxical result” where “works that are hostile to the original creators
. . . can be read more explicitly as making critiques of the source material,”
thus “having greater freedom from copyright enforcement than works
that embrace the ideas behind the original work and simply seek to extend
them in new directions.”23 Furthermore, Jenkins laments today’s eﬀects
of a fair-use law developed in a bygone era of unidirectional media, where
professionals created content largely for the static consumption of the
masses. Today’s technology, in contrast, emboldens citizen participation
in cultural works and cultural production like never before. Yet copyright
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fair-use analyses have been slow to recognize the rise of participatory
culture. As Jenkins writes:
Current copyright law simply doesn’t have a category for dealing with amateur creative expression. Where there has been
“public interest” factored into the legal deﬁnition of fair use—
such as the desire to protect the rights of libraries to circulate
books or journalists to quote or academics to cite other researchers—it has been advanced in terms of legitimated
classes of users and not a generalized public right to cultural
participation. Our current notion of fair use is an artifact
of an era when few people had access to the marketplace of
ideas, and those who did fell into certain professional classes.
It surely demands reconsideration as we develop technologies that broaden who may produce and circulate cultural
materials.24
The result? Heather Lawver and other kids who inhabit the Potter universe, developing their own critical reading, writing, and thinking skills
through it, are left in a legal grey zone. Indeed, rather than parody, many
user-created YouTube videos and other fan works shared on the Internet
are better understood as paying homage to the original works and their
creators.
The critique here is twofold: ﬁrst, current visions of fair use driven
by market failure analysis show little understanding of the beneﬁts of
working through culture—that is, playing, learning, and creating through
the cultural objects given to us. Law privileges only a narrow form of
working through culture—parody—not because of its normative beneﬁts,
but because a license for parodies may be diﬃcult. This leaves a host of
socially and culturally worthwhile activities in a legal grey zone. Second,
the narrow market failure analysis of fair use does not acknowledge the
ways in which the culture concept today is radically changing. Increasingly, culture is no longer a static object handed down by cultural authorities. Changing technologies and social mores have made culture more
interactive and participatory. But this paradoxically puts more ordinary
people at risk of committing copyright infringement.
One of the most famous mash-ups of recent years, which I mentioned brieﬂy in the Introduction, oﬀers an illustration. Turning the tables
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on the traditional modalities of cultural production and reception, one
disc jockey known as “Dangermouse” digitally mashed The Beatles’ The
White Album with hip-hop artist Jay-Z’s The Black Album to create The
Grey Album. Dangermouse celebrated his copying, boldly declaring on
his website that his album “uses the full vocal content of Jay-Z’s Black
Album” and that “[e]very kick, snare, and chord is taken from the Beatles
White Album and is in their original recording somewhere.” 25 Despite
its pointedly derivative nature, the album drew critical acclaim. Culling
from the past, DJ Dangermouse created music that Rolling Stone hailed
as “ahead of its time.”
In the hip-hop music world, this modus operandi is not new. Indeed,
Jay-Z had intentionally facilitated mash-ups by releasing an a cappella version of The Black Album. The owners of copyrights in The Beatles catalog,
in contrast, had long resisted licensing these works. Publishing house
EMI, which claims ownership in The White Album, issued a cease-anddesist letter to Dangermouse, to which he quickly complied, removing The
Grey Album from his website. But by then the cat was out of the bag. The
work quickly became a cult hit in underground hip-hop clubs, exchanged
via peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing services and other Internet-based protocols.
On a single day declared “Grey Tuesday,” more than a hundred websites
distributed 100,000 copies of the work, making The Grey Album, “if only
for a day, the #1 release in the country.”26 Grey Tuesday was widely reported
as a coordinated act of civil disobedience against an excessively restrictive
copyright law. Suddenly, the copyright law of the last century appeared
too obedient to traditional cultural, technical, and legal authorities.
Technically, sampling is “a digital process in which pre-recorded
sounds are incorporated into the sonic fabric of a new song.” Socially,
sampling is homage: new creators use the technique to represent themselves historically within a lineage of earlier creators and traditions. The
popular practice of digital sampling in hip-hop and rap exempliﬁes this
approach of working through culture. Sampling reveals its social side in
precisely its reiterations of tradition. Far from simple mimesis, rappers
practice an art that cultural theorists call signiﬁcation: the exercise of
cultural agency within a context of discursive hegemony.27 Individuals
express themselves through critique, comment, or parody of cultural
authorities, all the while seeking to represent themselves within a culture
that had previously overlooked, or even worse, oppressed them. Stated
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diﬀerently, the mash-up is often a form of cultural dissent. The sample
is used to evoke the past and to create a lineage between authors, thus
claiming a place for oneself within a culture’s historical narrative. Sampling signals that an artist is working within a tradition, not without it.
At the same time, as Walter Benjamin has described, the proliferation of
copies contributes to the “shattering of tradition”; it debunks the mythical cult of the original, questioning the very existence of a singular text
or cultural authority. The Age of Mechanical Reproduction is yielding to
the Age of Electronic Participation. To unmask cultural autocracy is to
make way for cultural democracy.
But while private arrangements may sometimes strike in favor of
these new auteurs, the default rules themselves oﬀer little predictability
or comfort for those fan creators who express themselves by inhabiting,
or working through, the canon, without necessarily critiquing or writing
against the original. The current legal regime would either chill such
creative eﬀorts or drive cultural democracy and equality underground.
Hence Jenkins calls for rewriting the law of fair use to cover “legitimate
grassroots, not-for-proﬁt circulation of critical essays and stories that comment on the content of mass media.”28
The economic theory of fair use as market failure in fact has an
underlying cultural theory—even if it is an accidental one. The market
failure approach privileges creative work developed wholly outside popular culture (hailed as “original”) or that goes against culture (understood
as parody, or critique), but it does not recognize activity working through
culture. This view of fair use, and of culture, is too narrow. In contrast,
where Posner would allow a free ride for a “take oﬀ ” on an original copyrighted work, I would emphasize the importance of a “take on” an original
copyrighted work.29
My analysis is both descriptive and prescriptive. The current market
failure approach misrecognizes how individuals actually participate in
culture. I use the phrase “working through culture” to describe what
contemporary cultural theorists from Bourdieu to Foucault to Habermas
recognize about how modern subjects engage the world (I develop this
theory further in Chapter 2). Foucault, for example, describes authorship
not as the search for an original subject, but rather as the quest to “grasp
the subject’s points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of
dependencies” on existing discourses.30 As I show in the next chapter,
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cultural theory elaborates the view that the modern subject is situated
within contemporary discourses, and yet is not fully deﬁned by them.
It is true that, by and large, the Enlightenment understood freedom
and equality as developed in opposition to culture. The Romantic Movement exalted the artist above others as someone who created truth and
meaning for him- or herself, unlike those for whom knowledge came from
religious and cultural authorities from above. Recall this was the ﬁrst time
we saw use of the word “creator” with a little “c”—until then, only God
was endowed with the gift of Creation.31 But the proliferation of authorship alongside cultural rights at the turn of the century has confounded
expectations that Enlightenment would triumph over culture. Increasingly, we now understand that we develop our autonomous selves through
and within a cultural discourse, inhabiting tradition, not just resisting it.
In the next chapter, I elaborate normative arguments for freedom
within culture. These range from liberty to “think for oneself,” to the
use of rational argument to seek equality and liberation from oppressive
culture, to the ethical responsibility to critique unjust traditions.32 There
are still other reasons. According to Habermas, communicative action
is the process through which people form their identities, transmit and
renew cultural knowledge, and achieve mutual understanding.33 I consider, as well, how active participation within the cultural sphere promotes
learning and qualities central to a well-functioning democracy, especially
critical thinking and communal engagement. In short, rather than focusing on market failure and building the theory from there, I argue that we
must ﬁrst recognize the social value of working through culture, from
autobiographical storytelling through YouTube videos; to empowerment
by making oneself the superhero in the story; to satire, homage, and
sharing as ways of connecting with others for mutual understanding.
A libertarian may argue that we may ﬁnd more freedom by exiting restrictive cultures rather than remaining within them. Indeed, this notion
underlies traditional copyright law, which envisions creativity as taking
place either against culture or outside of it. But this traditional binary option of culture (on the terms of the powerful) or freedom (without culture)
is less and less satisfactory today. In the modern world, individuals want
both: they demand freedom, but often within the cultural communities
in which we live and grow.
The law and economic scholar of intellectual property will reply that
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intellectual property law should address not just market failure, but also
incentives. The concern is that a rule broadening fair use will not promote
innovation as well as a rule focused on originality would. The conceit is
that fan ﬁction and mash-ups are copying, not creativity. But this presumes that fans rotely mimic the original. Hundreds of thousands of
entries on fan-ﬁction websites dispel such an idea. They reveal instead
painstaking eﬀorts to develop one’s own voice within existing, often almost overpowering, discursive frameworks. Fan communities help writers in this process of ﬁnding one’s own voice within culture, critiquing
and advising one another to better tell one’s own stories, albeit within a
framework of shared meaning.
Furthermore, the critic will argue that the existing rule promotes
greater expressive diversity than would one that allowed for more working
through culture. But this critique privileges diversity across culture rather
than within it. The familiar idea is that diversity across distinct cultures
allows individuals greater choice among ways of life. But as I have argued
elsewhere, this vision often creates false choices. Rather than choosing to
leave one’s cultural communities, modern individuals prefer to remain
within them, and to exercise choice and reason within those spheres. For
example, many gays do not wish to leave the Boy Scouts of America but
instead hope to be recognized within this association. Women typically
choose not to leave patriarchal religious communities but rather to stay
within and reform them. Thus the value of diversity within cultures begins to come into focus: such diversity allows for greater choice among a
range of options within our normative communities.34
I oﬀer a ﬁnal critique of the traditional economic approach to fan
and user-generated content. The traditional economic approach does not
consider the distribution of the material beneﬁts of this cultural production. Law is content to condemn YouTube videos, mash-ups, and fan ﬁction to a legal grey zone, in which authors of such material create in the
shadow of the threat of lawsuits and dare not commercialize their work.
The Grey Album was critically acclaimed, but DJ Dangermouse could
not earn a single penny from the “pirate” work. While many fan-ﬁction
writers enjoy participating in a noncommercial culture—indeed, they
argue that a nonpropertied space allows for the development of more
experimental creative products and communities—still others may seek,
understandably, to proﬁt from their creations. These distributive concerns

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 39

2/10/12 2:23 PM

40

be yond incentive s

are particularly poignant when we ﬁnd that people from traditionally marginalized communities are producing cultural criticism that is also potentially lucrative. I shall return to these distributive questions in Chapter 3,
“Fair Culture.”

s tories in the cup: participation, me aningful work,
and livelihood
Ethiopia is the birthplace of coﬀee. According to a local legend dating back
to the ninth century, a shepherd boy named Kaldi observed that goats who
ate wild coﬀee berries appeared to “dance” after consuming them. Kaldi,
hungry and tired himself, tried the berries and found himself joining the
dance.35 Today, more than a thousand years later, 1.5 million Ethiopians
earn their livelihood from coﬀee.
But the last decade has proven disastrous for many of these coﬀee
farmers. In 2001 a global oversupply of coﬀee led to a sharp decline in
prices, drastically aﬀecting Ethiopian farmers’ proﬁts and well-being.
Many were left with no money for basic necessities such as food and
schools. The eﬀect on Ethiopian coﬀee farmers from the fall in commodity prices was not, however, inevitable. Ethiopia produces some of
the world’s ﬁnest coﬀees, in particular Harar, Sidamo, and Yirgacheﬀe,
which sell well above commodity coﬀee prices in Western specialty markets. Indeed, the top coﬀee buyer for coﬀee giant Starbucks declared
Ethiopian coﬀee “the world’s best coﬀee.” 36 But the Ethiopian farmers
failed to distinguish their specialty products from the pedestrian coffee purveyed around the world, and their specialty product sold at mere
commodity prices.
In 2005, Getachew Mengistie, the director of Ethiopia’s Intellectual
Property Oﬃce, traveled to the United States, where he discovered a pound
of his country’s Sidamo coﬀee selling at a local Starbucks for a gourmet
price of $26 a pound. He knew that his country’s farmers only received
$1.45 a pound for this specialty coﬀee, and sometimes even $0.75 at the
commodity price. Ethiopia was capturing only 3 to 6 percent of the retail
price, and Mengistie believed that the remaining value did not simply
derive from roasting, distributing, and marketing the coﬀee. Indeed, estimates are that specialty coﬀee should return about 45 percent of the
retail price to the owners of this coﬀee’s high reputation.
Mengistie struck upon a bold plan to try to claim more of the coﬀee’s

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 40

2/10/12 2:23 PM

be yond incentive s

41

value for his countrymen and -women. Ethiopia applied for trademarks
in Harar, Sidamo, and Yirgacheﬀe coﬀees around the world. While most
countries granted the trademarks, there was resistance in the United
States from a formidable foe—Starbucks. The coﬀee retail giant argued
that no other countries were using trademarks to control their coﬀees.
Many countries used “geographic certiﬁcation” marks instead, which ensure that the origin of a coﬀee is not misrepresented. With a geographic
certiﬁcation, for example, coﬀee not grown in Guatemala cannot be sold
as “Guatemalan coﬀee.” In Chapter 6, I discuss the growing use by developing nations of geographical indications such as these as a way to
prevent their products from being copied and mass-produced elsewhere
yet sold under the geographical name. I argue that these legal devices
oﬀer a good way of protecting “poor people’s knowledge” because they
are relatively cheap to acquire, they allow for multiple producers within
a certain region, and they recognize, socially and materially, the cultural
and scientiﬁc contributions of the community.
Ethiopia, however, insisted on trademarks. The legal diﬀerence is signiﬁcant; the country did not simply seek to enjoin counterfeits but instead
sought to control and develop a brand. Ethiopia sought to distinguish its
high- end coﬀees from commodity products, which a geographic certiﬁcation would do, but it also sought to build consumer desire for these
coﬀees. Ethiopia proposed to license these trademarks to Starbucks and
other coﬀee retailers only if they invested in building the brand among
consumers. If Starbucks wanted to market this coﬀee under the Harar,
Sidamo, or Yirgacheﬀe names, it would have to play by Ethiopia’s rules.
After a global consumer campaign led by Oxfam International, Starbucks
relented, withdrawing its opposition to the trademarks and signing the
license agreement.37
After centuries of making coﬀee, Ethiopia recognized that in today’s
global markets much of the retail value of the coﬀee lay in the coﬀee’s
meaning. Indeed, Starbucks trades as much on the social meaning of coffee as its taste. The latte-drinking Starbucks customer pays a premium for
the story in the cup. Starbucks recognizes this, often enhancing the experience with photographs of indigenous coﬀee farmers around the world
and text about their lives on its coﬀee packaging. Consider the evocative
language of a Starbucks ad:
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Sometimes the coﬀee stirs you. A completed sentence ends
with a small black dot, but that’s how epiphanies begin. A coffee bean. A tiny, good thing from the earth. But the best ones
have something special locked inside: an exotic destination, a
spirited conversation, a divine inspiration. We search the world
to ﬁnd those beans and bring them to you.38
Starbucks even decorates some cafes with the bright colors and motifs
found in some developing countries.39
Ethiopia sought to move from being the object of someone else’s
lucrative story to becoming its subject. Its trademark eﬀort signals the
country’s desire to move from being the supplier of mere raw materials to a purveyor of social meaning with real economic value. Ethiopia’s
tactic suggests the next wave in “fair trade” practices. Rather than rely
on a charitable act on the part of the Western enterprise or Western public, developing countries may claim their rights as intellectual property
owners—thereby gaining control over their own reputation and destiny.
It is not commonplace for a developing country to apply for trademarks in foreign lands. Ethiopia worked in conjunction with foreign notfor-proﬁt groups such as Light Years IP and pro bono attorneys at the
Washington-based law ﬁrm of Arnold & Porter. Ethiopia’s campaign for its
trademarks in the United States was championed by Oxfam International,
a group better known for its activities combating hunger worldwide. But
Oxfam saw trademarks for Ethiopian coﬀee as central to that very enterprise. Such a move accords with Amartya Sen’s insight that famine arises
out of the lack of capacity to purchase the food one needs, not from the
absence of food in the local marketplace.40 To combat hunger, one needs
to work on human capabilities to generate income.
A cultural approach to poor people’s knowledge converges with the
traditional economic approach to intellectual property on the following
point: intellectual property rights related to poor people’s knowledge
can provide the incentives needed for the preservation, cultivation, and
exchange of resources and knowledge. Yet the utility in the cultural
approach goes beyond the creation of beneﬁcial products. Anil Gupta,
founder of the Honey Bee Network in India, which helps locate and support innovation among India’s rural poor, explains: “Once this knowledge
becomes a basis for livelihood, conservation, lateral learning and social
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networking, a knowledge society starts emerging.” Developing countries
too seek to ﬂourish as knowledge societies—communities in which all
people have the capacity to participate in the cultivation and progression
of knowledge. Intellectual property ownership makes up a signiﬁcant proportion of the total value of world trade, but rich countries and businesses
have captured most of this. Increasingly, some of the poorest countries
and communities in the world are seeking a greater share of the global
value of their products. As the Ethiopian example shows, this value lies
not in the raw materials themselves, but in how they are marketed, especially to consumers in high- end markets. These consumers seek more
than just a cup of coﬀee. Often they promote and support a set of global
social relations based on recognition of others, shared meaning, and a
conception of fairness.
The uproar about “biopiracy” in the ﬁeld of patented inventions can
be understood along similar lines. Attempts by Western corporations to
patent the Indian staples turmeric, neem, and basmati rice, for example,
drew sharp condemnation in the developing world. Another infamous
case involves the hoodia cactus, a plant native to southern Africa. The San
people of the Kalahari Desert of southern Africa eat this “miracle plant,”
which “tells your brain you are full,” suppressing hunger and thirst during long desert crossings.41 Upon learning of the San’s use from a Dutch
anthropologist, the South African Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial
Research patented the hoodia’s appetite-suppressing element. The patent
was eventually acquired by Pﬁzer, which sought to develop a diet drug to
serve a market potentially worth billions. The central question in many of
these cases is who should claim the value, and how much is their rightful
claim, in these inventions. Even the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) has
acknowledged that yesterday’s answers to these questions are inadequate.
In Scenarios for the Future, a landmark work considering the pressures
that will confront the patent oﬃce in the next quarter-century, the EPO
writes that patent law must now respond to claims from below. “The key
question that emerges,” the report states, is “[a]s new and powerful players
emerge, who has power and authority?” 42
Despite calls to maintain our understanding of intellectual property simply as a utilitarian tool for stimulating creative production, intellectual
property more and more demonstrates a claim on plural values, from
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participation to freedom, equality, mutual recognition, meaningful work,
and development. The intellectual-property- as- incentives approach fails
to account for the wide range of values at stake in global intellectual
production today. Even the well-intentioned critics of maximalist intellectual property cannot address the giant-sized values implicit in current
debates, from democracy to development, purely from within the traditional economic framework. The fundamental value of the intellectualproperty-as-incentives approach is maximizing cultural production. This
narrow theory presumes that maximizing cultural production in the aggregate will lead to the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
We may assess this theory on its own terms—both from a narrow and
from a broader utilitarian analysis. But this is not my project. My goal is
to broaden the descriptive and prescriptive framework for understanding
intellectual property. In so doing, I show that concerns about equality,
social relations, and democracy animate contemporary intellectual property law and eﬀorts to reform it.
But before proceeding, let me repeat: I do not reject the utilitarian account’s central insights in toto; it remains a necessary tool in formulating
intellectual property policy. Neither do I wish to exchange one metanarrative for another. Rather I argue that neither an economic nor a cultural
lens alone provides a complete picture, and I urge intellectual property
scholars to begin to integrate the two and come to recognize that the interrelationship between culture and economics goes well beyond incentives.
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Bespoke Culture

a four - ye ar - old girl jumps up from the couch and starts messing
around behind the television. Her curious father asks, “What are you
doing back there?” The little girl, who was born digital, replies: “I’m looking for the mouse.”1 Culture in the last century was marked by a mouse
named Mickey—a canned product of a powerful media corporation held
tightly under lock and key. Culture in this new century is symbolized
by a very diﬀerent mouse. The new mouse is not a product, but a tool for
participating in the process of making culture oneself.
This chapter considers a principal raison d’être of intellectual property law: culture. The conceit is that intellectual property is a tool for
incentivizing cultural production, from literature to art and science.2 But
thus far scholars of intellectual property have spent far too little time
considering what culture is and how the object of law’s desire, culture, is
itself changing. The dominant law-and- economic theory of intellectual
property law is premised on a thin theory of culture as commodities.
But culture is not just a set of goods; it is a fundamental component of a
good life. In this chapter, I turn to social and cultural theory to elaborate
a richer theory of culture as critical processes of creative engagement and
exchange that promote our humanity.
Intellectual property is one of the most important legal tools for regulating the production and circulation of culture today, from music, art,
45
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and ﬁlm to scientiﬁc knowledge to expressive commercial speech in the
form of trademarks. Yet law misunderstands the very nature of culture
itself. What is perhaps most surprising is that social and cultural theory
are largely absent from scholarly study of the ﬁeld. In fact, culture studies, from anthropology to development economics to philosophy, have
elaborated rich understandings of culture—its processes of production
and circulation, its eﬀects on social and economic life, and its role in
human development.
In this chapter, I turn to these disciplines to contrast three views of
culture that have dominated cultural studies (and inﬂuenced intellectual
property law in turn): culture as tradition, culture as commodity, and culture as participatory community. From the late nineteenth century and for
nearly a century thereafter, both anthropologists and the public at large
understood culture as tradition, that is, as a set of learned customs and
rituals transmitted from generation to generation. Culture as tradition
presumed culture to be ﬁ xed, hierarchical, and unchanging over time.
The rise of mass media during the last century fostered the corresponding emergence of culture as commodity. In Jürgen Habermas’s account,
the turn toward viewing culture as a commodity paradoxically had its
roots in the Enlightenment. In The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, Habermas fascinatingly recounts how the Enlightenment coﬀee
house culture of the late eighteenth century, in which people debated
ideas, literature, and politics, evolved from a culture-producing society to a
culture-consuming one. Mass media grew to serve a growing bourgeoisie
that sought to mix learning and leisure. As Habermas reveals the irony,
over time the consumption of books became the end of Enlightenment,
rather than its means.
At the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century, these two views of culture—as
tradition and as commodity—are being challenged, by both social actors
and scholars in the academy. On the ground, global social movements
fueled by new technologies and political economies are challenging the
conventional “take it or leave it” understanding of culture as either unassailable truth called “tradition,” or as canned commodities poised to
entertain. Whereas people of the last century understood culture as “oﬀ
the rack”—a set of homogeneous goods and beliefs imposed on citizens
by cultural authorities—increasingly people today understand culture
as bespoke, tailored for the wearers themselves. On the Internet, young
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girls publish their own Harry Potter “fan ﬁction” that moves Hermione
Granger from the periphery to the center of the adventure. In India, a
fan renames Harry as Hari, taking the hero’s adventures to the streets of
Kolkata. Muslim youth fashion Islamic superheroes, challenging Marvel’s
and DC Comics’ vision of who is a superhero. Players of the digital game
The Beatles: Rock Band inhabit the world of John, Paul, Ringo, and George,
collaborating and creating the world’s most popular music “all together
now.”3 And on YouTube, hundreds of millions of people have answered the
challenge to “Broadcast Yourself,” making an end-run around traditional
commercial media by connecting directly with millions around the world
on every topic under the sun. Welcome to the age of bespoke culture, aka
DIY (do-it-yourself) or DIWO (do-it-with-others) culture.4
The enhanced ability—and willingness—of ordinary people to challenge cultural authorities, be they mullahs or Hollywood moguls, is notable in its own right. Some of the most popular videos on YouTube, for
example, have been posted by ordinary Muslim men and women around
the world, who use the medium to deﬁne and share their own answers
to the oft-asked question after September 11, 2001: What is a Muslim?
Homemade videos by and of ordinary Muslims around the world—in
their college dormitories; as female police oﬃcers on the streets of Amman, Jordan; as moms debating mullahs in the United Kingdom—and
even simple one-line “Tweets” such as those from the street protests of the
“Arab Spring” of 2011 are a potent part of the content of culture today and
are remaking Muslim identity in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The result is
that traditional cultural authority is eroding as more and more individuals
in the modern world are questioning, debating, and collectively redeﬁning
their cultural communities just as they would their political communities.
Web 2.0 is spurring and reﬂecting a much larger shift in the fabric of
society: we are moving away from imposed cultural identities toward a
conception of cultural identity based on autonomy, reason, and choice.
This is a big claim. Let me clarify that in making it, I do not deny
the existence of participation and dissent within cultures for millennia.
Indeed, we have long understood that the very essence of culture is participation. Culture is fundamentally collective, requiring the participation of
many in making and sustaining shared meaning. Surely, this was true
before the Internet: individuals and communities have always sought to
participate in the cultural universes they love, by doing everything from

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 47

2/10/12 2:23 PM

48

be s po ke c ultur e

singing, dancing, and telling stories together to playing with Star Wars
action ﬁgures, dressing in elaborate DIY character costumes, and attending Star Trek conventions. As my own grandmother’s story illustrates,
culture has never really been a ﬁ xed tradition or static commodity simply
handed down to people to imbibe; individuals have always had a hand in
challenging cultural traditions and inventing new ones. Cultural theorists such as John Fiske have amply demonstrated how even before the
Internet, individuals and disempowered communities reimagined the
mass culture produced on television in active, not passive, ways to better
reﬂect their own lives and desires.
But while this may have always been the case—that culture is always
invented, not discovered—our theories of culture, combined with our law
and technological architectures for producing and consuming culture, have
not always reﬂected or promoted this vision. Indeed, as the culture-astradition and commodity views suggest, for most of the twentieth century,
the dominant scholarly understanding in democratic liberal theory has
been that “culture constrains.” 5 A few select reformers challenge custom, but the masses obey it. As Anthony Appiah reminds us, it has long
been the role of the artist to “disturb us and make us dissatisﬁed with
our habitual life in culture.” 6 But increasingly today, on blogs, YouTube,
Flickr, Twitter, Weibo, and Facebook, we are all artists who, if not literally
making our own news and art, are at least more ready to author our own
lives and to not take the given culture lying down.
To be sure, culture does not represent a sphere of unlimited autonomy
or choice. To the contrary, French theorist Pierre Bourdieu has famously
described culture as a “habitus,” referring to the constraints our social
environment imposes on us. According to Bourdieu, cultural constraints
may more or less determine our lives. But today, there is growing recognition that as cultures modernize and as more and more options are made
available to people through technology, travel, and liberalization, “culture
becomes less . . . habitus . . . and more an arena for conscious choice.”7
Law’s conception of culture matters. If law conceives culture as tradition, or as a ﬁ xed commodity to be handed down primarily to entertain
the masses, it will instantiate traditional or commodity culture. In this
chapter I argue instead that law ought to put its weight behind what I call
a participatory culture. While the beneﬁts of democracy in the political
sphere are well known, scholars have spent far less time considering the
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beneﬁts of participation and debate in the cultural sphere. I turn to social
and cultural theory to elaborate the beneﬁts of active and more widespread
participation in the cultural sphere, which range from promoting learning and the critical thinking skills crucial in a democratic society, to
incentivizing freedom and creativity, to challenging discriminatory cultural traditions and authorities, to promoting economic development and
mutual understanding. Furthermore, I will show that the view of culture
as participatory community is not only more in line with Enlightenment
values than are the tradition and commodity views of culture, but also
better takes into account the changes wrought by the Internet and shifting social expectations at the turn of the century. It is to the elaboration
of this third view of culture as participatory community that I will soon
turn. But ﬁrst we must revisit the conventional understandings of culture,
for these still have a powerful hold on our imaginations today, and are
especially entrenched in intellectual property law.

culture a s tr adition
Scholars credit Edward B. Tylor with the ﬁrst anthropological deﬁnition
of culture, in 1871. Tylor called culture “that complex whole which taken
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”8 Credited with
being ahead of his time, Tylor’s conception of culture found adherents
among anthropologists well into the twentieth century. Bronislaw Malinowski in the early twentieth century deﬁned culture as “inherited artifacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits, and values.”9 Ruth Benedict
wrote of culture as “learned behavior” passed down from generation to
generation.10 Margaret Mead called culture “the whole complex of traditional behavior which has been developed by the human race and is successively learned by each generation.”11 Edward T. Hall wrote in 1966, “[N]o
matter how hard a man tries it is impossible for him to divest himself of
his own culture, for it has penetrated to the roots of his nervous system
and determines how he perceives the world.”12 Émile Durkheim did not
use the word “culture,” but his description of “collective conscience” is
similar in concept: “The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to
average citizens of the society forms a determinate system which has its
own life; one may call it the collective or common view.” 13 These early
theoretical views of culture are consonant with some popular concep-
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tions of culture even today. The most recent Merriam-Webster Dictionary
deﬁnes culture as “the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief,
and behavior that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations.”14 In the culture-as-tradition
view, culture is ancient, ﬁ xed, unitary, and transferable.
But by the late twentieth century the idea of culture as tradition began
to morph considerably, at least in intellectual circles. Postmodern intellectuals began to question large, theoretical concepts such as “nation”
and “culture,” ﬁnding that the reiﬁed conception of culture as a “whole”
made famous by Tylor “obscures a good deal more than it reveals.”15 Postmodernists observed that cultural groups were in fact more internally
diverse—engaged in dialogue with other cultures, and subject to change—
than the culture-as-tradition formulation allowed. Anthropologists like
Renato Rosaldo observed that cultures are marked by fault lines such
as class, race, gender, and sexuality. The postmodernist project was to
highlight the suppressed or repressed voices that metanarratives sought
to hide—that is, to de-reify and unmask culture.
But while postmodernism disintegrated culture, it did not destroy it.
After postmodernism cracked open and fragmented the concepts of nation and culture, new movements in anthropology and “cultural studies”
stepped in to pick up the pieces. Scholars in these disciplines attempted
to navigate a conception of culture that is somewhere between the banks
of culture as a static “thing” and culture as a “ﬁction.” Today, whereas the
dictionary may continue to deﬁne culture as reﬁned traditions learned by
individuals in discrete “cultures,” the specialists who study culture, from
anthropologists to social theorists, shun such a view.
As Cliﬀord Geertz memorably characterized it in his inﬂuential The
Interpretation of Cultures, “the concept of culture . . . is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in
webs of signiﬁcance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs.”
Culture describes the meanings that individuals create in order to make a
home in the world.16 According to this view, culture is made, not found, and
culture-making is an ongoing, dynamic process, not a ﬁnished product
passed down through the ages. In the contemporary view, collective identity
is “a hybrid, often discontinuous inventive process.” 17 Cultural theorists
today reject a notion of culture as natural or given and rotely learned,
instead viewing culture as socially constructed webs of shared meaning.
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culture a s commodit y
Let us examine another powerful view of culture: culture as commodity.
Return to Habermas’s account The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, in which Habermas
tells of the rise of the liberal bourgeois public sphere in late eighteenthand early nineteenth-century Europe during the age of Enlightenment.
There, for the ﬁrst time in history, individuals rejected monarchy and feudal social relations in favor of republicanism. The Enlightenment motto,
articulated by Kant as “Think for Oneself,” extended beyond politics. From
here on, the people would drive not only politics, but also art, philosophy,
and literary meaning. “Public opinion” on this vast range of matters was
formed in what Habermas calls the “public sphere,” places and spaces
where private individuals gathered as citizens to debate publicly the issues
of the day. Salons, coﬀee houses, pamphlets, and journals became sites
of critical-rational debate where public opinion could be freely formed,
and reformed. Habermas’s ideal public sphere has several key features:
individuals are equals, debate takes place on rational terms, and persuasion involves mutual recognition, not coercion. Habermas adopts C. W.
Mills’s formulation for determining what constitutes “public opinion”:
In a public . . . (1) virtually as many people express opinions
as receive them. (2) Public communications are so organized
that there is a chance immediately and eﬀectively to answer
back any opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed by such
discussion (3) readily ﬁnds an outlet in eﬀective action, even
against—if necessary—the prevailing system of authority.
And (4) authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public,
which is thus more or less autonomous in its operation.18
For Habermas, the promise of Enlightenment was not simply its commitment to public access to cultural knowledge in the form of literature,
books, and essays, but also its commitment to truly democratic participation in cultural debates about the meaning of the works themselves.
Simply stated: intellectual works are the means, not the ends, of Enlightenment. In a democratic public sphere, individuals should have more options
than just “yes/no responses” to given works. In Habermas’s view, without
choice and the opportunity for individuals to engage with and debate
given ideas, there would be no diﬀerence between republicanism and
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feudalism. For Habermas, the growth of an autonomous public sphere in
newspapers, journals, reading clubs, Masonic lodges, and coﬀee houses in
eighteenth-century Europe was crucial for maintaining the people’s independence of thought. In an ideal public sphere, thought was not coerced
by power—be it the king or media moguls. The essential characteristic
of the public sphere is its “critical” nature, whereby the public no longer
accepts the authority of the monarch and begins to rationally debate policy
and morals among citizens themselves. Habermas holds that “ideal” discourse occurs where individuals recognize one another as equals, have
equal capacity to engage in discourse, and can speak uncoerced by power.
According to Habermas, to have truly public opinion, there should be the
opportunity for “criticizable validity claims.” 19
But The Structural Transformation tells two tales. The second half
of the book, Habermas’s earliest work and now a foundational text in
discussions of the public sphere, chronicles the decline of this Enlightenment culture of rational debate and its transformation into a culture of
mass media and bourgeoisie commodity consumption in the twentieth
century.20 Habermas recounts an ironic transformation, whereby the Enlightenment ideal of access to knowledge led to the commercialization
of cultural goods for the masses. Two simultaneous developments—the
rise of mass media, and the introduction of the concept of leisure for a
bourgeois middle class—transformed the participatory culture of the
Enlightenment era, when citizens themselves debated and created meaning, into a culture of consumption. “[A]t one time the commercialization
of cultural goods had been the precondition for rational-critical debate,”
but over time this access to cultural goods began, “surreptitiously,” to
become the end and not the means of debate. By the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, we were beginning to see “the replacement of a
reading public that debated critically about matters of culture by the mass
public of culture consumers.”21 Debate itself became a canned commodity
for consumption and for enjoyment as entertainment and leisure, rather
than a political activity of the people. Writes Habermas:
Put bluntly: you had to pay for books, theater, concert, and
museum, but not for the conversation about what you had read,
heard, and seen and what you might completely absorb only
through this conversation. Today the conversation itself is ad-
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ministered. Professional dialogues at the podium, panel discussions, and round table shows—the rational debate of private
people becomes one of the production numbers of the stars in
radio and television, a salable package ready for the box oﬃce.22
The focus on cultural products for mass consumption went hand in
hand with the rise of the concept of leisure23 and with democratization. In
Habermas’s words, “Anyone who owned an encyclopedia was educated.”24
Mass media acquired its power and cultural authority in the name of
making knowledge accessible to the public. Culture as commodity and
as entertainment stimulated mental relaxation rather than the engaged
and critical faculties required for the public use of reason.25 Furthermore,
there was a heightened separation between cultural elites—intellectuals, artists, and big media conglomerates—and the general public. As
Habermas tells it, “the public is split apart into minorities of specialists
who put their reason to use nonpublicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical.”26 Intellectual property
rights such as copyright further protected and entrenched a creative elite.
In short: the public sphere became privatized. Meanwhile, the very core
of democratic society—a critical and innovative citizenry—was dulled.
Culture as commodities bears some resemblance to culture as tradition: again, cultural meanings are produced by a few and imposed on the
many. The irony of commercial “mass” culture is that while culture is
distributed to a mass public, it is produced only by a few. Furthermore,
the ﬂow of culture from mass media to the public is largely unidirectional;
cultural products are presented as ﬁnished products and consumed “as
is.” Habermas adopts C. W. Mills’s distinction between “mass” opinion
and “public” opinion as deﬁned earlier, noting that in a “mass”
1) far fewer people express opinions than receive them. . . .
[as] individuals receive impressions from the mass media;
(2) it is diﬃcult or impossible for the individual to answer
back immediately or with any eﬀect; (3) authorities control
possibilities for any action upon opinions; and (4) the mass
is not autonomous.27
In a commodity culture, Habermas critiques, culture consumers are
“as little a ‘public’ as were those formations of pre-bourgeois society in
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which the ancient opinions were formed, secure in their tradition, and
circulated unpolemically with the eﬀect of ‘laws of opinion.’”28 (Observing
the similarities between commodity culture and traditional culture, the
Brazilian musician and culture minister Gilberto Gil has decried advocates of “absolute [intellectual] property control” as “fundamentalists.”)29
Professional purveyors of culture and media solidify social control, and
more and more the public comes to accept culture as a given. Commodity
culture fails Habermas’s ideal of a public sphere because although mass
media reach a broad public, “they do not fulﬁ ll the requirements of a
public process of rational- critical debate according to the liberal model.
As institutionally authorized opinions, they are always privileged and
achieve no mutual correspondence with the nonorganized mass of the
‘public.’”30 Habermas holds that mass opinion is the result of coercion, not
consensus. Private interests and power drive debates and social change.
In sum, the public sphere is “public” in name alone; once again, culture
functions as imposed tradition.
John Philip Sousa was an inﬂuential early critic of commodity culture. Sousa famously lamented “the menace of mechanical music” when
an improved phonograph was introduced in the early twentieth century.
The American composer argued that mechanical delivery threatened to
strip music of its human soul. “Canned music,”31 he said, would lead to
the death of amateur musicians and even impede the evolution of humans
themselves to the point where “we will not have a vocal cord left.”32 While
no such biological transformation came to pass, the changes in social culture Sousa feared are similar to those documented by Habermas. Sousa
worried that the role of individual creators (now dubbed “amateurs”)
would diminish and be replaced by that of professional entertainers. “[I]t
must be admitted that where families lack time or inclination to acquire
musical technic [sic], and to hear public performances, the best of these
machines supply a certain amount of satisfaction and pleasure,” Sousa
wrote, continuing:33
Under such conditions the tide of amateurism cannot but recede, until there will be left only the mechanical device and the
professional executant. Singing will no longer be a ﬁne accomplishment; vocal exercises, so important a factor in the curriculum of physical culture, will be out of vogue! Then what of
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the national throat? Will it not weaken? What of the national
chest? Will it not shrink?34
Sousa laments the democratic society that loses its voice for lack of exercising it.
Sousa’s critique, while powerful, is also overblown. Let me state at the
outset that I acknowledge far more the beneﬁts of commodiﬁed culture
than Sousa did a century ago. As even the New York Times observed in
an editorial response to Sousa in 1907, Sousa’s tirade against “canned
music” failed to acknowledge the signiﬁcant ways that “the self-playing
piano and the improved phonograph . . . are eﬀective instruments in the
spread of culture.” The Times opined that “[a]ppreciation of the best music
is largely growing through their inﬂuence,” and “they are musically educating the multitude.”35 As Walter Benjamin later observed, mechanical
reproduction or copies demystify the mystique of the original, allowing
more democratic access to knowledge. Mass media also spurred the formation of national consciousness and identity, as Benedict Anderson has
described, because the widespread distribution of common cultural referents helped cement communities of shared knowledge and experience.
There is another important context in which I do not reject wholesale the commodiﬁcation of culture. In Chapter 1, I discussed the recent
turn to intellectual property rights by poor peoples in the developing
world, from the trademarking of Ethiopian specialty coﬀees to the San of
southern Africa claiming patent-like rights in the medicinal properties of
the hoodia cactus. In such contexts, commodiﬁcation can have multiple
beneﬁts, from helping to preserve valuable art and knowledge, to giving
recognition to the world’s diverse authors and inventors, to oﬀering a
vehicle for sharing one’s knowledge and culture with others, to providing
a potentially lucrative means of economic development. As scholars like
Arjun Appadurai and Rosemary Coombe have shown, cultural commodities have social and cultural lives and meanings.
My critique of the commodity view of culture is not Sousa’s—that
commodiﬁcation itself is inherently profane and dehumanizing. Rather,
my critique is of a twentieth-century mentality that began to view cultural
commodities as the ends and not means of Enlightenment. As Habermas showed, the Enlightenment commitment to universalizing access
to knowledge perversely led to a single-minded focus on the production
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of culture for the people, but not by them. Simply stated, and to take just
one example, the production of books took precedence over a culture of
book clubs and similar discussion groups. Driven by this logic, utilitarian intellectual property sought incentives for the production of more
cultural goods, without care for who produced the goods and the terms
under which they could be engaged.
Today, when scholars and practitioners of intellectual property law
advocate for this law to promote “culture,” it is largely this commodity
view of culture. Law protects the incentives of cultural elites, from Apple
to Disney, to produce cultural products for mass consumption. These
cultural producers are praised for educating and entertaining the public;
in turn, current law supports the expectation that the public should passively receive information products. Worse still, when confronted with
revolutionary challenges to traditional and professional cultural authority
at the dawn of the new millennium, we have witnessed new intellectual
property laws that seek to actively maintain the commodity view of culture, giving creators even greater exclusive control over their cultural
products. The recent Digital Millennium Copyright Act, for example,
imposes criminal liabilities for circumventing technological encryptions
on digital content and legally obligates Internet service providers such as
Google to take down copyright-infringing material posted on sites like
YouTube. The market failure rationale for fair use gives maximum value
to incentives for professional creators and minimal value to public participation in making and sharing culture. In short, the utilitarian logic
of intellectual property today, which is focused on incentives to produce
goods, has led to a law that stands fundamentally at odds with the emergent participatory culture.

participatory culture in the t went y- firs t century
At the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the century- old conceptions of
culture as tradition and culture as commodity are being turned on their
head. True to its motto “Broadcast Yourself,” half of YouTube’s nearly 100
million videos are “user-created.”36 A 2007 report by the Organisation for
Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) estimates that over
one-third of all U.S. Internet users have posted content to the Internet and
more than one-half of users under age thirty have produced and shared
original content on the Web, from blogs to videos.37 Web platforms deriv-
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ing content from users are among the most popular and fastest growing in
the world, with YouTube the fourth most popular website behind Yahoo,
MSN, and Google.38 In the music world, bands like Radiohead partner
with iTunes and GarageBand to give fans the musical components to their
songs—known as “stems”—to allow users to rip, mix, and burn their own
tunes. Creators upload their remixes under Creative Commons licenses
to share with others. The participatory culture of new media is converging with old media as well. Now even broadcast television shows invite
audience participation, challenging fans to “create your own superhero,”
or to develop your own storyline to share with a show’s creators and with
other fans on a show’s website. Some 20 million viewers call in to vote for
their favorite talent on American Idol. As Jean Burgess and Joshua Green,
authors of a new study on YouTube, write, “Consumption is no longer
necessarily seen as the end point in an economic chain of production but
as a dynamic site of innovation and growth in itself.”39
Surely the Internet bears witness to the stupidity as well as the wisdom of crowds. An important new book edited by Saul Levmore and
Martha Nussbaum, The Oﬀensive Internet, highlights the prevalence of
sexist and racist harassment in Internet communities, and excruciating
instances of public shaming of young people who may be most vulnerable
to peer pressure and abuse. But the solution to such abuses, as contributors to that book argue, is not to throw out the baby with the bathwater,
but to ask what technological and legal architectures allow for these abuses
to take place, and whether they can continue to be justiﬁed. The goal is
to root out abusive activity that in fact stiﬂes participation, while constructing law and technology that would allow for broader, productive
engagement.
It bears repeating that participatory culture is fueled by more than
technological change. Its roots are undeniably social and political. At its
core is an Enlightenment claim that all men are intellectuals, capable
of thinking for themselves and of making knowledge of the world. The
movement known as “identity politics” in the 1990s grew out of this conceit. Disempowered groups argued that they lacked media power and the
ability to control their own images and identities. Minorities and women
pointed out that they were more often the objects of dominant culture,
rather than allowed to be subjects capable of producing knowledge themselves. The social movement known as “identity politics” sought to en-
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hance recognition of cultural others, namely those who had been written
out of the dominant cultural discourse.
At the turn of the century this social movement converged with a
technological one. The rise of the Internet and digital technology signiﬁcantly enhanced the possibility of democratic inﬂuence over meaningmaking. The Information Age of the late twentieth century has given way
to the Participation Age of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Several features of
the high-technology architecture of the new millennium, from the digital
medium to the Internet, oﬀer the potential for a return to what Habermas calls the “unﬁnished project” of Enlightenment, that is, the promise
of a time when cultural meaning comes from the people themselves.
By disseminating more widely the levers of making cultural meaning,
new technologies—what the legal scholar Michael Froomkin refers to as
“hardware for democracy”40 —assist us as we seek to think for ourselves,
reﬂecting Kant’s aspiration for humankind.
To be sure, obstacles to full participation remain, among them a
continuing digital divide, lack of leisure time, and technical incapacity
(the hardware is still diﬃcult to use for many). Young white men still
dominate the Internet. And traditional media retain strong control and
inﬂuence in new domains, from YouTube to Twitter. But as I will emphasize, the rise of participatory culture is signiﬁcant just in its potential. The
relative ease of commenting on others’ cultural expressions and making
one’s own content destabilizes traditional cultural authorities, making
that authority more transparent and contingent. Moreover, the simple
fact that individuals can more easily participate—even if they ultimately
choose not to—can itself be empowering.
The technological features of participatory culture include:
• Many-to-many interactivity. While traditional media allowed for
either one-to-one interactivity (a phone conversation between two
people) or one-to-many non-interactivity (a broadcast radio or
television program), the Internet allows many people at once to
communicate with many others (described variously as “narrowcasting” or “multicasting”). Given that traditional media tend to
privilege the message of those with access to the few channels of
communication, the democratizing potential of this new communicative power has been well noted, even by the U.S. Supreme
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Court: “Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone
line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages,
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become
a pamphleteer. . . . ‘[T]he content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought.’”41
• Amenability to manipulation and revision. Information stored in
digital form is far easier to manipulate than information in analog form. Cutting and pasting once involved scissors and glue. The
digital medium facilitates the rearranging of text, art, music, and
video, and permits the addition of new elements along the way.
• End-to- end architecture. The architecture of the Internet shifts the
development of culture away from popular media with top-down
control to a system known as “end-to-end architecture.” The current infrastructure of the Internet offers a system in which intelligence is located not in the middle but at the ends—that is, in the
computers of the users themselves. This open architecture facilitates democratic resistance to dominant cultural discourses. As
I argue in Chapters 4 and 6, the digital technologies empower
minorities, girls, women, and the poor who have not been reflected in traditional media to represent themselves and foster
mutual understanding.42
• Digital hardware. Digital video cameras now abound, creating
amateur auteurs. Sony’s latest high-definition video camera,
whose $2,000 price tag makes it an expensive luxury for most
home users, brings even high-quality video imaging within the
reach of some middle-class households. The computer itself, of
course, is the most powerful piece of digital hardware. Its increasing penetration in American households has extended access to
the digital revolution, though a digital divide still persists.
• Authoring software. Consider Apple’s iMovie, or the music software GarageBand, which lets you, depending on your preferences, feel and sound like a rock star or conduct a full orchestra.
Both iMovie and GarageBand come free with the purchase of an
Apple computer. The Web itself comes with authoring software.
Tim Berners-Lee, the Web’s inventor, insisted that Web software
include not just a browser, which would enable one to access con-

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 59

2/10/12 2:23 PM

60

be s po ke c ultur e

tent on others’ computers, but also an editor, which would enable
the user to add her own content.43 “Mod” software, such as Machinima, enables users to not merely watch a movie or play a
videogame, but also to turn the games into film and to “modify”
or “re-skin” existing characters to look like themselves. Increasingly, software will allow our children to insert themselves into
their favorite make-believe worlds. Dollhouses now face virtual
competition.
• Peer-to-peer networks. Technologies of creation require technologies of communication. Peer-to-peer networks give us each a
bullhorn, mercifully without forcing anyone else to listen to what
we have to say. Peer-to-peer services capitalize on the fact that at
any moment most computers exhaust only a small percentage of
their computational power and their network access. Bandwidth
access can be expensive, but peer-to-peer services reduce the need
for the author to purchase large amounts of it by making the file
available for download from a variety of distribution points across
the Internet. Even very large files—typically ones including
video—can be disseminated rapidly using software such as BitTorrent. The more popular a file, the more readily it becomes
available via peer-to-peer services. By sharing computing resources across the Web, each of us becomes more powerful than
we would be standing alone.
• Blogs. Companies such as Google and Moveable Type offer free
software to create Web-based diaries that enable any individual or
group to comment on the issues of the day—or on the issues of
their own lives. They also host such blogs for free. By 2008,
worldwide blogs numbered over 150 million; nearly 350 million
people worldwide were reading blogs.44
• Wikis. Even the task of writing a major encyclopedia of the world
is no longer in the hands of a small group of editors at a major
publishing house. Wikipedia takes advantage of the distribution
of human knowledge by permitting individuals worldwide to
contribute bits and pieces to a large encyclopedia. It is written and
edited “collaboratively by volunteers, allowing most articles to be
changed by anyone with access to the website.”45
• Podcasting and vidcasting. The radio station now faces competition
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from home-brewed talk and music available on the Internet. The
wide distribution of mobile digital music players enables users to
download readily their favorite audiocast and listen to it at their
convenience. Rather than rely on editors at radio stations to determine audio programming, podcasting permits anyone to supply
material, subjecting herself only to the mercy of the audience.
Fast on the heels of podcasting has been vidcasting, in which
individuals—equipped with digital camcorders, editing software,
and a home computer—offer television clips, music videos, political commentary, and amateur video blogging on popular sites
such as YouTube, without requiring the intermediation of large
studio houses.
• Social networking sites. Individuals have found a powerful means
of expressing themselves to a community of their own choosing
through social networking sites such as MySpace, Facebook,
Orkut, and Twitter. In these sites, individuals can initiate the
topics—they can set the agenda. Some might protest that much
of the conversation responds to items in the mass media, from
television to movies to news.46 But it is in this communal conversation that individuals can question, debate, and criticize what
is happening around them. Social networking sites also provide
for a forum for political association. Members of Facebook can
create or join a “group” with a specific goal or purpose and then
initiate or comment on discussion topics. Due to social networking sites, countries such as Egypt have seen increased grassroots
movements by women toward political participation. Facebook’s
“event” feature, for instance, allows individuals to publicize
events, including ones that they are initiating. Because of such
features, authoritarian governments across the world have come
to see Facebook as a threat. When Ahmed Maher Ibrahim used
Facebook to organize a protest against the Egyptian president,
the police beat him—and demanded his Facebook password.47
And while most social-networking sites consist of communities
of “friends,” they are not necessarily parochial. Questions like
“do you like my new haircut” and commands to “see how much
the baby grew today” are “the ephemera that keep . . . people
related to each other.”48
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culture and liber al democr atic theory
My account thus far has been largely descriptive. The question remains:
Why does participatory culture matter? Should we support the rise of participatory culture or seek a return to the logics of cultural production and
consumption that governed the last century? To answer these questions,
we need to turn to theory. Today there is increasing recognition that participatory culture is centrally linked to freedom, equality, democracy, and
development. It is to the elaboration of these connections that I now turn.
I suggest that John Rawls is much less relevant in this context than is
Habermas, or Aristotle as elaborated by Nussbaum. Rawls, who is credited
with elaborating the most important theory of justice in the twentieth
century, focuses on the requirements for structuring a society that betters
the least well-oﬀ. But Rawls’s concern is political institutions, not culture,
and he expressly limits his theory to the political sphere, specifying that
judges, legislators, and citizens should engage in rational debate in the
public sphere over political matters.49 Rawls’s theory of public reason does
not apply to normative communities or commitments—what he calls the
“background culture.”50 Rawls intentionally “leaves untouched all kinds of
doctrines, religious, metaphysical, and moral, with their long traditions
of development and interpretation.”51
My own interest is culture rather than political institutions. For although Rawls takes as a given the “background culture,” this is precisely
the arena of privately created and contested meanings that liberal and
postmodern theories must more critically explore today. In fact, democracy, participation, freedom, and equality are just as important in the
cultural sphere as they are in the political.
In contrast to Rawls, Habermas takes a much broader view of the
“public sphere.” Where Rawls takes the background culture as a given,
and focuses on the creation of public discourse apart from it, Habermas
views the background culture itself—what he calls the “lifeworld”—as
his real subject of interest. In his magnum opus The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas describes the lifeworld as the background culture in which we live and act, including everything from traditions and
communities to language, beliefs, and institutions. While the lifeworld
is usually taken for granted as self- evident or natural, the challenge of
a robust public sphere, says Habermas, is to debate everything openly
and free from coercion, including and especially the lifeworld itself. The
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public sphere becomes corrupted, or in Habermas’s terms “rationalized,”
when power controls the lifeworld, making certain ways of being appear
natural and uncontestable.
Habermas’s lifeworld is not something an individual can exit. The
lifeworld forms us and provides the language and symbols through which
we speak and act. And yet the lifeworld can and must be transformed—
thus, Habermas’s conception here stands in contrast to the view of culture
as tradition that I described earlier. In Habermas’s view, a robust public
sphere frees culture from being ﬁ xed and determined and reveals the
lifeworld as something that individuals create, challenge, and can change
of their own free will. While Rawls leaves the “background culture” untouched, Habermas urges that those very normative commitments and
truths that appear sacrosanct are the ones we should be willing to question
and critically engage with reasoned arguments. Habermas envisions a
culture that “puts itself on trial.”52
Surely, Habermas highlights the instrumental role that culture plays
in liberal democratic society. Habermas credits the eighteenth- century
salons and coﬀee houses of the Enlightenment with creating the spaces
in which citizens could develop their critical faculties and form “public
opinion” by debating the political issues of the day. Signiﬁcantly, here
culture was not only an end of Enlightenment but also its means. The
public use of reason was exercised through the medium of literature
and literary debates. For Habermas, a robust and autonomous public
sphere is constitutive of republican democracy. But in Habermas’s view,
the beneﬁts of ideal communicative action go further, from facilitating
self- development and equal recognition of participants in an inclusive
public sphere, to engendering social solidarity and mutual understanding
among participants.
Michel Foucault, most often understood as a postmodern critic of
liberal theory, at the end of his life penned an important exchange with
Habermas about cultural critique. In that later work, Foucault also advocates critical engagement with the cultures in which we live. The Enlightenment is to be understood not as a speciﬁc age or epoch, Foucault writes,
but as a critical “attitude” toward the present.53 Revisiting Kant’s essay
“What Is Enlightenment?” Foucault concludes that Enlightenment is “the
attitude of modernity,” which he describes as a commitment to engage
in “a permanent critique of our historical era.”54 For Foucault, Enlighten-
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ment is at once “a task and an obligation.”55 The modern individual can
simultaneously revel in the present yet assert the liberty to transgress it
and transﬁgure the world. We must recognize “the limits that are imposed
on us” and then engage in “an experiment with the possibility of going
beyond them,” Foucault writes. The modern individual “simultaneously
respects [her] reality and violates it.” 56 For all their diﬀerences, in this
ﬁnal exchange between them, Habermas and Foucault both rejected the
passive acceptance of culture as tradition in favor of cultural critique.
My praise of participatory culture builds on the insights of these
philosophers. Habermas and Foucault expanded the focus beyond political process, noting how culture constitutes self and society while also
providing the very building blocks for reconstructing the social ediﬁce.
To repeat: we can never leave the lifeworld. But as modern beings we
must be empowered to question and transform it. Indeed, it is precisely
because culture is so inﬂuential in shaping our world and our selves that
individual rights to debate it and participate in its making are imperative.
As Jack Balkin has persuasively argued, we need “democratic culture”
because people must have a say in critiquing and remaking the cultural
forces that shape their lives, just as democratic citizens have a say in shaping the politics that govern us.57 Democratic culture may be even more
important than democratic politics. Balkin explains, “[L]aw and governance are only parts of this world. Culture is an even larger part, and in
some ways it has an even more capacious role in structuring our lives.”58

the benefits of participatory culture
Participatory culture is instrumentally and intrinsically related to promoting freedom, engendering equality, and fostering human and economic
development. I consider here in some more detail particular beneﬁts of
participatory culture in these regards.
Freedom and Equality
Freedom to participate in cultural life stands at the very core of liberty. As
Salman Rushdie has stated, “Those who do not have power over the story
that dominates their lives, power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke
about it, and change it as times change, truly are powerless, because they
cannot think new thoughts.”59
Additionally, there is a liberty interest in engaging cultural works not
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just intellectually but also physically, with one’s whole body. Consider the
human imperative for physical interaction with cultural works by singing, dancing, dressing up, or acting out favorite lines from a ﬁlm. Martha
Nussbaum describes how physically performing in dance or theater can
itself be liberating, particularly for women. She recalls the Indian intellectual Rabindranath Tagore’s emphasis on empowering women through the
arts, particularly dance and drama. “Women were his particular concern,
since he saw that women were typically brought up to be ashamed of their
bodies and unable to move freely, particularly in the presence of men,”
Nussbaum writes. “A lifelong advocate of women’s freedom and equality,
he saw that simply telling girls to move more freely would be unlikely to
overcome years of repression, but giving them precisely choreographed
moves to perform, leaping from here to there, would be a more successful
incentive to freedom.”60
Today, we can witness precisely these types of liberating moves that
simultaneously recode popular culture on YouTube. Beyoncé’s hit song
“Single Ladies (Put a Ring on It)” has inspired hundreds of individuals
to post themselves dancing to the song on YouTube. Although each video
entails fans mimicking the pop star’s moves in the original video, the
individuality of each dancer is unmistakable. Particularly interesting are
the numerous videos of “Single Ladies” by gay men, a phenomenon noted
on the popular television show Glee, which focuses on the tribulations
of high school. Recognizing that young gay men struggle to come out to
their families and peers during high school, one episode featured a gay
football player videotaping himself and two female friends doing their
own rendition of “Single Ladies”—until his father walks in and abruptly
stops the recording. The young man provocatively lip-syncs Beyoncé’s
words, “Acting up . . . I could care less what you think.” He continues, “I
need no permission, did I mention, don’t pay him any attention.”61 In the
hands (and feet) of these men, the song “Single Ladies” is reworked as a
comment both on the possibility of gay marriage and on the performance
of femininity. These videos persist on YouTube, generating literally millions of views, because Beyoncé invited fans to create their own versions
of her hit song. Unlike some artists, Beyoncé seems to embrace participatory culture. She even aired some of the videos during her world tour.
In this example, we can also see how cultural liberty has important
implications for equality. The liberty to contest hegemonic discourses
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has particularly profound possibilities for women and other minorities
who have not traditionally had power over the stories that dominate our
lives.
We have an intuitive understanding for the value of political dissent
in a democratic republic. First Amendment theory views dissent as crucial to autonomy and choice, and as a means for discovering truth. But
what about cultural dissent—that is, the right and ability to disagree with
cultural traditions or norms? Is not cultural autocracy just as constrictive
of freedom and equality, especially as experienced by women, gays, and
others who have suﬀered under oppressive cultural traditions? Theorists
from Bourdieu to Foucault have described the profound ways in which
culture governs human capability—in Nussbaum’s words, what people
“are actually able to do and be.”62 Women may have equal rights on paper,
for example, but cultural norms about women’s roles profoundly inﬂuence
women’s aspirations and opportunities. Misrepresentations and the lack
of representation of gays and lesbians in mainstream media contribute to
their leading closeted lives, at times unable to reveal their identities publically or express themselves. Participatory culture is a means of challenging oppressive cultural constraints that negatively aﬀect both individual
liberty and social status. As Stuart Hall writes, “Popular culture is one of
the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is
engaged. . . . It is partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured.
. . . That is why ‘popular culture’ matters.”63
Intellectual property laws are often implicated in contests over cultural meaning, and particularly in challenges to dominant cultural discourses, because many of the most popular cultural images, which generate far-reaching understandings of gender, race, sexuality, and dominance,
are protected by copyrights and trademarks. The YouTube videos using
Beyoncé’s song may violate her copyright, leaving the participants at the
mercy of her generosity. In 2005, DC Comics demanded that a New York
gallery cease and desist from showing artist Mark Chamberlain’s homoerotic watercolor depictions of Batman and Robin kissing and embracing.
Mattel has ruthlessly gone after individuals and artists who put Barbie in
a compromising and unﬂattering light. While many artists have emerged
victorious in legal battles over their right to rework such popular icons,
their victories have cost millions of dollars in legal fees and have entailed
years of protracted battles. Worse still, many artists and amateur creators
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simply “cease and desist” because they do not have the funds to legally
discern whether theirs is a “fair use” of intellectual property.
Michel de Certeau describes such acts as resistance to cultural hegemony. Individuals engage in everyday resistance to dominant culture by
a process called “bricolage,” which entails making do and tinkering with
the cultural images around us to create subversive meanings. Bricolage
involves “artisan-like inventiveness” by ordinary people; often, the texts
to which people respond are owned by others.64 “Everyday life invents
itself by poaching in countless ways on the property of others,” 65 writes
de Certeau. According to de Certeau, individuals do not receive culture
as ﬁ xed products, but rather “inhabit” cultural texts “like a rented apartment.” The individual “transforms another person’s property into a space
borrowed for a moment by a transient.” Just as “renters make comparable
changes in an apartment they furnish with their acts and memories,”
de Certeau writes, so “do speakers, in the language into which they insert both the messages of their native tongue and, through their accent,
through their own ‘turns of phrase,’ etc., their own history.”66 For de Certeau, the question is not what cultural products are handed down to the
people but what they make of them. His analysis is both descriptive and
prescriptive. Culture is the web of meanings in which we make a home;
it is where we live and the discursive space we “inhabit.” At the same
time, we are actively spinning our own meanings, contesting hegemony
through everyday acts of resistance.
Autonomy and Self-Development
In our examples of Indian women acting and dancing and gay men lipsyncing on YouTube, we can begin to see more clearly how cultural participation is a vehicle of self-development. Simply put: individuals develop
themselves through culture. In one of the most important pieces of American writing on the signiﬁcance of art in human life, Art as Experience,
John Dewey writes that individuality “is realized only in interaction with
surrounding conditions.” 67 Dewey is critical of both the “classical” approach to art, which views art as outside of culture, and the “romantic”
view that searches for that which is fresh and spontaneous.68 Notably,
Dewey describes the creation of the self and of a work of art in nearly
identical terms. Both are the creation of what Dewey calls “intercourse”
between the self and society. “[T]he self is both formed and brought to
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consciousness through interaction with the environment,” and it is the
result of such intercourse that we call a “work of art.”69 Self-cultivation,
like art, is work—something actively made, not discovered. Both arise
only from sustained interaction with one’s cultural surroundings.
A “School of Political Participation”
John Stuart Mill described local government as a “school of political participation and skill.” 70 Similarly, today we are recognizing the ways in
which cultural participation serves as an arena for developing engaged
and active political citizens among the young and old. The election of
President Barack Obama in 2008 was spurred by an enormous surge in
cultural creativity shared on the Internet, from Will.i.am’s “Yes We Can”
video to Shephard Fairey’s now iconic street art ripped and mixed from
a digital photo. More profoundly, the surge in cultural participation by
ordinary Americans, especially youth, illustrated how democratic cultural
participation can bring about broad cultural change.
The relationship between cultural participation and political democracy goes further still. We often hear that the goal of intellectual property
is to foster innovation. Yet innovation ought not simply mean the production of more technical goods. The essence of innovation is critical thinking.
Participation rather than passive reception in the production of culture
and science enables a democratic citizenry ready to question convention
and to seek novel answers to problems, old and new.
Children, too, develop themselves as future democratic citizens by
actively sharing, debating, critiquing, and re-creating copyrighted and
trademarked literary works. The central characters in Harry Potter are
themselves role models for democratic citizenship: they question authority, confront evil, and defend the rights of the weak. (In contrast, the
benighted “Muggle” family that raises Harry, his aunt and uncle the
Dursleys, lives by the motto “Don’t Ask Questions.”71) The rise of participatory groups around the Potter series enables readers to go even further,
acting out these values themselves in the real world around them. I have
already mentioned Heather Lawver’s The Daily Prophet, the fan-created
virtual newspaper for the ﬁctional wizarding world of Harry Potter. This
online newspaper was written and edited by hundreds of children from
around the world. The stories they penned do not simply mimic the original Potter stories but take them further, making the case for the rights
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of Muggles and house elves, and illustrating by example that children
should make themselves aware of current events and the news of the day.
We need to ask: Is children’s time best spent in front of a computer?
Should children not be outdoors, running and playing? In other words,
critical thinking may be developed by new and enhanced forms of online cultural participation, but what is lost? Will we replace parks with
computer labs, or relationships with our neighbors and classmates with
virtual friendships and online communities? I reply that multiple forms
of engagement—local and global, real world and virtual—are important
for developing ourselves as individuals and as citizens. Cultural engagement with mass media, in particular, is an important tool for developing
critical faculties—participatory culture online can teach children to critically assess and reconstruct information rather than passively receive it.
Furthermore, cultural texts can serve as vehicles for questioning or
critiquing something in the real world. The Harry Potter Alliance is another real-world extension of the ﬁctional Potter universe that illustrates
this phenomenon. Through the Alliance children are coming together
to form an army of young citizens dedicated to upholding the Potter
books’ values of being kind, having the courage to question authority and
cultural norms, and ﬁghting for justice in the real world. The Alliance
website describes itself as “dedicated to using the examples of Harry Potter and Albus Dumbledore to spread love and ﬁght the Dark Arts in the
real world,” imploring, “Please join us in creating the real Dumbledore’s
Army.” 72 Protesting the banning of books (including the Potter books),
one member asks “everyone to stand up against the Dolores Umbridges
of the world,” making reference to the narrow-minded teacher in the
Potter lore. Young members of the Alliance are challenged to “think of a
banned book that you’ve read that means a lot to you . . . [and then] leave
a short blog post explaining what that book is and what it means to you.”73
The Alliance post concludes: “Let’s prove Hermione right by continuing
to read books that deal with big ideas and hard issues, despite those who
would try to keep them oﬀ our shelves and out of our heads.”74
Henry Jenkins describes a partnering between the Harry Potter Alliance and a citizen watchdog group critical of Walmart.75 Young members
of the Alliance made campy videos casting themselves in the familiar
roles of Harry, Ron, and Hermione, but here they are battling the Lord
Waldemart, who nefariously underpays employees and runs smaller
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businesses into the ground. We can witness similar play that engenders
democratic engagement in the multiplayer online gaming worlds, where
children in middle school run for elected oﬃce and edit the newspapers
of their online communities.
The increased transparency of knowledge production gives youth
a healthy skepticism of truth claims, and helps them ﬁ lter fact from
ﬁction—critical skills necessary in a democracy. Furthermore, Jenkins
argues that simply having the capacity to participate and eﬀect change
empowers youth, regardless of whether they actually participate or not.
“Even if many of them have chosen not to participate,” concludes Jenkins,
“they understand their place in the media ecology diﬀerently because they
know how easy it is to contribute content.”76
This important point—that simply having the capacity to have a say in
political aﬀairs empowers individuals to make their voices heard—applies
equally well to children and adults. Today even if individuals are not blogging, they may still be more likely to produce some political content—even
if that simply means posting comments on citizen blogs and traditional
media sources, which increasingly invite and air emailed questions and
“Tweets.” At this juncture, actual participation by the masses may be less
signiﬁcant than the widespread knowledge of the potential to contribute,
which may be empowering enough and threatening to traditional cultural
and political authority.
Participatory culture aﬀects democratic citizenship in a number of
other ways as well. Participation greatly enhances the sheer amount of information available to citizens as they critically assess their governments
and societies. I am far from the ﬁrst to observe that Wikipedia harnesses
the wisdom of crowds. This people’s encyclopedia collects the knowledge
of many diverse peoples rather than simply the knowledge of a few homogenous cultural elites. Today there is more knowledge in circulation
than ever before, and even better, it is free and readily available at one’s
ﬁngertips on mobile devices as well as desktop computers. The immediate
accessibility of information, with the enhanced ability to search for more
information (revolutionized through Google Books), and then ﬁnally the
ability to modify the information itself, democratizes access to knowledge
in terms of both consumption and production.
To be sure, enlightened public debates about issues from climate
change to health care reform mandate deeper knowledge and study than
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cursory online encyclopedia entries allow. And there are real concerns
that Wikipedia spreads inaccuracies and is dominated by white males.
But these critiques apply equally to traditional media.
Perhaps more fundamentally, participatory culture demystiﬁes knowledge itself. Wikipedia’s transparency—illuminating who added or modiﬁed
what information—reveals knowledge production as the result of human
agency exercised here and now, not something static, given, or natural.
Publicly airing dissent and the plurality of opinion also delegitimizes
authorities, whose claims to represent the will of the people may be revealed as false. Ultimately, the challenge to traditional authorities may
be profound; as Hannah Arendt notes, a “loss of authority” precedes all
revolutions.77
There is an ethical component to fostering critical thinking within
cultural spheres. As Amartya Sen has written, “To see identity as merely a
matter of discovery can not only be a conceptual confusion. It can also lead
to a dereliction of duty by thinking human beings.”78 Passive acceptance
of cultural authority or tradition feeds autocracy and inequality. Cultural
critique, in contrast, is in Foucault’s words “a task and an obligation” of
democratic citizens.79
Learning Through Play
The very ﬁrst copyright law, the Statute of Anne enacted in England in
1710, was described as “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning.” Born
during the Enlightenment, copyright has always been a critical tool for
facilitating learning. Today, we largely focus on the learning that accrues
from accessing copyrighted works created by others. Yet in the ﬁelds of
education and human development, nearly a century of clinical studies
and theory have elaborated how children learn not by imbibing knowledge from the top down, but by actively working through the cultural
discourses that surround them through “pretend play.”80 Role-playing is
not just a descriptive term for how children learn; studies document that
it is a normatively beneﬁcial way of learning, and one that schools have
increasingly adopted and encouraged. Elaborating on the world around us,
children mime to learn social roles and yet also take creative liberties that
test established expectations. Culture for children is a sphere not only of
entertainment and enjoyment but also of experimentation and innovation.
When my daughter was six, rather than restrict her schoolyard play
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to house, fairies, or princess games (the dominant culture sold to young
American girls), she took on the roles of knights and star warriors. My
son at four pretended he was a boy version of Mei, an inquisitive fouryear- old girl in the ﬁ lm My Neighbor Totoro. Even such simple pretend
play that challenges gender stereotypes, studies show, has beneﬁts, from
disrupting dominant discourses about gender roles (a girl can be a knight)
to engendering sympathy for the other (a boy sees the world through the
eyes of a four-year-old girl). Indeed, a worldwide phenomenon for adults
celebrating these same principles, called cosplay (short for “costume role
play”), has spread from Japan to other parts of the globe. In cosplay, individuals develop and wear elaborate costumes mimicking their favorite
anime or manga characters. Within the game gender-switching called
“crossplay” is common as a vehicle for gaining greater understanding of
the other and of challenging traditional gender roles.
Recent studies show other beneﬁts of role-playing include helping
children to negotiate conﬂ ict and develop language and collaborative
skills.81 Perhaps most importantly in our diverse and increasingly interconnected world, physically and emotionally inhabiting the role of the
other helps children learn empathy, as they contemplate what it may be
like to walk in another’s shoes.82
To be sure, child’s play at recess or at home does not threaten copyright holders. The children’s work is not “ﬁ xed” or recorded—thus it does
not even constitute a “copy” under law. But the new online worlds of fan
ﬁction, interactive gaming, and videotaping for widespread distribution
on platforms such as MySpace and YouTube threaten copyright owners
unlike in the past, as the quality of children’s creations—and the reach of
their work—are signiﬁcantly enhanced through technology. Consider, for
example, what happens when yesterday’s most interactive toy—Legos—
combines with digital technology and the Internet. For seventy years,
the Danish company Lego, which literally means “play well” in Danish,
has been making interlocking plastic bricks and components for creative
young minds to build whatever they imagine. In 2007, then-fourteenyear-old Coleman Hickey ﬁlmed a short video starring his Lego ﬁgurines
performing “Tonight I’m Gonna Rock You Tonight” from the album to
Spinal Tap (the ﬁlm, a spoof documentary of a rock band, is a cult classic
from the early 1980s). Hickey posted the video on YouTube and received
an overwhelming response, with over 80,000 hits. But his success did

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 72

2/10/12 2:23 PM

b es p o k e cult ure

73

not end there. The band Spinal Tap itself began showing the video to
audiences during its recent concert tour—that is, until the Lego company
objected, claiming copyright ownership in the Lego images in the clip.
Spinal Tap reluctantly agreed to stop showing the video.
For its part, the Lego company, which has seen a signiﬁcant resurgence in popularity,83 claimed it objected to the video because its depiction of the rock stars was inappropriate for most Lego users, who mostly
range in age from six to twelve.84 Yet Lego has allowed numerous other
questionable fan-made videos posted on YouTube. One stop-action video,
“Lego Weapon Store,” opens with the main character entering a (Lego)
weapon store stating, “I’d like to buy a weapon to kill my neighbor.” The
store features numerous tiny weapons that Lego actually sells to kids,
from pickaxes to chainsaws, small pistols, and dynamite.85 “Lego Weapons
Store” has been viewed by over two million people. And in a parody video
of the “Girls Gone Wild” video series, called “Legos Gone Wild,” the narrator invites hundreds of thousands of viewers on YouTube to watch as “the
hottest chicks in town ‘Lego’ their inhibitions”—the video features female
Lego characters exposing themselves.86 On YouTube, Legos even have sex.
Thus far, Lego has not objected to these videos, regarding them
as noncommercial use.87 To the extent that individuals are not making
money using Lego’s copyrighted characters, the company has continued
to uphold the value of interactivity on which it has been built. Indeed,
corporate copyright objecting to interactivity may soon be a thing of the
past. Lego itself unrolled an online interactive version called Lego Universe in 2010.
There is a ﬁnal point about learning by doing or playing with copyrighted works. Individuals learn and master skills by copying and putting
themselves in the shoes of masters, from musical greats to literary giants
and star scientists. A new interactive video game, The Beatles: Rock Band,
hailed by the New York Times as potentially “the most important video
game yet made,” 88 is premised on this insight. The game allows users
to “come together” with John, Paul, George, and Ringo, jamming and
creating songs. Learning is a key goal of the game. As Paul McCartney
acknowledges, even great musicians hone their skills through imitation.89
Just as McCartney emulated “Buddy Holly, Little Richard, Jerry Lee Lewis,
Elvis,” so too will tomorrow’s musicians learn by miming The Beatles
and other rock bands.90
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Greater Sociability and Sharing
Cultural activity cements social solidarity and community in much the
same way that social scientist Robert Putnam argues that civic engagement in activities like bowling does. Dancing, singing, story-sharing,
and acting are often group activities, as are fan-related activities such as
cosplay and fan ﬁction. To repeat: shared meaning is what makes culture
tick.
Mutual Understanding
For Habermas, there is a moral component to discourse, because public deliberation requires “mutual recognition” of others as equal participants to the dialogue.91 Communication requires recognizing and understanding the other. As Antje Gimmler writes, much of the interactive and
participatory culture of Web 2.0 is built on an implicit understanding of
Habermas’s discourse ethics. YouTube, he observes, is primarily about
“sharing” and “social connections, not high quality commercial content.”92
The jury is still out on whether YouTube will fulﬁll Habermas’s rigorous
standards for an ideal public sphere in which dialogue involves “genuine
negotiation of complexity and diﬀerence.”93 Burgess and Green optimistically opine that YouTube “is an enabler of encounters with cultural differences and the development of political ‘listening’ across belief systems
and identities.”94 Tweets and blog posts by Iranian protesters during that
country’s mass protests in the summer of 2009 oﬀer an example. The
moving images posted on YouTube of the death of the youthful Iranian
woman Neda Agha-Solten, who was tragically murdered by authorities as
she peacefully protested for democracy and human rights in her country,
awakened the world to the courageous quest of millions of Iranians. The
rapid and spontaneous accumulation of ﬁnancial support for victims of
the Haiti earthquake, elicited in part by the dissemination of pictures and
video of the aftermath, may be another recent variation on the theme of
digitally facilitated empathic feeling. Long ago, Dewey observed that “the
art characteristic of a civilization is the means for entering sympathetically into the deepest elements in the experience of remote and foreign
civilizations.”95 Today, ordinary citizens are artist-ambassadors and their
videos and Tweets are documentaries.
I have already described the important role that art plays in cultivating children’s creativity, collaborative skills, and empathy for others. In
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adulthood, these same skills and emotions continue to be engendered
through participation in the arts. David Winnicott has argued that art is
the sphere in which childhood play is extended into adulthood. Martha
Nussbaum describes the arts as a crucial sphere for recognizing the humanity in others because the arts aﬀord a rare opportunity to feel emotion
and contemplate the other as human. In his classic treatment on the role
of art in social life, Art as Experience, John Dewey concluded that “art is
the most eﬀective mode of communication that exists.”96
Nostalgia and Remembering
Milan Kundera writes: “Remembering our past, carrying it around with
us always, may be the necessary requirement for maintaining, as they say,
the wholeness of the self.”97 Just as culture can connect disparate peoples
from across the globe, it also facilitates connections across generations
and connections between past and present. A simple song, ﬁ lm, or story
can immediately evoke nostalgia, triggering memories and perhaps even
a reconsideration of one’s youth. Burgess and Green observe that YouTube
has become an “accidental archive” of cultural memories. People “spend
hours at a time watching old music videos, half-forgotten TV commercials,
or clips from Sesame Street—recapturing memories from their childhood or young adulthood.” 98 These cultural artifacts are historical and
yet also elicit personal, emotional responses among listeners and viewers.
And again, intellectual property often becomes implicated as individuals
seek to tell and broadcast their own personal histories told through the
brands, characters, music, and ﬁlms owned by corporations. Copyrighted
songs often form the soundtrack to individual video-biographies. Cultural
works can become the basis of memories in other ways as well. The ﬁrst
generation of youths to read and fall in love with Harry Potter has grown
up. Now in college, they maintain their connection to the stories of their
youth by forming real-life “Quidditch” teams, with tournaments to boot.
“I associate ‘Harry Potter’ with my childhood,” says one senior at Northwestern.99 For these young adults, the games are a way to feel secure and
to stay connected with their past.
Economic Development
President Obama’s mother, the late Ann Dunham Soetoro, spent much
of her life living and working with poor communities in Indonesia. An
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anthropologist by training, Ms. Soetoro observed that far from evincing
wholly diﬀerent mores and a way of life, the villagers and craftspeople
with whom she lived and worked had ambitions and lifestyles similar
to those in the United States. Their heartfelt desire was to participate
actively in culture and commerce. Inventiveness in rural Indonesia was
“in plentiful supply,” she observed—indeed, crafts and trade were their
tradition—and these innovators were also “keenly interested in proﬁts.”100
The anthropologist in Ms. Soetoro sought to show that studying a diﬀerent
culture can ultimately help illuminate the common human aspirations
that bind us all. Her work reveals a common desire for recognition as a
creator of the world, and for fair remuneration in global markets. In the
next chapter, I elaborate on the connections between culture and development created by democratic participation in making culture.

critiques of participatory culture
Some scholars have objected to the idea that intellectual property law
should support individuals’ participation in the development of their culture. Their arguments generally fall into the following categories.
Law Should Promote Originality, Not Mimesis
There is a powerful critique of participatory culture: if we do not allow
people to play in other people’s worlds, perhaps they will create their own
worlds. And should we not be especially concerned when individuals,
and perhaps especially children, are mimicking the dominant culture,
which often exhibits sexism, racism, and class hierarchies? Lego has itself
come under scrutiny for its recent adoption of play sets with commercial
themes featuring, for example, Star Wars, Indiana Jones, and yes—Harry
Potter. As one observer worries, “When you have a less structured, less
themed set, kids have the ability to start from scratch. When you have kids
playing out Indiana Jones, they’re playing out Hollywood’s imagination,
not their own.”101 More to the point: Do we want children to emulate the
popular culture with which they are bombarded? Superman and Batman
are hyper-masculine, praised for their might and not prone to expressing
their feelings. Female characters are no better; from Tinkerbell to Snow
White they set up unattainable and misguided standards of perfection
for girls, from physical appearance to their accommodating qualities.
Does the emulation of popular culture in pretend play simply encourage
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the next generation to mimic and replay the unfortunate traditions of
the past?
These are important concerns, but my approach neither rejects originality nor condones inequality. Instead, I argue that a closer look at participatory cultural communities, such as the elaborate cosplay and fan-ﬁction
communities among adults, reveals that participants subvert given texts
in radical ways. In Chapter 5, I describe some of the ways that fan ﬁction
often contests the hierarchical norms of the original—centering the girl,
for example, or making gay relationships more explicit. As mentioned
earlier, in cosplay gender switching is not unusual, with women playing
male roles and vice versa (a feature dubbed “crossplay”). This is also true
in the context of children’s play. Studies show that children learn creativity and divergent thinking through pretend play that emulates their existing worlds, as children extend the original stories in new directions.102
Furthermore, we have seen that even strict mimesis can have positive
eﬀects; the struggle to re-create the work teaches the individual the skills
she needs to perhaps create her own original work in the future. But play,
too, especially for children, must be properly supervised and directed. The
essence of the participatory culture I advocate is critical engagement in
contrast to passive reception.
Participatory Culture Breeds Factionalism and Narcissism
Habermas himself has observed that the “Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and readers.”103 But
he has worried publicly about the loss of shared meaning that may result
when the mass media culture of the last century is fractured into millions of individualized channels and blogs. Is “bespoke culture” culture
at all? More recently the legal scholar Cass Sunstein has argued that a
beneﬁt of mass media is that it served as a common reference point for
a broad swath of people. Mass media may have been imposing, but its
dominance led to the creation of cohesive nation-states with common
memories and shared values. Sunstein fears that the proliferation of chat
rooms and social networks dedicated to narrow interests of relatively homogeneous groups—from Star Trek fans to Sarah Palin foes—will lead to
cultural fragmentation. Sunstein worries that dissent may decrease on the
Internet, as individuals tune away from the “Daily Us” to the “Daily Me”—
social networks that reinforce our views rather than challenge them.104
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A related critique is that a world of iP (culture as a community that
individuals make together) and MySpace is narcissistic. Posters on YouTube are self-aggrandizing and seek glory, not mutual understanding.
Again, the idea is that individualism is trumping community.
But as I have shown, what is most signiﬁcant about cultural production today is that new creators are not leaving the community of others, but rather, they increasingly seek to participate in the collaborative
project of making our culture together. Minorities and gays are inserting
themselves into a popular culture that would otherwise either ignore
or debase them—as with the gay Batman and Robin, or an empowered
girl ﬁ gure in a story where the original hero is a boy. In Chapter 4, I
consider one of the most important cultural rewritings of our day—the
African American author Alice Randall’s revision of Margaret Mitchell’s
classic Gone with the Wind in the unauthorized parody The Wind Done
Gone, which is told from the perspective of a black slave girl during the
Civil War period. Rewriting iconic cultural works with themselves front
and center is a radical tool for historically disadvantaged minorities, who
have thus far been denied this subjectivity. As Anupam Chander points
out, for many minorities, Sunstein’s idealized “Daily Us” is the “Daily
Them.” 105 Claims by girls and minorities to retell popular stories from
their perspectives are not a rejection of shared culture, but a call for the
“Daily Us” to better reﬂect who we really are.
Participatory Culture Threatens Professional Creators
In the face of the challenge of participatory culture, some scholars argue
that law must be ﬁrst and foremost a tool for incentivizing the work of
professional creators. Behind Andrew Keen’s lament in The Cult of the
Amateur is the fear that while “intoxicated by the ideal of democratization”
we will kill “professional mainstream media.” 106 The legal scholar Rob
Merges has similarly expressed concern “that an over- emphasis on the
conditions of participation may signiﬁcantly worsen the conditions for
original creativity.” He concludes that “IP policy has as one of its central
functions to attend to the care and feeding of creators of original works.”107
Keen and Merges are coming from diﬀerent places. Keen is not a fan
of participatory culture, which he decries as inferior and shameless.108 But
current copyright law is not, in fact, focused on promoting only “quality” content or professional creators, as Keen would suggest. The infer-
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ence of the law’s relatively low bar on “originality” and the lack of any
rigorous registration process, for example, suggest the opposite—that
nearly anyone can be a legally recognized creator. Even if we concede that
quality matters, copyright law implicates more than the production of
more and better things. Copyright law plays a central role in facilitating
learning (not only from books but through active and critical engagement with them), democratic citizenship, freedom, equality, and mutual
understanding.
In contrast to Keen, Merges has much more sympathy for participatory culture—indeed, he would likely concede many of the beneﬁts I
have described here. But he feels that “IP policy has a special obligation
to promote and encourage professional creatives,” without whose eﬀorts,
Merges argues, “our collective culture would suﬀer enormously.”109 I am
sympathetic to the claims of professional creators—indeed, in subsequent
chapters, I argue that many people who have not traditionally been considered authors ought to be recognized and rewarded for their cultural
contributions. I agree that intellectual property law ought to contend
with issues of livelihood, fairness, and incentives to participate in creating our culture. But I do not believe that incentives to participate in cultural production should be our only concern. I have shown in Chapter 1
how an increasingly exclusive focus on incentives and market failure has
made fair-use analysis narrow. Furthermore, as I have just argued, it is
simply not the case that current copyright doctrine is structured to favor
professionals over amateurs, as the low bar on originality and the ease of
obtaining a copyright suggest.
There is another important point. Merges seems to presume that the
“creative professionals” are more deserving of protection than others because their creations are “original” while those of remixers are derivative.
But characterizations of romantic authorship are often overblown; such
distinctions often overlook the extent to which all creativity is derivative.
I examine these issues in more detail in Chapter 6, where I focus on
cultural sharing—and stealing—between Hollywood and Bollywood.
We Do Not Need Law to Promote Participatory Culture
Some suggest that while participatory culture is important, we may not
need law to promote it. These observers are optimistic that markets will
facilitate such participation, oﬀering enhanced tools for users to make
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culture themselves if this is indeed what the public demands. Moreover,
they argue that even where copyright owners have rights to exclude the
public from using their works, high enforcement costs will mean that
many users will be able to make use of others’ copyrights without either
permission or payment. Scholars thus seek to justify the current distribution of entitlements favoring professional creators using a range of
arguments, from incentives to Lockean labor theory.
But we could argue that law should put its weight on the side of those
who would dissent from cultural authorities, or those who seek greater
autonomy to play and share in cultural communities, in order to actively
balance competing claims and interests. Cultural authorities already have
the force of tradition and market power supporting them; legal authority
to suppress dilution and change may be overkill. Just as the First Amendment recognizes the importance of political dissent, intellectual property
law should acknowledge the importance of cultural dissent.
Notably, recognizing the value of freedom and participation within
culture need not require wholesale rewriting of the law. The statutory
fair-use provision of U.S. Copyright Law, for example, expressly privileges “comment” and not just parody or critique. But as I argued in the
last chapter, the statute has been narrowly interpreted in recent decades
to promote a singular economic vision of fair use as market failure. In
fact, fair-use law, with its required balancing of numerous factors and
express concerns for transformative uses of copyrighted material, can
accommodate uses that critically engage copyrighted works and put the
original works to new educational purposes and expressive uses. Broader
social and cultural theories that recognize the central role of working
through culture in promoting freedom, equality, democracy, and selfdevelopment would help ground the law surrounding intellectual property
and promote human freedom in ways that narrow economic theory alone
does not.
This is not to rule out doctrinal reform—but speciﬁc doctrinal reform is not my project here. Instead, I urge that what we need is a new
normative vision of culture and how it matters to be incorporated into intellectual property law. A law that presumes culture to be static products
or imposed tradition reinforces the power of a few cultural authorities
and thwarts the ability of ordinary citizens to challenge existing cultural
discourses and make cultural meaning themselves. These outcomes, in
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turn, have profound eﬀects on freedom, equality, social relations, politics,
and economic development.
If the raison d’être of intellectual property law is the promotion of culture, we need to know what vision of culture we are promoting. The
theories of culture from anthropology to philosophy I have elaborated
here usefully complement our current economic analysis of intellectual
property. The goal of economic analysis is well intentioned: maximizing
the social welfare. I have sought to show, however, that we need input
from diﬀerent ﬁelds as to just what constitutes social welfare, and how
conceptions of welfare change over time, in light of new technologies and
social relations. “Economics as a discipline cannot determine what goods
or activities provide value to individuals,” Omri Ben-Shahar has written
in response to my call for the elaboration of social and cultural theories of
intellectual property to stand beside the economic account. “It welcomes
any insight from other disciplines, regarding sources of value, including
insights from cultural perspectives.” Cultural and social theories provide
insight into the value of cultural production, not just consumption, and of
working through culture, not simply against it or outside of it. Law ought
to recognize these beneﬁts and consider them when determining the
metes and bounds of intellectual property.

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 81

2/10/12 2:23 PM

chapte r thre e

Fair Culture

as a young child in the South African hinterlands, Solomon Linda
spent his nights protecting cattle from lions in the jungle. Later, when he
was living in a squalid Johannesburg hostel reserved for black migrant
workers, he recalled this time and composed a song called “Mbube,”
which means “lion” in Zulu. “Mbube” was sung a cappella, but Linda borrowed the syncopation of contemporaneous American music and added
his own haunting falsetto overlay. It was 1939. The song became Africa’s
ﬁrst pop hit.1
“Mbube” would cross the Atlantic and be reborn ﬁrst as “Wimoweh”
and later, “The Lion Sleeps Tonight.” It would go on to be recorded more
than 170 times, generating millions of dollars, and was eventually incorporated into Disney’s immensely proﬁtable movie The Lion King. The “most
famous melody ever to emerge from Africa”2 added to the wealth of many,
especially in the United States, but not its composer, who, as I mentioned
in the Introduction, died destitute from a curable kidney disease in 1962
at age ﬁfty-three, with less than $25 to his name. Linda’s children had
heard their father’s song playing over the radio, but remained unaware of
their intellectual property claims until a South African writer chronicled
the injustice in 2000. In February 2006, the publishing house, which
claimed the song on the basis of an apartheid-era assignment from Linda
that paid him less than one dollar,3 settled with Linda’s family. The settle82
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ment would come too late for his daughter Adelaide, who died of AIDS in
2001, lacking the resources to purchase antiretroviral treatment. Two of
Linda’s other children had died as babies, one of malnutrition.
The international circuit traveled by “Mbube” links north and south,
past and present, copyrights and patents, songs and medicines, intellectual property and development. This story of international injustice
illustrates a number of points. First, it demonstrates the intercultural dimensions of creativity. Linda’s creation oﬀers an exemplar of Paul Gilroy’s
“Black Atlantic” thesis, evidencing the interchange of cultures across the
African diaspora. Second, it shows that cultural exchanges can take place in
the presence of sharp diﬀerences in power and knowledge. Taking the warning
of Linda’s story to heart, African lawyers today urge local creators to protect themselves from a similar fate by learning their rights. Third, Linda’s
tale tragically illustrates the interrelationships among intellectual property
rights and other freedoms. Linda’s failure to be recognized—and remunerated—for his contribution to our shared culture in turn prevented him
and his family from having the resources to access life-saving medicines,
ﬁ rst for himself, and then for his daughter. Intellectual property law
both incentivized the creation, and in due course, exacted a high price
for their retroviral drugs, a price his family could not aﬀord even to save
a life.
In this chapter, I will try to articulate a vision of intellectual property
that comprehends the complexities and import of cultural production
in a global context and, in so doing, helps to promote more just global
social relations. Intellectual property does not merely incentivize and
reward creators; it structures cultural and social relations. Intellectual
property not only governs the production of life-saving medicines or worksaving machines, but also disciplines their distribution. The relationship
between intellectual property and development goes well beyond GDP.
Economic, social, and cultural rights are interconnected and mutually
reinforcing: as in the case of Solomon Linda, intellectual property rights
aﬀect one’s social standing, health, and overall well-being.
Intellectual property utilitarianism neglects these deeper connections
between culture and economics. Law’s focus on the economics of cultural activity is narrow, recognizing law’s role in stimulating the optimal
level of creative production (however elusive this goal may be), and the
market’s in rationing distribution. As I have argued, the goal is creating
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the greatest number of cultural artifacts to be trickled down to the greatest number of people. The utilitarian approach to intellectual property
does not ask: Who makes the goods? Who proﬁts, and at whose expense?
The approach ignores the moral failure to distribute essential knowledge
goods, from textbooks to medicines, widely, so long as there is no market
failure afoot. But in this chapter my critique goes further. I argue that the
current narrow economic approach to intellectual property has failed to
comprehend the broad eﬀects that this law has on structuring cultural
and social relations, and how diﬀerences in power and knowledge, in turn,
aﬀect one’s ability to acquire intellectual property. Intellectual property
recognizes some authors and inventors, and misrecognizes others. In
turn, law apportions the material spoils of creativity unequally. Cultural
standing ultimately aﬀects social standing and individual well-being, as
some people come to lack the resources to furnish themselves with the
basic accoutrements to live a healthy and fulﬁ lling life.
Furthermore, the economic approach, with its reliance on the market
to distribute cultural and social beneﬁt, has failed to recognize asymmetries in the world, including the unequal capacity to participate on
fair terms in global markets. The Solomon Linda story illustrates how
intellectual property laws exacerbate these incapacities rather than relieve
them. This must no longer be the case. Today, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) has pledged to reorient intellectual property law from its exclusive focus on incentives to the broader promotion
of development. I believe that meeting this ambitious goal will require a
theory of culture and development that goes beyond those that have been
oﬀered by contemporary intellectual property scholars.

why free culture is not enough
A principal critique of the intellectual-property-as-incentives story is that
broad and durable property rights might jeopardize further creation. Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle have demonstrated the risk that maximalist
intellectual property laws pose to innovation.4 Their concern resonates
with the economists’ concern for eﬃciency. The fear is that property
rights that are too many and too broad will stiﬂe innovation. A maximalist intellectual property law proves to be poor innovation policy.5 Before
we can stand on the shoulders of giants, we will need to beg their permission. The libertarian might respond by arguing that one should not
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borrow—that one should be clever enough to make one’s point without
relying on others’ production. But scholars such as Suzanne Scotchmer
have shown that innovation is often incremental, with new discoveries
building on older ones.6 Requiring downstream innovators to purchase
licenses from upstream ones might at times run aground on the diﬃculty
of assembling (and paying for) all the necessary licenses.7 A vibrant public
domain, however, becomes a fount of creativity, and thus preservation of
such a domain is vital to innovation.
Lessig’s insight goes beyond innovation policy to consider the requirements of a free society. In his book Free Culture, he worries about
the development of a culture where we will need permission to speak if
that speech involves borrowing someone else’s words. A free culture is
not merely eﬃcient; it is essential to a democratic society. Lessig aﬃrms
the value of freedom to participate “in culture and its growth.”8
But there are several reasons why Lessig’s passionate plea to protect a
free culture is yet incomplete. First, the dynamics of culture itself remain
unexplored in Lessig’s account; the cultural vision embedded within the
call for a free culture remains obscure. But without a cultural account we
cannot fully understand the relationships among intellectual property,
culture, and freedom. This book seeks to set forth a fuller vision of culture
itself and some of these rich relationships.
Second, Lessig’s account fails to acknowledge people’s unequal capacity to exercise the freedoms that law provides. Freedom in theory is
not freedom in fact. Contemporary public domain scholars hold as their
paradigm ﬁgure the “commoner” who easily appropriates popular art
and innovations for his or her own purposes. But this conception fails to
acknowledge disparities in the ability of individuals to exercise their freedoms. In truth, the public domain movement leaves the common person
to the mercy of an unregulated marketplace where she must struggle to
realize her rights. Public domain advocates seem to accept that because a
resource is open to all by force of law, that resource will indeed be exploited
by all.9 In practice, however, diﬀering circumstances—including knowledge, wealth, power, and ability—render some better able than others to
exploit a common resource.10
Third, Lessig’s vision of freedom sometimes leads him to give short
shrift to other values. In 2004, the Creative Commons, which Lessig and
Boyle helped found, introduced a Developing Nation’s License, which
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would allow authors to commit their work for free use in the developing
world, but retain their full rights in the developed world.11 Lessig praised
the license as allowing creators to participate, ﬁrsthand, “in reforming
global information policy.” But the license was quickly retired for failing
to “meet the minimum standards of the Open Access Movement” because
it “does not free work in any way” in the West.12 In short, Lessig’s libertarian vision of “free culture” would give up on those authors who hoped
to use copyright to promote more egalitarian values and development.
Fourth, the vision of freedom embedded in Lessig’s free culture is
ultimately expressed through the marketplace. This leaves cultural and
other knowledge production to the mercies of the market. Governments
must consider directly whether knowledge production requires more direct support, through alternative mechanisms such as prizes and subsidies. The U.S. Congress recognized that certain diseases may aﬀect
too few people to incentivize drug companies to invest the enormous
resources required to produce treatment. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983
oﬀers tax breaks to drug companies that produce treatments for such
diseases (though it is unclear whether the tax beneﬁt is greater than the
resources required to produce the drugs). The realization that states may
need to step in to support some cultural activity applies to minority cultures as well. Markets may not be the best mechanism for stimulating
poetry in the vernaculars of less economically powerful communities.
The support of the arts often has many knock-on economic and cultural
beneﬁts, and is often regarded by governments as key to a successful
economic development policy.
Fifth, Lessig’s theory of free culture tends to romanticize freedom
in the past. Lessig begins from the premise that a “free culture has been
our past.”13 But the story of Solomon Linda begs the question: even when
copyright terms were shorter, were people equally free? Who could participate, and who was left out? A more critical historical account would
recognize that we have traditions of both freedom and oppression, and
that not all of our traditions are worth preserving—indeed, our public
domain tradition is rife with examples of exploitation of the knowledge
and creativity of traditionally disadvantaged groups and the poor (I explore
some examples in Chapter 6). Furthermore, Lessig’s privileging of free
culture in the past does not acknowledge the important ways in which
our conceptions of culture have changed. As I showed in Chapter 2, for
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more than a century the prevailing view of culture has been one of static
tradition and imposed authority—a far cry from free culture.
Finally, public domain advocates do not suﬃciently acknowledge
the extent to which the romantic rhetoric of the public domain obscures
unjust appropriation. Pioneering public domain scholars such as Boyle
point out that the rise of the “romantic author” helped to mask the importance of the public domain for innovation. The romantic author presumed
that artists create out of thin air, rather than borrow from a rich and
diverse public domain.14 In truth, however, most innovation is derivative,
building on earlier works and discoveries. Even the world’s most famous
copyright owner, Disney, thrived by mining the works of past creators,
from Rudyard Kipling to Victor Hugo to Robert Louis Stevenson, as I
discuss further in Chapter 6. But the romance of the public domain is
guilty of its own subterfuges. Unlike the works of Kipling that Disney
appropriated, Solomon Linda’s song suﬀered the common fate of being
falsely and conveniently cast as belonging to the public domain. Linda’s
composition was performed and recorded by the Original Evening Birds.
But recording artists across the Atlantic treated the song as African “folklore” and therefore as part of the public domain and free for the taking.
Pete Seeger, one of the fathers of American folk music and world music,
heard the African hit. He turned “Mbube” into “Wimoweh” in the 1950s
and registered the copyright in the new composition under his alias Paul
Campbell.15 (Seeger has recently decried this apparently common practice
on Tin Pan Alley, and I will return to his confessional at the end of this
chapter.16) A decade later, by the time “Wimoweh” was being rewritten
as “The Lion Sleeps Tonight” by the American music legend George
Weiss, Weiss “leapt to the obvious conclusion: ‘Wimoweh’ was based on
an old African folk song that didn’t belong to anyone. As such, it was fair
game.” 17 The South African journalist Rian Malan notes that the liner
notes to the song by Weiss, who later rose to become president of the
Songwriter’s Guild of America, described “Mbube” as “a familiar Zulu
song about a lion hunt.”18 Lest one think that I am testing the actions of
earlier generations with the copyright ethics of our generation, I should
point out that Seeger’s father, Charles Seeger, published an article titled
“Who Owns Folklore?” in 1962. “American and European copyright law
has been designed to encourage the acquisition and retention of property
under rules favoring the more enterprising citizens,” he wrote. But, he
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concluded, the folk song is “entirely a product of plagiarism” and the act
of claiming copyright in it “unethical.”19
Solomon Linda’s story serves as warning that intellectual property
should not be the law of the jungle. As Linda’s tale shows, simply leaving
a resource in the public domain is not enough to satisfy societal ideals.
Our laws must serve to facilitate the free ﬂow of culture but on fair terms.
This will require, ﬁrst, recognizing inequalities in people’s capacity to
participate in cultural production, and second, ensuring fairness in cultural exchanges, which may otherwise exploit innovators with unequal
wealth, knowledge, or social status.
The skeptic will object. Solomon Linda’s tragic story is one of the
past, and a distant past at that. Apartheid is no longer; no limits to freedom of contracting exist for Africans even in South Africa. Moreover,
does not Linda’s story prove the importance of economic compensation
as essential to intellectual property? Thus, does it not underline the economic rationale for intellectual property oﬀered by contemporary law and
economics accounts of the subject? Indeed, does it not link that account
with a view of justice?
Solomon Linda’s tale is the grossly magniﬁed version of commonplace
inequities.20 Today, creativity around the world ﬂourishes, but few have the
knowledge to commercialize on fair terms and sustain a livelihood. Even
the Beatles sued their publisher for unpaid royalties. Furthermore, Linda’s
story shows that respecting a creator’s rights can sustain livelihoods, even
if exclusive rights prove unnecessary to incentivize the original creation.
At the same time, unequal marketplace treatment can discourage people
from sharing their knowledge, leaving creators to adopt the strategy that
intellectual property lawyers call trade secret. This defeats a central purpose of culture—sharing, participating, and making meaning together.

toward a fair culture
The critique of free culture must be supplemented with a more complex
vision of the relationship between culture and freedom. My vision builds
upon Lessig’s free culture, but seeks a role for law in promoting equal
capacity to meaningfully participate in making our culture. Others have
spoken of the importance of fair culture. A report by the Finnish Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture deﬁ nes “fair culture” as “the
realization of cultural rights and the inclusion of everyone in cultural
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signiﬁcation, irrespective of their age, gender, ability, or ethnic, religious
or cultural background.”21 I adopt that deﬁnition here, and elaborate on
the normative vision that underlies fair culture.
Like free culture, a central value animating fair culture is still freedom. But where Lessig found his inspiration for free culture in the writings of technological guru Richard Stallman, who decried permissions
to access software code from a largely libertarian position, I ﬁ nd my
inspiration in Amartya Sen’s concept of “development as freedom,” an
idea that relies on Sen’s and Nussbaum’s focus on expanding human
capabilities. Both Stallman and Sen take freedom as their touchstone
value. “Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves
and also to inﬂuence the world,” Sen explains.22 Sen’s conception thus
sees freedom not only as an end but also as a means of development. Sen
praises “agency-oriented” programs for development, whereby the poor
improve themselves not by being the passive beneﬁciaries of “cunning
beneﬁt programs,” but rather by freely exercising their capacity to work
and participate in markets. Hence freedom is both a right and a tool for
advancing further freedom. Moreover, Sen’s approach recognizes that
diﬀerences in individuals’ social, cultural, and economic standing aﬀect
their capacity for exercising freedom. Like free culture, fair culture values
freedom but, going further, seeks to spread the capacity for citizens to
meaningfully exercise their freedom.
In earlier chapters I have argued that participatory culture is normatively valuable in its own right. As Amartya Sen has shown, development
requires far more than meeting basic needs and enhancing GDP. Sen’s
vision of development as freedom requires improving each person’s capacity to make choices and meaningfully participate in political, economic,
and cultural life. The capacity to participate in cultural life has particularly
important implications for human ﬂourishing. First, the cultural spheres
of life are those we typically associate with the communities or experiences that give one’s life meaning. Participating in a religious or cultural
community; listening to or making music with others; posting a video to
YouTube of your child dancing or creating a “video response” to someone
else’s post; reading, watching, and then rewriting Harry Potter—promoting freedom to partake in these activities may be thought of as central to
what development is for, that is, the opportunity to innovate, share ideas,
and enjoy life with others. Singing, reading, writing, innovating, and
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sharing: these cultural activities are crucial to human ﬂourishing. Indeed,
the right to freely “participate in the cultural life of the community,23 to
enjoy the arts and to share in scientiﬁc advancement and its beneﬁts,” is
recognized in article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and countless other human rights instruments.24
At the same time, freedom to create and share with others in work
and play has important implications for other freedoms. In this chapter,
I elaborate how enhancing participation in culture can also serve as a
means of development. A central insight of Sen’s theory of development
as freedom is the recognition of “the mutually reinforcing connection
between freedoms of diﬀerent kinds.”25 Let me consider two important
connections here. First, cultural participation helps secure livelihood. As
Solomon Linda’s story illustrates, all people—rich and poor, from North
or South, white or black—may serve as the source of culture that can be
shared globally. Additionally, Linda’s story illustrates that tremendous
wealth may be generated from cultural knowledge production; experts
value Linda’s single song in the millions of dollars. This wealth may, in
turn, be used to promote basic needs, such as health and safety. In short,
at the turn of the millennium, the Participation Age and the goal of poverty eradication have dovetailed. The concept of fair culture yokes together
meaning and livelihood. Indeed, as knowledge in the new millennium
leads to social and economic power, the role of culture in development
promises to be profound.26
Ironically, the law-and- economics analysis often gives short shrift
to the actual economic consequences of intellectual property. Of course,
property rights facilitate marketplace transactions that generate wealth.
But the vision pays little heed to questions about who has access to lifesaving medicines, who earns money from her creativity or industry, and
whether the legal system promotes innovation in cosmetics or vaccines
for tropical diseases. As Linda’s story shows, the answers to these questions are interrelated.
There is another important connection between participatory culture
and social and economic well-being. Social power derives from controlling
knowledge, or discourse. Who is speaking matters. We may reconsider
one of the most important recent decisions in U.S. copyright law with
this in mind. For much of a century, the most popular account of life on
a slave plantation has been Gone with the Wind. That was until one Alice
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Randall disturbed Margaret Mitchell’s idyll by retelling the story from the
perspective of a slave protagonist on the O’Hara plantation, and thereby
laying bare the racism and objectiﬁcation of the original.27 A U.S. appellate
court held Randall’s The Wind Done Gone to be a parody, and therefore a
“fair use” of the original. Most accounts of this case champion the decision as enhancing free speech in the form of criticism, and promoting the
production of more intellectual works (viewing copyright as the “engine
of free speech”). But they have missed the novel’s act of cultural revolution. The Wind Done Gone represents a shift in the distribution of power
in cultural production and meaning-making. We must see intellectual
property law as regulation of meaning and, in turn, of the social relations
that ﬂow from how we envision our world. Indeed, there are even claims,
likely exaggerated, that the depiction of black presidents in Hollywood
media paved the way for President Obama (a particularly surprising claim
given Hollywood’s resistance to calls for greater diversity in its casting).28
These claims reﬂect the rise of the late twentieth- century social
movement that Charles Taylor calls “the politics of recognition.” Taylor
eloquently described the emergence of a new paradigm for understanding
equality, where minority groups decried not material deprivation but
psychological injury deriving from demeaning and misleading cultural
images expressed in mainstream media and markets. “Nonrecognition
or misrecognition” of one’s identity, Taylor wrote, “can inﬂict harm, can
be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and
reduced mode of being.” 29 Power derives from the ability to shape and
inﬂuence culture; inversely, those who do not have the power to create
and contest culture “truly are powerless.”30
Some critique identity politics for its temptation to place representation above other concerns, such as the distribution of social and economic
power.31 The challenge, as Iris Marion Young described it, is when “misrecognition” becomes a “problem independent of other forms of inequality or oppression.”32 I embrace an understanding of identity politics that
recognizes the “interpenetration” of culture and economics. Cultural
representation—in the form of who is represented, how, and under what
terms—aﬀects economic and social power, and vice versa. To be sure,
analyses of “cultural diﬀerences” are often overblown and essentializing;
for this reason, some scholars are wary of cultural analysis altogether. But
the mere fact that many have taken an overly simplistic or erroneous view
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of identity and culture does not mean that we ought to turn our heads
from the important ways in which a cultural analysis matters. As I have
argued earlier, we ought not to discard cultural analysis but rather we
should employ it more critically, retaining a commitment to recognizing
the heterogeneity, dynamism, and interconnectedness of cultures. We
must avoid the trap of viewing “culture” as separate from other factors
related to inequality. As Arjun Appadurai writes, “The challenge today
. . . is how to bring the politics of dignity and the politics of poverty into
a single framework.”33
This is beginning to happen. Nancy Fraser has led the charge that
identity politics, with its focus on representation and dignity, abandoned
the traditional goal of social movements: redressing material inequality.34
But the more recent linking of identity politics to intellectual property,
which I describe in this book, brings social movements back, full circle, to
issues of distribution. In India, local artisans apply for “geographical indications” in Darjeeling tea and Mysore silk, which would grant an exclusive
right to peddle goods under these names. In Australia, aboriginal communities assert copyright in their artwork. And, as described earlier, Ethiopians have trademarked the names of their specialty coﬀees, often praised
as the best coﬀees in the world, in the hopes of retaining more control
over the global social meaning of the coﬀees and the hearty proﬁts they
command in global markets. Diasporas, the Internet, and international
travel have brought the danger of distant foreign exploitation to the attention of local artisans. Increasingly today, diverse authors and inventors
seek recognition and to beneﬁt materially from their cultural production,
especially where recognition and material beneﬁt were denied in the past.
These claims suggest, as a UNESCO Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions makes plain, the
complementary nature of the cultural and economic aspects of development. The UNESCO Convention urges that the cultural contributions of
the poor be encouraged, recognized, and materially rewarded. These new
claims for intellectual property understand rights not just in the familiar
terms of incentives-for- creation, but also as tools for both recognition
and remuneration. Tracking a shift in human-rights thinking away from
ﬁrst-generation rights (civil and political rights) toward second-generation
rights (culture, development, and distributive justice), new claims for
intellectual property rights by the historically disadvantaged tether so-
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cial justice movements to the attainment of greater cultural, social, and
economic power. Intellectual property is increasingly understood as a
legal vehicle for facilitating (or thwarting) the recognition of diverse contributors to cultural and scientiﬁc discourse. Call it the property turn in
identity politics. Wielders of this law increasingly deploy the law to create
and beneﬁt from the processes of meaning-making.
Current intellectual property law addresses economic incentives but
focuses little on livelihood. Current law’s raison d’être is to promote culture but it pays no heed to the value of participating in communities or
the importance of shared meaning. Law is concerned with producing
more goods but is indiﬀerent to the kinds of goods being produced, or
more aptly, to which goods fail to get produced in the absence of market
incentive. This need not be the case. Intellectual property law can be
understood through a broader cultural and economic lens focused on livelihoods, social relations, and well-being. Solomon Linda here becomes a
metonym for those human beings involved in the transnational processes
of collaboration, cultural production, and wealth creation. Cultural theory
takes as a starting point that human beings are creative, continually seeking to make and remake our world, contributing to commerce and culture,
science and spirituality. Individuals demand and deserve both recognition
and remuneration for their intellectual production. As a United Nations
report puts it, “At its best, the Knowledge Society involves all members
of a community in knowledge creation and utilization. The Knowledge
Society is not only about technological innovations, but also about human
beings, their personal growth, and their individual creativity, experience
and participation.”35
To repeat: the vision of culture here is not one of enclaves fenced
oﬀ from one another seeking “protection” or making claims for “survival.” Recall that “fair culture” is committed to free culture in the sense
of facilitating open cultural exchanges. Fair culture promotes the view
that individuals can claim the world’s heritage as one’s own. “Whatever
we understand and enjoy in human products instantly becomes ours,
wherever they might have their origin,” Rabindranath Tagore famously
asserted. “I am proud of my humanity when I can acknowledge the poets and artists of other countries as my own. Let me feel with unalloyed
gladness that all the great glories of man are mine.” Indeed, the impact
of “Mbube” has been truly global. The song has appeared at Navajo pow-
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wows, President John F. Kennedy’s last birthday party, and the Apollo
space launch.36 It has been rendered by generations of artists, from Glen
Campbell to R.E.M. to Phish. Solomon Linda’s tune, journalist Rian Malan writes, “has penetrated so deep into the human consciousness over so
many generations, that one can truly say, here is a song the whole world
knows.”37 Furthermore, in order to create new cultural or scientiﬁc works,
individuals need access to globally produced knowledge, which serve as
building blocks for this future innovation. Solomon Linda himself relied
on American jazz for his innovation.
At the same time, a cultural approach would acknowledge that global
asymmetries of capability threaten cultural production and sharing, and
raise important ethical questions about global culture ﬂows. Not everyone
can realize his or her creative aspirations if, for example, the home country
lacks a research and development infrastructure, funding for innovations,
adequate health care, access to information, or a lack of access to capital,
especially venture capital. Moreover, dominant culture industries have
economies of scale that enable easier production and dissemination of
cultural products around the world. Thus some cultures are more capable
than others of being heard and having inﬂuence.

what is a “fair culture”?
A “fair culture” should seek to promote free cultural exchange on fair
terms. A central concern of a cultural approach to intellectual property
should be how to facilitate cultural production that involves inter- and
intra-cultural borrowing in a socially just manner. The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, mentioned earlier, recognizes the twin goals of promoting sharing
of cultural expressions, on the one hand, and providing fair recognition
and remuneration, on the other. The convention celebrates “interculturality”—that is, the exchange of ideas among cultures—and eschews a
conception of cultures as hermetically sealed oﬀ from one another. Yet
the convention also recognizes that rapid globalization and new technologies simultaneously “aﬀord unprecedented conditions for enhanced
interaction between cultures” and “represent a challenge for cultural
diversity, namely in view of risks of imbalances between rich and poor
countries.” The convention links culture to development goals and would
foster respectful and equitable interactions between and within cultures.
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A richer cultural vision of how people create (within and across communities), why people create (to share experiences and make meaning with
others), and which obstacles threaten cultural sharing (especially unequal
human capacity and global asymmetries of power) should include the
following tenets:
Fairness as the capability to participate in cultural production. A narrow
focus on spurring innovation through intellectual property rights fails to
diﬀerentiate between capacities to innovate or, perhaps more importantly,
capacities to commercialize innovation. Such capacities may be limited
because of small home markets or the absence of government funding
for research and development.38 Furthermore, the expansion of intellectual property rights globally has not been coupled with a reinvigorated
commitment to global development. Foreign aid budgets have largely
stagnated or declined—and so are hardly likely to compensate for the
huge net royalty payments for intellectual property now ﬂowing from
the South to the North as a result of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which I consider in more
detail in Chapters 5 and 7.39 Recognizing the fact of global inequalities
(both within and across communities) requires focusing on improving
the capacity to participate in knowledge production. Some examples of
aﬃ rmative assistance to boost local innovative capacity include World
Bank lending programs that build capacity in science and technology,
government assistance to secure export markets for local producers, and
the enactment of local laws in developing countries that require developed
world partners to involve and train local scientists in joint projects conducted in the developing country. Microloans to poor entrepreneurs who
do not otherwise qualify for bank loans are yet another important tool for
addressing the capital deﬁcit that impedes innovation in the developing
world. Finally, local innovators need to be educated about prospects for
commercializing their innovations on fair terms.40
Crucial to this goal is improved access to information tools, from
innovative programs such as “One Laptop per Child,” which produces
and disseminates laptops endowed with software designed to spur “collaborative, joyful, self-empowered learning,” to technology transfer under
TRIPS, to the development of Web 2.0 software that empowers users to
make culture themselves. Additionally, being attentive to the most basic
human capabilities, for example, health, is vital: intellectual property laws
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should thus recognize the moral claims to promote access to essential
medicines. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health promotes
such capacity by ensuring countries’ ﬂexibility to provide essential medicines to their people. Similarly, a proposal for an international treaty on
copyright exceptions and limitations would enhance the poor’s access
to educational materials. All of these eﬀorts, inside and outside formal
intellectual property law, seek to promote free culture in fact, not just as
abstract theory, by improving the human capacity to create.
Fairness as recognition. Even where people do create, law can fail to
recognize their creativity as authorship or invention. Recognizing poor
people’s claims to their creative knowledge need not require the creation
of new intellectual property rights, but likely will entail critically examining our preconceptions of what is “public domain.” Often, the poor’s
contributions meet the requisite requirements of novelty demanded by
intellectual property law—as they did in Linda’s case—but the poor lack
knowledge of their rights, as well as the skills and capital necessary for
commercializing their contributions. In Chapter 5, I show that our distinctions between “traditional” and “modern” knowledge are often overdrawn. What is often cast as traditional, created by anonymous collectives,
passed down over generations, and remarkably, static over millennia, is
in fact often vibrant, novel, and created by recognizable and identiﬁable
living individuals. In India the Honey Bee Network, founded by innovation professor Anil Gupta, sets out to show just this: that Indians are
economically poor but knowledge rich. Twice yearly, Gupta and nearly
a hundred students and colleagues set out on a “Shodh Yatra,” a trek
by foot of sometimes hundreds of miles to remote villages in order to
access the knowledge of India’s poor. The network has helped to locate
inventors of a natural nonstick coating for pots and pans, a foot-powered
washing-machine, and, my personal favorite, an “amphibious bicycle”
created by one Mr. Saidullah so he could cheaply, and quickly, cross the
river to meet his love.41
Gupta’s Shodh Yatras illustrate well that the rallying call for “Access to
Knowledge” should not mean simply redistributing the knowledge of the
West to the rest. We must search out, recognize, and if need be translate
the knowledge of diverse creators around the world. At the same time,
asymmetries in cultural and economic power threaten ethical sharing of
the knowledge of the poor. For its part, the Honey Bee Network seeks to

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 96

2/10/12 2:23 PM

fair cult ure

97

model sharing that is open and yet also fair—like a honey bee, which connects ﬂower to ﬂower through pollination without diminishing the beauty
of any one. The network gives prizes to inventors, shares their inventions
across communities, helps ﬁnd partners who would commercialize ideas,
and, on occasion, helps inventors to seek intellectual property rights in
the inventions.
Issues of fairness through recognition and reward of diverse authors
apply at home and abroad. Recall that under current copyright law, those
who use copyrighted material without the authorization of the copyright
owner, and outside the protections of fair use, are not eligible for copyright protection in their creations, however transformative they may be.
Thus fans who create by using copyrighted work without authorization
can never be “authors,” unless the court ﬁnds fair use. This approach to
improvements in copyright law is distinct from the approach in patent
law, where the improver may receive a patent for the improvement, but
must still seek a license from the original patent owner. The result is
that copyright owners may freely appropriate from fans that create under
the threat of injunction and have no rights in their contributions. A recent case pitted a fan with encyclopedic knowledge of the Harry Potter
universe against the series’ author, J. K. Rowling herself. Steve Vander
Ark had produced and edited on the Internet the Harry Potter Lexicon,
an A–Z compendium of the spells and bestiary of Potter’s world. Vander
Ark’s Lexicon was so complete that Rowling and Warner Bros., producers
of the Harry Potter ﬁ lms, admitted to using the site as a guide during
the production of the ﬁ lms. Just as Vander Ark free rode on Rowling’s
creations, Rowling and Warner Bros. also free rode on his.
Fairness as livelihood. Enhanced capacity for participatory culture is
not only a good in itself, but also, as I have argued here, a key to economic development. In a Knowledge Age, wealth increasingly derives
from the capacity to produce knowledge for the world. From Ethiopian
coﬀee farmers to indigenous Australian artists to Indian scientists perfecting methods of farming basmati rice, intellectual property rights,
from trademark to copyright to patent, can be used as tools for generating
wealth for the poor.
Fairness as recognizing vulnerability to exploitation. The very essence
of culture is sharing knowledge and meaning with others. But diﬀerences in power and past mistreatment aﬀect people’s willingness to share
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culture. That is, fear of exploitation may discourage people to share and
distribute their knowledge, be it music, literature, or local knowledge of
the medicinal properties of plants. Anthropologists now report resistance
to their ethnographic studies, with potential local informants refusing to
participate in what they perceive to be objectiﬁcation and global exploitation of their knowledge. Indeed, histories of colonial exploitation may
go further to explain cultural insularity than do assertions of essential
cultural diﬀerences. Promoting fairness among global creators makes for
good innovation policy, fosters free speech, and promotes better cultural
relations. Modern intellectual property law ought to be attentive to crafting rules that promote ethical extraction of knowledge. Recent proposals in the World Trade Organization to amend the TRIPS agreement to
require patent applicants to disclose the origin of genetic materials and
traditional knowledge are premised on this very insight.
We have come to believe that property rights in intellectual creations
are there simply because they incentivize creative activity. But there is
an older understanding that ﬂows out of notions of unfair competition
and more visceral feelings of justice. It is now commonplace that in fact
people create without exclusive property rights—as evidenced by opensource software, fan ﬁction, mash-ups, and Solomon Linda’s story. But
behavioral economists have identiﬁed a natural sense of justice that may
lead people to “irrational” decisions if they feel that they are being treated
unfairly.42 Even the premise of the “intellectual property as incentives”
thesis can be understood as responding to the “vulnerability” of the creator in the absence of intellectual property rights, given the often high
costs of production and the typically low costs of copying.43
Focusing on fairness rather than incentives to create also helps reveal
intellectual property’s role in releasing information to the public. Left to
themselves, scientists may not share but rather hoard their knowledge,
fearing exploitation. Patents address this possibility by protecting innovators through property rights. The ﬁrst copyright statute in England, the
Statute of Anne, did the same: recall that this “Act for the Promotion of
Learning” established limited copyrights for authors in order to wrest
knowledge from the monopoly control of a few publishers. Intellectual
property law from the beginning was crafted to promote fairness and access to knowledge.44 This insight ought to empower us to recognize and
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accept broader visions beyond the narrow incentives vision alone. Indeed,
we may usefully reconsider numerous intellectual property doctrines
through this lens.
Fairness as support for non-market- based cultural production. I have
emphasized the links between participatory culture, global markets, and
livelihood. As I will further argue in Chapter 5, markets provide incentives
for cultural preservation through transformation. For example, obtaining
geographical indications encourages communities to invent new applications for old traditions, thus keeping the community alive through dynamism, not stasis. But should markets determine which cultural products
and activities are supported? I have argued no in the case of essential
goods, such as drugs to treat tropical diseases (an issue to which I return
in more detail in Chapter 7). And we have already recognized that states
commonly support the arts through subsidies, because they appreciate
the importance of cultivating robust artistic activity. But more detailed
questions about which cultural activities should be subsidized and how
far state support should go are more diﬃcult. The aforementioned Orphan Drug Act in the United States, for example, may oﬀer subsidies to
corporations in excess of their costs to make the drugs. Subsidies to prop
up some withering artistic or literary traditions, or translation eﬀorts to
preserve local languages, are perhaps even more diﬃcult to assess. What,
precisely, does democratizing the capability to participate in making culture require? For example, how far if at all ought the state go to support
the niche literary community of Bengali feminist poets?45 Subsidies for
poetry in the vernacular?
Cultural diversity is a good in itself but markets, especially large
multinational corporate actors within them, often promote mass culture.
Preserving diverse cultural traditions, languages, and works may oﬀer
people near and far, and over generations, new ways of thinking by exposing them to more ideas. State subsidies can serve as a critical mechanism
for promoting participation, diversity, and cultural vitality, and indeed
states routinely engage in supporting local cultural industries, often as
part of a development policy. At the same time, we should be wary of state
preservation of tradition for its own sake. As I have argued elsewhere,
we ought to critically probe whether certain traditions are harmful, for
example to women or children, and are therefore not worthy of preserva-
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tion. Indeed, the theory of participatory culture developed in Chapter 2
is premised on full participation by all members of a culture in order to
critically engage traditions and bring about cultural change.
But the case of Bengali poetry does not raise such concerns. Furthermore, we should not conﬁne such support to grant mechanisms. Awards
and recognition systems can also generate cultural creativity outside of
markets. Support from appreciative communities on the Internet can
spur one to keep on producing as well. Indeed, despite the common perception of homogenization resulting from globalization, niche cultures
may fare better in markets today than in the past. The Internet and other
technological improvements in distributing knowledge make Bengali
feminist poetry potentially a more lucrative activity today, as the diaspora
of Bengalis and all other interested parties become easier to connect and
access. This is the phenomenon known as the “long tail,” where larger
numbers of people are able to purchase (or support implicitly through
advertising) “non-hit” items.
This example reinforces a broader point. I do not reject the incentive
analysis in full, but rather propose that plural values and goals animate
intellectual property law. Property rights in information clearly can incentivize innovation that would otherwise draw insuﬃcient investment. But
they can also promote freedom, cultural dynamism, human capabilities,
and more fair cultural and social relations.
A further clariﬁcation: I do not mean to treat intellectual property as
an end in itself. Rather, the end is participation in meaning-making and
in having the capacity to earn a livelihood to achieve the life one scripts
for herself. Intellectual property remains a tool, not a right. But it may
now be seen as a tool for incentivizing participation in processes of intercultural sharing on fair terms, not just the creation of more products
by a select few.

criticisms and responses
Skeptics will object. Intellectual property law is a human construction designed to solve a fundamental problem of information economics: without
intellectual property protections, the ready duplicability of information
undermines incentives to create information. Armed with this economic
insight and fortiﬁed by a constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts,” some intellectual property scholars—we have
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labeled them “Intellectual Property Originalists”—would keep intellectual property’s focus solely on incentivizing the production of information.46 They would thus resist any call to expand the values of intellectual
property to the broad array of values I have oﬀered, from freedom to
fairness. But let me answer some speciﬁc critiques here.
Whose values? How do we identify the myriad values to be considered?
And whose values? The values I champion in these pages, from democracy
to development, to freedom and equality, reﬂect long-standing commitments to Enlightenment, international human rights, and in many cases
constitutional mandates. Furthermore, social theories from Nussbaum’s
capabilities approach to Sen’s view of development as freedom resonate as
normative guides for a revised intellectual property. Within these larger
frameworks, details will be elaborated through political processes. Brazil
and Thailand, for example, have stronger constitutional commitments
to public health than do some other nations, as I elaborate in Chapter 7.
We may also allow for some reconsideration of intellectual property to be
determined dynamically through the politics of the age, just as the social
movements of the past inﬂuenced real property law.
Adding to the law would make it too complex. Introducing additional
values to intellectual property analysis will necessarily complicate that
analysis. But if this move adds complexity, it is just the complexity necessary to get things right. Narrowing the calculus to ease the calculation
will likely lead to the wrong answer. Economy should not come at the
expense of achieving a just outcome. Moreover, a single-minded focus
is not true of most other areas of the law. Property rights in land serve
myriad values, and are justiﬁed and cabined accordingly.
Changes would threaten the public domain. Many intellectual property
scholars have mounted a heroic eﬀort to staunch the enclosure of the
public domain of information, and they worry that broadening our understanding of intellectual property will buttress maximalist intellectual
property claims.47 But a single-minded focus on incentivizing creation
could also lead to maximalist intellectual property claims, because the
only limits on intellectual property would occur when (1) additional intellectual property rights are unnecessary to spur creation, and (2) situations where expanding intellectual property rights for some will interfere
with others’ ability to create. A broad range of human values, in contrast,
should help restrain maximalist intellectual property demands. Human
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rights are a principal source for delimiting intellectual property, not simply expanding it. For example, the arguments for access to medicines
(and the compulsory license schemes they often entail) typically rely not
on claims of authorship or incentive, but rather on the desire to expand
human capabilities. Similarly, recent eﬀorts to reconstruct the fair-use
doctrine as principally an eﬀort to head oﬀ a market failure caused by
excessive transaction costs might jeopardize the doctrine itself. As the
transaction costs of ﬁnding the copyright owner and negotiating a license
decrease in the digital age, the rationale for fair use can vanish, transforming fair use into fared use. A broad understanding of intellectual property
values might justify fair use in the face of potential obsolescence of the
doctrine due to technological change. In short, rather than shrinking the
public domain, my argument may expand it. Recognizing the diversity
of values underlying intellectual property should lead us to share certain
rights in intellectual products, rather than reserve them more closely.
Recall that new theories of property, from personhood to social relations,
enhanced our ability to explain and justify legal limits on property, even
while they served to bolster some property claimants.
Intellectual property law should have a limited purpose. The originalist
objects, claiming that intellectual property was not intended to promote
such ends. But intellectual property laws have always sought to promote
development and principles of Enlightenment. Intellectual property has
long harbored multiple values, such as the First Amendment values implicit in fair use.48 This plural tradition notwithstanding, the fact that a
legal regime might be created for one purpose should not mean that the
implications of that regime for all other purposes should be ignored. The
state raises an army because of the need to assure its security against
foreign invasions. Yet the state might deploy the army domestically in
case of natural disasters. And it might need to create limits on how the
army might operate (such as prohibitions on torture and sexual harassment)—limits stemming not necessarily from self-defense but from other
human values. Similarly, the fact that intellectual property law might be
established for instrumental reasons does not mean that other purposes
should not be considered when we set its metes and bounds.
Why focus on distribution? Why not mete out any distributive justice explicitly through the tax system? Those who disfavor a social justice agenda
for intellectual property are not necessarily antagonistic to social justice
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itself. They would often simply prefer what they ﬁnd to be a superior forum for considering such issues: tax.49 But it seems unrealistic to expect
the eﬀects of intellectual property law I have discussed here to be sorted
out through a redistributive tax regime. First, as in the case of Solomon
Linda, such a regime would have to be global, redressing unjust appropriation across borders. Second, a tax regime that oﬀered credits to the
poor would keep them wards of the state, rather than recognizing their
contributions and fairly remunerating them. It is a very diﬀerent thing
to give people a handout rather than acknowledge their contributions to
cultural life. Such a regime would also negatively aﬀect people’s incentives to create and share their knowledge with the world in global markets.
As I have pointed out, vulnerability to exploitation can serve as a strong
disincentive to the poor, diminishing their desire to contribute to world
science and culture. The potential for closing oneself oﬀ to the world, and
hoarding knowledge, would deprive all of humanity of that knowledge.
Finally, why compound disadvantage through an intellectual property
system indiﬀerent to equality in the usually vain hope that it might be
sorted out later through a tax system?
Rights intended to aid the poor are more likely to be wielded ultimately
by those already in power. This suggests that it is analytically diﬃcult to
distinguish Disney from the dissident, or Monsanto from a mountain
tribe. In fact, courts can make such distinctions when they are justiﬁed
by other normative reasons. Furthermore, this is the risk of any legal reform eﬀort—even the public domain movement itself. The campaign to
preserve the public domain, which has been taken up in everyone’s name,
in fact may beneﬁt the powerful, who are in a better position to quickly
appropriate for themselves ideas and goods in the public domain. An
intellectual property regime that expressly acknowledges and confronts
its social and cultural eﬀects will be best suited to resolve these issues.
Now in his nineties, Pete Seeger is spearheading what he calls the Committee for Public Domain Reform. In a letter to the United Nations, he
decries the standard practice in the music industry of copyrighting songs
supposedly in the public domain. Many of these works are not public
domain at all, Seeger argues. He quotes Joseph Shabalala of the South
African vocal group Ladysmith Black Mambazo, who notes that when
the word “traditional” is used, “it means the money stays in New York.”
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Seeger proposes that a share of subsequent copyright royalties “go to the
place and people where the song originated.”50
On the ground, international actors are developing new understandings of intellectual property as a tool for promoting not just free culture,
but also fair culture. No human domain should be immune from the
claims of social justice. Intellectual property, like property law, structures social relations and has profound social eﬀects. If the twenty-ﬁrst
century will be the Age of Knowledge and Participation, surely we must
acknowledge and grapple with the reality that intellectual property law
will help deﬁne the possibilities and human capabilities of this age. Intellectual property regulates the production and distribution of culture.
Considerations of social justice cannot be peripheral to such a central
human enterprise.
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Newsweek’s Pakistan edition ran a cover in April 2011 featuring the Muslim superhero
and superheroine characters from Dr. Naif Al-Mutawa’s comic book series The 99.
(Courtesy of The 99)
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In 1999, Mattel sued Utah-based artist Tom Forsythe for his series of photographs entitled Food Chain
Barbie. (Courtesy of Tom Forsythe)
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Photo of Solomon Linda (farthest left) and The Original Evening Birds in 1941.

The energy drink Guaraná Power,
conceived and produced by a
farmers’ collective in Maués, Brazil.
The farmers sought to compete
with the global company Ambev’s
popular guarana berry–based drink,
Antarctica, in order to retain more
of the profits for cultivating the
berries. The logo “Guaraná Power”
is stamped across the more familiar
Antarctica label. (Courtesy of
Superflex)
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In collaboration with the Danish artists’ group Superflex, a farmers’ collective
in Maués, Brazil, brainstormed ideas for developing commercial products
derived from their crops. Here one member suggests “Mauescafé” coffee.
(Courtesy of Superflex)

The cover of the first
issue of Spider-Man India.
(Spider-Man ™ and
© Marvel Entertainment,
LLC. All Rights Reserved
and used with permission.)
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Mark Chamberlain’s watercolor of Batman and Robin kissing. (Courtesy of Kathleen Cullen
Fine Arts)
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Comparisons between Tezuka’s Kimba the White Lion and Disney’s
The Lion King. (Courtesy of MUSHI PRODUCTION Co., Ltd.)
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chapte r fou r

Everyone’s a Superhero

“Gee, golly, gosh, gloriosky,” thought Mary Sue as she stepped
on the bridge of the Enterprise. “Here I am, the youngest Lieutenant in the ﬂeet—only ﬁfteen-and-a-half years old.” Captain
Kirk came up to her.
“Oh, Lieutenant, I love you madly. Will you come to bed with
me?”
“Captain! I am not that kind of girl!”
“You’re right, and I respect you for it. Here, take over the ship
for a minute while I go for some coﬀee for us.”
Mr. Spock came onto the bridge. “What are you doing in the
command seat, Lieutenant?”
“The Captain told me to.”
“Flawlessly logical. I admire your mind.”1
going where only men had gone before, Lieutenant Mary Sue took
the helm of the USS Enterprise, performing to acclaim and earning the
Vulcan Order of Gallantry. This was, of course, fantasy, but doubly so. By
1974, no woman had commanded the Enterprise bridge, according to the
oﬃcial Star Trek fantasy. Indeed, it would take another two decades before
a woman would command the principal starship in a later Star Trek series.
Trekkie Paula Smith, however, was impatient. So she inserted the young
10 5
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Lieutenant Mary Sue into the Star Trek universe, not as a communications
oﬃcer, nurse, voice of the onboard computer, or passing Kirk love interest,
but as commander. In so doing, Smith began the modern incarnation of
an old and often celebrated phenomenon—retelling a canonical story to
better represent oneself.2
The name of Smith’s character, Mary Sue, has come to stand for all
such characters in the universe of fan ﬁction. Fan ﬁction spans all genres
of popular culture, from anime to literature. In every fan literature, there
is the Mary Sue: “She fences with Methos and Duncan MacLeod; she saves
the Enterprise, the Voyager, or the fabric of time and space; she ﬁghts with
Jim Ellison in defense of Cascade; she battles evil in Sunnydale alongside
Buﬀ y Sommers.”3 She stands as the only female member of the fellowship of the ring. According to Wikipedia, a “Mary Sue” is an idealized
“ﬁctional character . . . lacking noteworthy ﬂaws.”4 Often she appears in
the form of a new character beamed into the story or a marginal character
brought out from the shadows.
“Mary Sue” is often a pejorative expression, used to deride fan ﬁction perceived as narcissistic.5 But we may also consider Mary Sue to be a
ﬁgure of subaltern critique and, indeed, empowerment. Cultural studies
scholars deﬁne empowerment “as a function and possibility of participation in popular culture.”6 We may see empowerment also in terms oﬀered
by the civil rights movements—as increasing social, economic, and political power. As exempliﬁed by Lieutenant Mary Sue, this ﬁgure serves to
contest popular media stereotypes of certain groups such as women, gays,
and racial minorities. Where the popular media might show such groups
as lacking agency or exhibiting other negative characteristics, Mary Sues
are powerful, beautiful, and intrepid. Indeed, the gendered appellation for
this form—Mary Sue—reﬂects its popularity among female authors, who
often work against the gender stereotypes of the canon work. Through a
survey of social science research that reveals how media aﬀect our racialized and gendered view of occupations, the connections between cultural
and economic power become apparent.
The emergence of the World Wide Web has ampliﬁed this relationship. In the past, Mary Sue authors might have stashed what they penned
in a drawer, distributed photocopies, or, at most, published their work in
an underground magazine. The Web oﬀers writers a relatively inexpensive
and simple mass distribution vehicle. Posting a story to a fan-ﬁction web-
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site is literally free, at least for those with access to the Internet. Lacking
the global distribution channels of print media, Mary Sue authors now
ﬁnd an alternative in the Web, which brings their work to the world. In
fact, the increasing power and aﬀordability of digital tools may make it
possible to go beyond rewriting stories in words to permit video and audio
creations, often through mash-ups of existing copyrighted material. Such
spin-oﬀs can usher in a whole new universe of imagined possibilities—if
the law will allow us to go there.
This chapter has two goals, one practical and the other theoretical.
The ﬁrst goal is to clarify the law so that writers of Mary Sues will not be
chilled by possible legal threats to such speech. Such authors should not
readily “cease and desist,” as copyright owners demand. Rather than illegal
art, Mary Sues may well constitute fair use. Second, Mary Sues usefully
probe the theory of fair use itself. Mary Sue can be seen as a metonym for
fair uses that rewrite the popular narrative. Implicitly, I defend fair use
against eﬀorts to narrowly interpret it as merely a defense against a market
failure caused by high transaction costs, an explanation that would lead
ultimately to its evisceration as technologies reduce such costs. Under that
view, the cultural and speech consequences of transformative uses of copyrighted works lay hostage to the ability of the transformers to pay. I also
defend against the foremost cultural critique of fair use—that reinterpretation (or “recoding”) of the text destabilizes cultural foundations.7
Mary Sues challenge a patriarchal, heterosexist, and racially stereotyped cultural landscape. These popular stereotypes have subtle yet important consequences for our social, political, and economic relations, as
social science research reveals. The phenomenon of rewriting the story to
revalue one’s place in it is not simply an exercise in narcissism. Mary Sues
oﬀer important epistemological interventions in the reigning discourse,
confronting the traditional production of knowledge by reworking the
canon to valorize women and marginalized communities. They exemplify
the tactic that Arjun Appadurai describes as commodity resistance—a strategy of popular struggle through the resigniﬁcation of common goods.8
One of the most important recent copyright cases, which I touched on
earlier, revolves around a Mary Sue: Alice Randall’s take on Gone with
the Wind called The Wind Done Gone. In the latter, a slave protagonist
illuminates the oppression of the age and African-American characters
are imbued with complexity and agency.9
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Mary Sues that challenge the orthodox representations in the original
work should constitute fair use under U.S. copyright law in many cases.
The skeptic will ask the Mary Sue author: Why not write your own original story rather than inserting yourself into a story written by someone
else? Alternatively, why not license the original? Such arguments go far
beyond Mary Sues: they represent the fundamental challenges to any fairuse claim. I respond to these challenges, relying on theories of cultural
critique and change. Speciﬁcally, I argue that semiotic democracy10 requires the ability to resignify the artifacts of popular culture to contest
their authoritative meaning. I also show that concerns regarding any resulting cultural destabilization misunderstand the nature of culture itself.

marry, sue!
When Star Trek debuted on television in 1966, it was groundbreaking. Its
creator, Gene Roddenberry, “envisaged a multi-racial and mixed-gender
crew, based on his assumption that racial prejudice and sexism would
not exist in the twenty-third century.” 11 Lieutenant Uhura was the ﬁrst
African-American woman to be featured in a major television series.12 Oﬃcer Sulu oﬀered a rare Asian-American face outside a martial arts milieu.13
But despite these laudable aspirations, equality was not yet truly
complete in Federation space. Uhura, for example, was relegated to the
communications station. Women generally played secondary roles, often
serving as episode-long love interests for the white male members of
the crew. Uhura broke ground again when she participated in network
television’s likely ﬁ rst interracial kiss—with Captain Kirk, of course.14
(Same-sex romantic relationships, however, apparently did not survive
into our future.)
Women, gays, and racial minorities have certainly made major strides
over the past four decades of television. In 1993, for example, an AfricanAmerican actor commanded the station in the Star Trek series Deep Space
Nine.15 And in 1995, more than two decades after Lieutenant Mary Sue,
Captain Kathryn Janeway commanded the deck of the starship in Star
Trek: Voyager, the only Star Trek series to have a lead female captain.16 Yet
there remains a long way to go, as demonstrated by American television,
a principal source of information about our world. A recent Children
Now report shows that male characters remain dominant, consistently
outnumbering female characters by nearly two to one between 1999 and
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2004.17 Primetime television portrays “a world in which women are signiﬁcantly younger than their male counterparts and where older women
are hard to ﬁnd.”18 Perhaps especially telling is the occupational diﬀerentiation of men and women: “Male characters outnumbered female characters as attorneys (71% were male), executives/CEOs (80%), physicians
(80%), law enforcement oﬃcers (82%), paramedics/ﬁreﬁghters (84%),
elected/appointed oﬃcials (92%) and criminals (93%).”19
The racial divide on primetime television remains alarming. While
40 percent of Americans ages nineteen and under are children of color,20
nearly three-quarters of all primetime characters during the 2003–2004
television season were white.21 The racial diversity that does exist is found
mostly during the evening ten o’clock hour, when American children are
least likely to be watching: “The 8 o’clock hour remained the least racially
diverse hour in prime time with one in ﬁve shows (20%) featuring mixed
opening credits casts.” 22 Latino characters are often cast in “low-status
occupations.”23 Even when they were represented, Asian-American characters “were far less likely than characters from other racial groups to
appear in primary roles.” 24 An earlier study by Children Now concluded
that youth watching primetime television would most likely see a “world
overwhelmingly populated by able bodied, single, heterosexual, white,
male adults under 40.”25 When minority groups are depicted in the media, they are generally stereotyped, with Asian women, for example, cast
as “China dolls” or “dragon ladies” and Asian men denied any positive
sexuality.26 Latinos are commonly depicted as “criminals, buﬀoons, Latin
lovers, or law enforcers.”27
Movies may not be much better. In a study of black female characters
in the top movies of 1996, 89 percent were shown using profanities, 56
percent were shown being physically violent, and 55 percent were shown
being physically restrained. By contrast, 17 percent of white female characters were depicted using profanities, 11 percent were shown being physically violent, and 6 percent were shown being restrained.28
Popular books evince similar disparities. A study on children’s books
published in the early 1980s showed that adult male characters appeared
almost three times more frequently than females.29 Even more importantly, central characters were almost two-and-a-half times more likely
to be boys than girls. Consider Winnie the Pooh. The lovable bear is
Disney’s most valuable character, generating revenues of a billion dollars

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 109

2/10/12 2:23 PM

110

e veryone’s a superher o

annually.30 But despite his apparently wide appeal, the bear’s universe is
quite narrow. Of the nearly dozen characters in the Hundred Acre Wood,
only one is female—Kanga, Roo’s mother, who often dons an apron.31
Winnie the Pooh and his friends, of course, were created in a diﬀerent
era, written to cheer a young boy, but today these characters appeal to
both boys and girls.32
While Winnie the Pooh is the British literary creation popular among
younger children, older children are currently entranced by the magic
of Harry Potter. But although the stories are penned by a woman, J. K.
Rowling, the lead role is played by a boy, and the principal parts are mostly
male.33 Moreover, the vast majority of Hogwarts teachers and pupils—especially the principal characters—are white.34
Even magazines written speciﬁcally for girls fail to guarantee an empowering experience. Reviewing Seventeen magazine, sociologist Kelley
Massoni observes that “men dominate its pages, as both subjects and job
holders.” It is not only what is depicted that is important; it is also what
is omitted. Magazines for teenage girls, according to Massoni, “overtly
suggest, through content and pictures, how women should look, dress,
and act; they more subtly suggest, through exclusion of pictures and content, what women should not do, be, or think.” Massoni concludes: “In
the occupational world of Seventeen, Prince Charming still exists as the
ultimate goal.”35 The implicit instruction in the pages of teen-girl magazines: “Marry, Sue!”
Such images are not conﬁned to U.S. borders.36 Hollywood and other
American media multinationals have globalized American television
shows, the Hundred Acre Wood, and Harry Potter. Disney and Time
Warner oﬀer their fare on the many television channels they own around
the world. The ﬁctional worlds envisioned therein now charm the real
world’s youth. Hollywood’s global cultural hegemony translates Hollywood’s prejudices to the world.
Psychological and sociological research reveals that cultural representations may have social and economic consequences.37 Racial and gender
stereotypes depicted in popular media may impact children’s perceptions
of career paths. Children “as young as ﬁve years of age learn to gender
stereotype occupations based on the gender of a television role model.” 38
Early media research established a correlation (though not necessarily
a causation) between large amounts of television watching and stereo-
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typed views of gender occupations and traits. In one study published in
1980, children in the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth, and seventh grades were asked to
associate a given trait, such as shyness or conﬁdence, with a man or a
woman. Children who were heavy television watchers showed a marked
increase with age in male stereotyped responses, while children who
watched relatively little television demonstrated a decrease in such answers with age.39 In another study published in 1974, children between
the ages of three and six were asked about their career aspirations. The
result showed that 76 percent of children who were classiﬁed as “heavy
viewers” chose professions stereotypical for their gender, compared with
50 percent of “moderate viewers” who chose stereotypical professions.40
The occasional counter-stereotypical media portrayal may not suﬃce to
overturn engrained prejudices. In a study published in 1979, ﬁve- and
six-year-olds were shown four ﬁlms shorter than two minutes each and
questioned afterward about what they had seen. Each ﬁlm presented two
actors who portrayed doctors and nurses in various gender combinations.
Of the ﬁ lms with a female doctor and a male nurse, 53 percent of the
children stated that they had seen a movie about a male doctor and a
female nurse. In contrast, 100 percent of the children correctly identiﬁed
the actors’ genders in the ﬁlm with a male doctor and a female nurse.41
A recent study also demonstrates stereotypical correlations with respect to race. Researcher Rebecca Bigler and her colleagues invented new,
ﬁctional occupations and presented various combinations of white and
black persons in those occupations to children. Poorer African-American
children were less likely to aspire to jobs that had been depicted with white
workers exclusively. The study authors point out the potential for a vicious
cycle: African-American children, especially those from disadvantaged
backgrounds, may preferentially seek out low-status jobs in which minorities are well represented, thus perpetuating the skewed models for new
generations of poor African-American children.42
The eﬀects of media portrayals reach beyond children. One study
asked college students to complete questionnaires about their racial and
gender attitudes after they viewed stereotypical or counter-stereotypical
racial and gender portrayals in a newsletter. Those who ﬁrst viewed stereotypical portrayals were more likely to favor policy judgments against
blacks or women when asked who bears responsibility for Magic Johnson
contracting HIV and the police beating of Rodney King, and whether to
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accept the credibility of Anita Hill and Patricia Bowman in their respective claims.43
Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day.
A U.S. Civil Rights Commission study found that minority stereotypes
in the media reinforced the negative beliefs that minorities have about
themselves,44 echoing one author’s argument that “the television roles in
which Blacks are cast communicate to Black children the negative value
society places on them.”45 The importance of televised role models is not
lost, even on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It hired
Nichelle Nichols, who had played Lieutenant Uhura on Star Trek, to help
recruit women and African-American astronauts.46
Self-Insertion as Self-Empowerment
Lieutenant Mary Sue and those Mary Sues that have followed in her
wake appear against this backdrop. Yet within fan subcultures, Mary
Sues are typically derided because of their perfection. Indeed, websites
oﬀer budding writers tutorials on how to avoid the pitfall of writing a
Mary Sue.47 “Flaming” and negative reviews are deployed to discipline
fan-ﬁction writers who stray from acceptable additions to the particular
ﬁctional universe.48 Where texts have long been subject to socially regulated readings,49 the fan-ﬁction community—formed today principally
through cyberspace—extends this discipline even to acceptable reworkings of the text.
The Mary Sue needs reclaiming not only from the oﬃcial guardians of
the oﬃcial story, but also from the unoﬃcial guardians of the unoﬃcial story.
The fact that Mary Sues are marked by relentlessly superlative qualities
becomes more understandable when viewed against a popular culture
that marginalizes certain groups. Flattering self-insertion oﬀers a partial
antidote to a media that neglects or marginalizes certain groups. Victims
of prejudice often internalize its claims; indeed, oppressive societies have
often relied on this psychological trick to maintain hierarchies.50 A process of consciousness-raising and self- empowerment requires that one
recognize one’s own potential, even if others do not. Denied the principal
role in the oﬃcial canon, Mary Sue is no passive peripheral character:
“She does, not just simply exists. She slays, she runs a starship, she types,
she wields a sword.”51 Mary Sues help the writer claim agency against a
popular culture that repeatedly denies it.
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Some commentators worry that the “Mary Sue often reinforces the
impossible idea that women must strive for eﬀortless perfection.” But
would not the intrepid Captain Kirk or the invincible Superman suggest
the same goal for men? Based on the social science literature canvassed
earlier, I suggest instead that relentlessly positive portrayals of people
who look like you may lead to (1) others thinking that people who look like
you are capable and desirable; and (2) a belief in your own capability and
self-worth. Rewriting popular culture is a step toward breaking the cycle
of dominance, as the following three examples demonstrate.
Same-Sex Romance: Kirk/Spock
Even though Star Trek envisioned a purportedly egalitarian future, the
reality it posited was far from the ideal. Just as Paula Smith had introduced Lieutenant Mary Sue to make up for the absence of female leaders,
early fan-ﬁction writers often imagined same-sex romantic relationships
among the ship’s crew. Referenced often as “K/S” for “Kirk/Spock,” such
same-sex pairings in fan ﬁction came to be known as “slash.” 52 Slash
thus functions as a kind of Mary Sue, reﬂecting a desire to introduce
homosexuality where it has been omitted.
This may be true even when the author is a heterosexual woman. Consider the following accounts of why women write male same-sex pairings:
• Given the priority given to the hero in the original, the female
reader may identify with the hero, not the heroine, and then use
the hero to “‘feel’ the adventure with” another character;
• Rewriting masculinity places emotional responsibility on men;
• The male slash is erotic to the female writer; and
• It rearranges the expected sexuality.53
That is, the ripping, mixing, and slashing of traditional sexual roles
may allow the writers to reimagine their own places in the sexual order.
Heroes and Heroines: The Adventures of Hermione Granger
Some Harry Potter fan ﬁction gives center stage to Hermione Granger.
Given that the Harry Potter books already depict Hermione with extraordinary, positive characteristics, it may have seemed unnecessary to rewrite her story. But the stories oﬀer two twists on the oﬃcial tale. First,
they make it her story, not someone else’s story in which she plays a part.
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Second, the stories often ﬁnd her a romantic partner, especially Ginny
Weasley, Draco Malfoy, or Harry Potter. As one critic points out, the last
pairing is especially satisfying for some: “As the Potter series’ brilliant
bookworm, Hermione is a role model for smart girls (and boys) who
ﬁnd themselves overshadowed by their ﬂashier peers. There’s a certain
appeal to thinking that a young academic could couple with the hero of
the wizarding world.”54
Cultural Adaptation: Harry Potter in Kolkata
“Harry gets onto his Nimbus 2000 broom and zooms across to Calcutta
at the invitation of a young boy called Junto,” reads the text of an Indian
tale, Harry Potter Kolkataye (Harry Potter in Kolkata).55 Written in Bengali,
the book brings Harry Potter to Kolkata where he “meets famous ﬁctional
characters from Bengali literature.” Uttam Ghosh, the author, describes
the story as a “poor man’s Potter,” costing just thirty rupees—less than
one U.S. dollar.56 But does this poor man’s Potter simply further insinuate a foreign character into the imagination of Bengali youth? To some
extent, yes, but we must not overlook the power of global mass media,
which makes Potter diﬃcult to avoid for the middle-class Kolkata youth
likely to buy the book. Harry Potter in Kolkata is yet another variant of the
Mary Sue. It introduces a young Indian boy into the Harry Potter legend
and within a new environment—Kolkata—rather than Harry’s familiar
England. By situating Harry in Kolkata, it makes it easier to imagine the
local street corner as a place of magic.

suing mary
Potter in Kolkata was rapidly taken oﬀ the market. Indian lawyers for
Rowling and Warner Bros. issued a cease-and-desist letter to the “pirate”
work’s Indian publisher, which quickly complied.57 J. K. Rowling has generally tolerated literally hundreds of thousands of other fan-ﬁction stories
based on her characters, including stories that focus on Hermione—but
these have been largely noncommercial and web- rather than print-based.
The owners of the Star Trek franchise contemplated legal action against
Star Trek slash, but did not bring suit because of strategic considerations.
What are the respective legal rights of the owner of the oﬃcial work
and the author of the Mary Sue? I argue that U.S. copyright law permits
Mary Sues that challenge the orthodox depictions in the original.
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The Fair Mary
U.S. law permits the copyright owner to claim not only his or her own
stories, but also the characters in those stories.58 It also grants to the
copyright holder the exclusive right to make derivative works.59 The unauthorized author of a derivative work such as fan ﬁction cannot claim
a copyright in that work. This practice places the fan-ﬁction writer at
the mercy of the copyright owner, unless the fan ﬁction constitutes fair
use. Thus, a fan-ﬁction writer can pen stories employing copyrighted
characters only if (1) the copyright owner explicitly permits such fan ﬁction, (2) the copyright owner chooses not to pursue legal action against
the fan-ﬁction writer, or (3) the fan ﬁction constitutes fair use of the
copyrighted work.
This third avenue allows fan-ﬁction writers the freedom to create
using existing creative worlds without needing the permission, either
explicit or tacit, of the copyright owner. If a use is judged “fair,” then the
copyright owner cannot bar it. Whether a use is fair depends on a number
of factors, including the character of the work (is the use either commercial or transformative?), the nature of the underlying original work, the
amount copied, and whether the use injures the copyright owner’s market
for the original work.60 Courts enjoy wide discretion when weighing these
factors, referring in their deliberations to the statute as well as to a long
lineage of interpretive case laws.
Campbell v. Acuﬀ-Rose Music, Inc.
The leading case deﬁning the contours of fair use as it applies to critical
commentary concerns a rap group’s reworking of an earlier song, “Oh,
Pretty Woman.” In Campbell v. Acuﬀ-Rose Music, Inc., the copyright owner
of Roy Orbison’s song sued the rap group 2 Live Crew for copyright infringement for its song “Pretty Woman.” The Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit’s decision that the use was presumptively unfair because of
the song’s commercial nature, holding that 2 Live Crew’s parody of the
original might constitute fair use. Justice Souter, writing for the Court,
characterized 2 Live Crew’s version as a parody of the original: “[W]e
think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be perceived as
commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree. 2 Live Crew
juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true,
with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from
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paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the
naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signiﬁes.”61
The Court observed that parodies like 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman”
transform the original, providing “social beneﬁt, by shedding light on
an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”62 Even the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s work did not defeat the group’s fair-use
defense, though the Court remanded the case for fact-ﬁnding, in order
to determine whether the 2 Live Crew rap parody harmed the copyright
owner’s market for a non-parodic rap version of the song.63
Similarly, many Mary Sues comment on or criticize the original,
while creating something new. They highlight the absence of society’s
marginal voices in the original works, the stereotyped actions or inactions of certain characters, and the orthodoxy of social relationships in
the original. Lieutenant Mary Sue beamed on board, ﬁnally bringing a
leading woman character to the bridge, saving the day while parrying
Captain Kirk’s advances. The depiction of Lieutenant Mary Sue served
to challenge the original in a uniquely powerful way. It demonstrated the
glaring lacuna in the original, despite its pretensions of egalitarianism
(exempliﬁed in the ﬁrst Star Trek movie’s risible use of “Mr.” to reference
both male and female crew members). Such Mary Sues comment on
the disappointments of the original, particularly its racial, gender, and
sexual hierarchy.
The Wind Done Gone
Mary Sues help us rewrite not just the future, but also the past. For nearly
a century, the most popular account of life on a slave plantation has been
Margaret Mitchell’s literary classic Gone with the Wind (GWTW), a book
second only to the Bible in worldwide sales.64 That account presented an
idyll disturbed only by the actions of the North:
In the world of GWTW, the white characters comprise a noble
aristocracy whose idyllic existence is upset only by the intrusion of Yankee soldiers, and, eventually, by the liberation of the
black slaves. . . . Mitchell describes how both blacks and whites
were purportedly better oﬀ in the days of slavery: “The more
I see of emancipation the more criminal I think it is. It’s just
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ruined the darkies,” says Scarlett O’Hara. . . . Free blacks are
described as “creatures of small intelligence . . . [l]ike monkeys
or small children turned loose among treasured objects whose
value is beyond their comprehension, they ran wild.”65
In The Wind Done Gone (TWDG), Alice Randall, an African-American
novelist, retold the tale from the perspective of a slave, Cynara, on the
O’Hara plantation. Mitchell’s heirs sued for copyright infringement. The
trial court held that Randall had infringed Mitchell’s work. On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that TWDG likely constituted a parodic fair use.66 The two novels’ depictions of race and sex relations could
hardly be more diﬀerent, as characterized by the Eleventh Circuit: “It is
clear within the ﬁrst ﬁfty pages of Cynara’s ﬁctional diary that Randall’s
work ﬂips GWTW’s traditional race roles, portrays powerful whites as
stupid or feckless, and generally sets out to demystify GWTW and strip
the romanticism from Mitchell’s speciﬁc account of this period of our
history. . . . In GWTW, Scarlett O’Hara often expresses disgust with and
condescension towards blacks; in TWDG, Other, Scarlett’s counterpart,
is herself of mixed descent. In GWTW, Ashley Wilkes is the initial object
of Scarlett’s aﬀection; in TWDG, he is homosexual.”67
The Sue-iﬁcation of the African Americans in the story is unmistakable. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[i]n TWDG, nearly every black
character is given some redeeming quality—whether depth, wit, cunning, beauty, strength, or courage—that their GWTW analogues lacked.”68
Given the racist caricatures in the original, Randall’s redemption of the
African Americans is not only understandable but overdue.
Whether Mitchell’s heirs must tolerate The Wind Done Gone did not
turn on whether either they or even the public liked the retelling. Courts
have insisted that “public majority opinion” is irrelevant to the question
of whether a work is a parody;69 making the inquiry an issue of law helps
insulate uses that society disfavors. Of course, relying on judges to make
the parody determination inserts judges’ own prejudices into the decisionmaking. Yet on occasion, judges have endorsed as fair use those parodies
they have found objectionable. For example, the Second Circuit upheld
an actor’s right to poke fun of the pregnant female body, even though it
found the act “unchivalrous.”70
While parodies often constitute fair use, satires often do not (though
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they may). Satires employ the original work “as a vehicle for commenting on some individual or institution and not on the work itself.” As the
Supreme Court explained in the Campbell case: “Parody needs to mimic
an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of
its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand
on its own two feet and so requires justiﬁcation for the very act of borrowing.”71 That decidedly does not mean that parodies cannot comment
simultaneously on the underlying work and on society at large. Indeed,
this is the norm for parodies that courts have found fair. Justice Souter
recognized that a particular work might exhibit both satire and parody:
“[N]o workable presumption for parody could take account of the fact that
parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its
creative artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic
elements.”72 This will be especially true of source works that are cultural
icons—because of their popularity, critiquing these icons carries a larger
message. When the canon works stand for an era, a mood, a history, the
Mary Sue becomes a subversive intervention.
Mary Sues can be commercial and still be fair.73 Indeed, the history
of fair use is replete with commercial uses, including all of the cases
cited earlier.74 In Campbell, the Supreme Court declared that “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the signiﬁcance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a ﬁnding of fair use.”75
While amateur fan ﬁction is typically authored without remuneration in
mind,76 not all Mary Sues have a noncommercial motive. The possibility
of remuneration is important, because it spurs creation by allowing writers a livelihood in such work, while potentially giving them the ﬁnancial
means to reach a larger audience. Alice Randall, for example, found a
commercial publisher for her story, and will have the right to challenge
Mitchell’s ﬁlm version with her own.
Even when a work is found to be a parody, courts will analyze the
eﬀect of the parody on the market both for the original work and for
potential derivatives in the work. But when a new work transforms the
original in some substantial way, the market harm resulting from the
copying can be diﬃcult to ascertain. The Campbell court noted that “as
to parody pure and simple, it is more likely that the new work will not
aﬀect the market for the original . . . by acting as a substitute for it.” 77
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Mary Sue works—which by their very nature are subaltern critiques of the
dominant stories—are not likely to supplant the market for the originals.
Rather, they are likely to serve a diﬀerent market of specialized consumers who identify more closely with Mary Sue versions than with dominant versions. If part of the market for the original disappears because
the Mary Sue exposes the original’s prejudices, this is not a harm that
copyright law protects against. The Copyright Act is properly concerned
with illegitimate free riding, not the speech eﬀects of the use.78 Take,
for example, scholarly criticism that borrows quotes or images from the
subject of the critique. That criticism might ridicule or deride the original
and thus harm the market for that work, yet that market harm should
not be cognizable in the fair-use inquiry. While scholarly criticism can
be eﬀective, critiques written in the language of the original may prove
equally persuasive.
Not all Mary Sues that challenge stereotypes constitute fair use under
existing law. Fair use is a contextualized, fact-speciﬁc determination requiring courts to carefully consider the factors enumerated in the statute.
In deciding whether a use is fair or unfair, a court must “work its way
through the relevant factors, and . . . judge[] case by case, in light of the
ends of copyright law.” 79 While parodies by their nature require some
amount of borrowing in order to evoke the original,80 the question of how
much is too much can only be determined by considering the particular
context. For example, a Mary Sue masquerading as the canon work would
likely go too far. Indeed, fan-ﬁction authors have developed conventions to
avoid such false advertising.81 In the case of Warner Bros. Entertainment,
Inc. and J. K. Rowling v. RDR Books, a federal district court judge ruled in
2008 that a fan-published encyclopedia of all things Harry Potter did not
constitute fair use because the fan, Steve Vander Ark, copied too much
from Rowling’s original works, thus prompting Vander Ark to put more
of the encyclopedia into his own words before he could sell it.

common critiques of the “mary sue”
Like any claim to use another’s original work, the author of a Mary Sue
will face three fundamental objections. Let us consider some responses
here.
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Why Not Write an Entirely Original Story?
In Campbell v. Acuﬀ-Rose, the Supreme Court indicated its distaste for
someone who borrows someone else’s copyrighted work merely “to avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh.”82 Indeed, a skeptic might
ask: Why not simply write your own world? In a letter to her fans, this is
precisely the advice of the writer Anne Rice: “I do not allow fan ﬁction.
The characters are copyrighted . . . . I advise my readers to write your own
original stories with your own characters.”83
Both the preference for parody over satire and the penchant for entirely original stories have typically turned on economic analysis and the
underlying notion of substitutability. The critical legal inquiry is: Is there
a viable substitute for the copyrighted work? That is, can the later writer
employ a public domain work or invent a wholly original work as an alternative vehicle for his or her critique? Paul Goldstein expresses conﬁdence
that, for satire at least, such alternatives will be readily available: “There
will rarely be a shortage of works, including public domain works, that
with some ingenuity can be made to serve as equally eﬀective vehicles for
the intended satire.”84 If a viable substitute exists, it is no longer necessary
to use the copyrighted work. The focus on substitutability explains why
courts generally favor parody over satire. For satire, as Goldstein reminds
us, a substitute generally exists. But if the point is to comment on a particular work, and to seek to resignify it for oneself, there is no substitute
for the use of the original work.
Furthermore, there is only one Superman. In such cases, social commentary gathers its unique power because of its use of cultural icons.
The abstract statement may not hold the same cultural currency as the
one directed at, and employing, Superman. Thus, it is not the absence of
creative genius on the part of the later author that requires the use of an
earlier work. Rather, while the canon work’s inventiveness or brilliance
may have contributed to its current cultural status, it is the very popularity of the canon work that is the focus of the Mary Sue. Of course, by
piggybacking on the canon work, the Mary Sue cannot guarantee itself
a share in the original’s popularity. But for the author and a particular
set of readers, the Mary Sue helps reimagine the world by reworking the
most powerful elements of popular culture.
This dynamic is particularly important where the popular culture is
widely discriminatory and noninclusive. As Henry Louis Gates, Jr., testi-
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ﬁed in a declaration before the Court in the Wind Done Gone case, “Gone
with the Wind—especially in its book form—is widely regarded in the
black community as one of the most racist depictions of slavery and black
slaves in American literature.”85 In her declaration in the same case, Toni
Morrison asked simply, “Who controls how history is imagined? Who gets
to say what slavery was like for the slaves?”86 Randall’s retelling of the master narrative is a hoary tactic: as Gates testiﬁed, “African Americans have
used parody since slavery to ‘ﬁght back’ against their masters.”87 As Keith
Aoki has described, parody oﬀers a “cultural space for ‘talking back’ at, or
through, the pervasive and dense media languages which constitute much
of our social environment.”88 Rosemary Coombe powerfully asks: “What
meaning does dialogue have when we are bombarded with messages to
which we cannot respond, signs and images whose signiﬁcations cannot
be challenged, and connotations we cannot contest?”89 Theorists, both traditional and postmodern, aﬃrm the discursive nature of creativity: all creators borrow from earlier masters.90 But contemporary cultural theorists
recognize as an important discursive tactic the reworking of a discriminatory narrative to retell history and empower oneself.91 Building on Michel
de Certeau, Henry Jenkins describes fan ﬁction as “textual poaching,” in
which fans “reconstruct meanings according to more immediate interests.”92 Rewriting the popular narrative becomes not only an attempt to
change popular understandings, but also an act of self-empowerment. In
Gates’s words, “[S]ignifying can also be employed to reverse or undermine
pretense or even one’s opinion about one’s own status.” 93
But would not women and minorities who ﬁnd themselves misrepresented in culture be better oﬀ creating wholly new stories, rather than
redeploying the icons already oﬀered by cultural authorities? This is a
common criticism of Star Trek slash ﬁction, which paradoxically is often
penned by women but at the same time often excludes women in its gloriﬁcation of the male bodies of Kirk and Spock. Though I have already posited
some possible explanations for this phenomenon, here I consider it as
an example of a discursive practice known in cultural theory as “bricolage”—the act of creating by “making do” with the hodgepodge of cultural
elements that already exist.94 One study, for example, found that women
writers of Star Trek slash ﬁction focused on the lead males in the show
because (1) the women characters in the story are not interesting, and (2)
the writers were just “working with what’s out there” already.95
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Going further, I have posited a theory of cultural belonging and
participation that goes beyond describing how individuals create within
culture.96 I argue that, more and more, individuals seek a right to develop
their autonomous selves within the normative communities that matter
most to them. Mary Sue fan ﬁction aﬃrms Jane Austen’s observation that
“[o]ne does not love a place the less for having suﬀered in it.” 97 Writers
responding to discriminatory texts they nonetheless love may simply seek
to reclaim the works as their own, and in more aﬃrming ways.
There are, of course, brilliant, entirely original texts that reﬂect an
egalitarian worldview. Yet for whatever reason, few such texts have attained the popular cultural status of a small set of iconic works. Popularity
may arise through a grassroots, word-of-mouth groundswell, which the
Internet has made increasingly possible. More often than not, however,
popularity is carefully cultivated, often requiring a large capital investment that is out of reach for many marginalized communities.98 Even
when popular alternatives emerge, they can be co-opted by the dominant
players simply through acquisition. Take the alternative teenage girl magazine Sassy, purchased by Teen magazine, “which ﬁrst integrated it as a
column and later phased it out completely.” Teen itself was later acquired
and integrated into Seventeen magazine.99
Yet another obstacle to “wholly” invented alternatives is the possible
use of intellectual property law by dominant players against newcomers.
For example, Marvel and DC Comics both claim a joint trademark in the
use of the phrase “Super Heroes” in comic books. Faced with a threat of
suit, the creator of the comic book “Super Hero Happy Hour” changed his
comic’s name to “Hero Happy Hour.”100 While there are reasons to doubt
the validity of the “Super Heroes” mark (for example, the term “super
hero” is generic; the mark owners have failed to meet their obligation
to police unauthorized uses of the mark),101 Marvel and DC can employ
their questionable trademark against those parties lacking the resources
to test their claims in court.
Why Not License the Original?
Why not require that the Mary Sue be licensed from the copyright owner?
Copyright law assumes that copyright owners will be reluctant to license
criticism of their work. The Supreme Court so stated in Campbell v. AcuﬀRose: “Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license
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critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses
from the very notion of a potential licensing market.” 102 The Court accordingly concluded that, if there is no derivative market for criticism,
criticism of the original work cannot interfere with the potential market
for the copyrighted work. This supports the conclusion that critique of
the work itself will likely constitute fair use. But some might argue that
this is too pessimistic. If there is a market for a work, then the copyright
owner should seek to maximize his or her proﬁt by exploiting it—even
if it means tolerating criticism. (An alternative view is that rather than
calling for fair use for criticism, any reluctance to license criticism should
simply imply a compulsory license, requiring a royalty payment in lieu of
a royalty-free use.) For instance, DC Comics, the owner of Batman, Superman, and other popular characters, has authorized “Elseworld” alternative
universes, in which the heroes are villains, and the villains, heroes.103
Two recent moves by corporate America further suggest that “Oﬃcial
Mary Sues” are not entirely unlikely. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., licensed an
Indian version of Spider-Man, with the superhero donning a traditional
Indian loincloth and sparring with the Green Goblin recast as a Rakshasa,
a demon from Hindu cosmology.104 As the Indian publisher announces,
Spider-Man India interweaves the local customs, culture, and mystery
of modern India, with an eye to making Spider-Man’s mythology more
relevant to this particular audience. Readers of this series will see not
the familiar Peter Parker of Queens under the classic Spider-Man mask,
but rather a new hero—a young, Indian boy named Pavitr Prabhakar.
As Spider-Man, Pavitr leaps around rickshaws and scooters in Indian
streets, while swinging from monuments such as the Gateway of India
and the Taj Mahal.105
In late 2005, Disney revised its most lucrative story, Winnie the Pooh,
by replacing the central human ﬁgure, Christopher Robin, with a “redhaired six-year- old tomboy” girl.106 The reaction to Disney’s announcement was mixed. Nicholas Tucker, author of The Rough Guide to Children’s Books, declared the new character “a huge error,” explaining that
the original stories are “built around a boy who arrives and puts things
right, like little boys do.” 107 Yet another scholar of children’s literature
doubts whether the absence of female characters in Winnie the Pooh has
a deleterious eﬀect: Kathleen Horning, who instructs children’s book
librarians at the University of Wisconsin –Madison, reports that, “grow-
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ing up, I had no problem relating to Christopher Robin. He almost had
a non-speciﬁc gender.”108 Do these two events—involving what are likely
to be the single most popular superhero in the world and the single most
popular children’s cartoon character—suggest that underground versions
of popular culture are unnecessary? Indeed, recently even the producers
of Sesame Street, acknowledging their failure to produce “a single female
character with anything close to the name recognition of Big Bird or
Cookie Monster or Ernie and Bert” (not to mention Elmo), introduced a
new girl character, “Abby Cadabby” (although her iconic status remains
to be seen). This introduction comes in this progressive television show’s
thirty-seventh season.109
Despite these examples, the possibility of an oﬃcial Mary Sue for
Winnie the Pooh is unlikely for at least three reasons. First, Disney’s move
comes after almost eighty years of the male- dominated Hundred Acre
Wood; Spider-Man’s new ethnicity comes after more than forty years of a
white-only superhero. It seems unreasonable to expect the world’s women
and minorities to wait patiently for each such move. Second, the oﬃcial
Mary Sue may still leave much to be desired in the characterization of the
newly represented group. Third, even where it expands the representation,
it still leaves large omissions: the tomboy girl replacing Christopher Robin
was white. And ﬁnally, the masters of popular characters are unlikely to
license the most disfavored uses. When the Mitchell estate sought out an
author for a sequel to Gone with the Wind, it required a pledge that the
author “will under no circumstances write anything about miscegenation
or homosexuality.”110 Similarly, while DC Comics produced an alternative
strip featuring an evil Batman, it issued a cease-and- desist letter to an
artist depicting Batman and Robin as lovers.111 An evil Batman, it seems,
is more palatable than a gay one.
Won’t “Recoding” Popular Icons Destabilize Culture?
If popular icons are recoded, will a society’s culture suﬀer? The legal scholar
Justin Hughes worries that a permissive attitude toward transforming
social meanings will undermine cultural stability; according to another
scholar, “Hughes worries that a generally passive audience will suﬀer as
cultural minorities disturb their icons.”112 I disagree for four reasons.
First, human beings have the capacity to hold multiple, even contradictory, meanings simultaneously. Despite the multiplicity of meanings
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that any given word can hold, communication stumbles on. It may at
times require disambiguation, but that does not seem an unreasonable
price for a richer discourse.
Second, the canonical text itself might have multiple interpretations,
both oﬃcial and unoﬃcial. Authors of literary criticism do not seek to
uncover the one authentic meaning of a text, but rather understand that
it can accommodate multiple interpretations. Homosexual readings of
Batman have been oﬀered since at least the 1950s, yet Batman’s womanizing remains a popular motif. Oﬃcial owners have themselves promoted
“forked” meanings—consider Frank Miller’s “grittier” Batman, which
was oﬀered by DC Comics to revive the classic character.113
Third, the meaning of a text evolves over time, and cannot be ﬁrmly
ﬁ xed to some romantic original intention. Our contemporary understanding of culture rejects the static, thing-like terms of early cultural
anthropology. Today’s anthropologists understand culture as “traveling,”
engaging “in both internal and external dialogue” along the way.114
Fourth, demeaning representations in popular culture need to be
challenged. A semiotic democracy in which the power of meaningmaking has been democratized cannot declare certain icons sacred, especially those icons that valorize only the already dominant segments of
society. While many in society may not wish to despoil their romance
with Scarlett and Rhett Butler, the pair’s position in the ﬁction as lords
of a slave plantation cannot be whitewashed.
Everyone’s a superhero, everyone’s a Captain Kirk.
—Nena, “99 Red Balloons”

Reworking the proprietary icons of our age can lead to both political resistance and economic empowerment. Media stereotypes play an
important role in educating us about the capacities of others. Even more
alarming, they are a central way in which we learn about our own capacities. Given a popular media that marginalizes various segments of
society, the act of reworking popular stories to assert one’s own value is
empowering: it opens the path to new livelihoods and roles. Self-insertion
changes popular meanings, laying the foundation for economic change.
Copying can be an act of both homage and subversion.
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chapte r five

Can Intellectual Property Help the Poor?

in l ate december 20 04 , I traveled to India to witness the social ruptures that India’s entry into the modern intellectual property world would
likely trigger. The deadline for developing nations to be fully compliant
with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS), the preeminent global intellectual property law of the Information Age, was January 1, 2005. From that date on, India would have
Western-style intellectual property rights for everything from medicines
to seeds. For more than a decade, the developing world had resisted this
moment. Since they had been pressured into signing TRIPS during the
Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, countries such as Brazil and India
had argued that strong intellectual property rights helped the West but
would devastate the rest.
Sadly, my visit to India that December coincided with an all too literal
tsunami that shook the subcontinent. The tsunami focused the world’s
attention on the rural poor in the countries at the perimeter of the Indian
Ocean. I will seek to keep my focus on these people in this chapter.
Much to my surprise, India rang in the New Year without much ill
note of TRIPS. In the intellectual property storm, the dust had settled, for
now. TRIPS was ﬁnally in India, seemingly to stay, and the intellectual
property scholars and practitioners there with whom I spoke had little
interest in prolonging the battles of the last decade. “TRIPS has entered,
126
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and India took a U-turn because it felt it could not [continue ﬁ ghting
against TRIPS],” V. C. Vivekanandan, an intellectual property professor
at NALSAR, a leading national law school in Hyderabad, told me. “It has
been grudgingly accepted.”1
But in that characteristically Indian way of absorbing every contradiction and all the diversity of life, this was not simply an expression of
passive acceptance of destiny. After a decade of resisting the Western
imposition of intellectual property, now many in India—from the intellectual property professors and lawyers in the cities, to the farmers and
artisans in the villages—were beginning to ask: how can intellectual property rights work for us? TRIPS protected the knowledge and economic
interests of the developed world, the rich corporations of the West. But can
intellectual property be a tool for protecting poor people’s knowledge as
well? Some seem to think so. Take the case of an award-winning farmer
in Kerala who developed a high-yield method for planting rubber trees.
An intellectual property professor from Kerala related the farmer’s story:
“Later when somebody tried to plant [rubber trees] in the same way, [the
farmer] said, ‘No, I will get a patent in this.’” The professor noted, “Five
years back this concept [of patenting] was totally lacking. This farmer had
only studied up to [the] sixth or seventh [grade]. But he has some idea
about this particular law where you can stop somebody else from using
the method.”2
Certainly, the shift to appropriating intellectual property in India
is neither complete nor uncontested. When the Kerala farmer took his
claims to the Rubber Board, there was ﬁerce debate among the farmers.
“One young farmer stood up and said, ‘I [wouldn’t] want any monetary
beneﬁt from this. I [would] just want this to be propagated freely. Uncle,
I [wouldn’t] want a patent. For me the honor of the award [would be]
enough.’”3 But if the daily headlines are any indication, the country’s approach is shifting from this traditional view. The front pages chronicle a
rising tide of applications ﬁled with a national registry established pursuant to the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection)
Act of 1999 (also known as the GI Act).4 Required by TRIPS5 originally
as a means to protect French makers of wines and champagnes, the law
gives trademark-like protection to distinctive goods or services whose
quality and reputation derive from the geographical area in which they are
produced. In a country such as India, which has a vast cultural heritage
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and a store of traditional knowledge dating back to the Vedas, the GI Act is
seen as a potentially important source of recognition and income for India’s
rural poor—the very same poor who otherwise have been displaced and
forced further into poverty by globalization. One hope is that Geographical Indications (GI) protection will allow local artisans to stay in their
communities and fend for themselves, without having to renounce their
traditional work for life in the overcrowded cities. When I visited India in
2005, farmers and artisans from across the country were getting in line to
register their wares, from Darjeeling tea to Alfonso mangoes, Kolhapuri
chappals, Mysore silk and sandalwood, and the uniquely woven sarees
from the village of Pochampally, in the shadow of high-tech Hyderabad.6
Turn the clock back ten years. When intellectual property found its
way into the sanctions regime of the international trade order, there were
no marchers in the streets to mark the occasion. The White House had
issued a white paper declaring the need to strengthen intellectual property law in the face of the digital revolution. Congress was just about to
undertake enormous giveaways to intellectual property holders—granting
famous brands rights even in the absence of consumer confusion, extending copyright terms by another two decades, and securing technological copyright protection schemes against hacking. Courts signaled their
willingness to accept patents on business methods. In the new economy
of the information age, patents, trademarks, copyrights, and even domain
names7 were being distributed with abandon. Conventional wisdom was
that the digital world to come would require bigger and stronger intellectual property rights.
Amid this euphoria, some scholars recognized a dark side of intellectual property. In this narrative of progress, James Boyle, for example,
saw us sowing the seeds of our own destruction. Just as the ﬁrst enclosure of the commons and industrialization had threatened our natural
environment, this new “land grab” in cyberspace and on our cultural
commons, Boyle observed, threatened to ruin our cultural landscape and
deplete our cultural heritage. Boyle’s critical insight was that expanding
intellectual property rights were fed by the conceit of romantic authorship: the idea that individuals (and even corporations) create out of thin
air rather than borrow from a rich public domain of freely circulating
sources and inspirations. “The author vision blinds us to the importance
of the commons—to the importance of the raw material from which
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information products are constructed,” he wrote in his 1996 book Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information
Society.8 The process of creation, Boyle noted, requires the conservation
of cultural raw materials; if these are themselves owned, the process of
creation may be stunted.
Boyle’s vision of a political movement to protect and preserve the
public domain, complete with private institutions dedicated to the project modeled after Greenpeace, spurred the establishment of the Creative
Commons. The metaphor Boyle oﬀered, “cultural environmentalism,”
helped lay the foundation for the recognition and protection of traditional
knowledge and natural resources found in the developing world. Taking a cue implicitly from the environmental justice movement, which
demonstrated the disparate eﬀects of environmental harms on disadvantaged minorities, the cultural- environmental movement illustrated
how third-world peoples are disproportionately disadvantaged by intellectual property law, which historically has not recognized their cultural
contributions.
Indigenous people and those in the third world beneﬁted from the
attention to our cultural commons. It provided a moral and economic
basis to reward their cultivation of the world’s biodiversity and ancient
cultural knowledge about that biodiversity, both of which were required
inputs for innovation. By “reifying the negative” 9 and focusing needed
attention on the “other side” of intellectual property,10 Boyle invented the
public domain.
But now, in the developing world, scholars, lawyers, and activists are
turning the light on what they call “poor people’s knowledge.”11 For them,
this is “the other half of intellectual property”—the knowledge that is not
protected by TRIPS, but perhaps should be.12 In this chapter, I consider
how “cultural environmentalism” both bolsters and obstructs the project of protecting poor people’s knowledge and promoting development
through intellectual property. I argue that although the metaphor spurred
the invention of traditional knowledge as a political and legal category, the
same metaphor may also inadvertently obscure the inventiveness of traditional knowledge. Reifying the public domain may have the unintended
eﬀect of congealing traditional knowledge as “the opposite of property,”13
presenting poor people’s knowledge as the raw material of innovation—
ancient, static, and natural—rather than as intellectual property—mod-
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ern, dynamic, scientiﬁc, and culturally inventive. According to this view,
traditional knowledge holders may receive remuneration for conserving
biodiversity and contributing the raw materials of innovation, but they are
not recognized as intellectual property holders in their own right. What’s
more, a binary view of “intellectual property versus the public domain”
rejects new claims for intellectual property in traditional knowledge on
the premise that these rights would shrink the public domain.14
In truth, the line between what law considers “raw material” versus
“intellectual property” is less stable and more fraught with bias than the
binary approach would acknowledge. While politically eﬀective, reifying
the negative may have the perverse eﬀect of reinventing these categories
as real and stable, obscuring the degree to which they are constructed
and insecure.
If anyone understands this, it is Boyle himself. The author of “Foucault in Cyberspace,”15 Boyle articulated in Shamans, Software, and Spleens
one of his fundamental concerns: the contested concept of authorship.
Why was the shaman’s lore unprotected “traditional knowledge” but W. R.
Grace’s appropriation of that knowledge “innovation”? Why was the patient Mr. Moore’s spleen “raw material” but the UCLA researchers’ cell
line derived from the spleen “intellectual property”? These were more
than the sharp questions of a law professor challenging ﬁrst-year property students. Boyle oﬀered up the “romantic author” not to justify these
categories but to deconstruct them. Boyle persuasively argued for the
need to critically probe authorship and its premise of a “transformative
originality more often assumed than proved.”16
How is it, then, that the cultural environmentalism metaphor may
now be inadvertently helping to reconstruct some of the very same false
binaries that Boyle set out to tear down more than a decade ago? The
answer, I believe, turns on the historical contingency of the work, its intellectual history. In Shamans, Software, and Spleens, Boyle was concerned
about the morality of legally recognizing some members of society as
authors and not others. He bemoaned the distributive eﬀects of such
intellectual property laws as “colossally unfair”17 and boldly called for “a
critical social theory of the information society” 18 that would consider
these diﬃculties. But by and large, Boyle’s own work did not stray far
from intellectual property’s economic tradition. While Boyle acknowledged the broad social, cultural, moral, and distributive eﬀects of intel-
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lectual property, his primary prescriptions stuck to a law-and-economic
analysis of intellectual property. Failure to protect a public domain was,
above all, ineﬃcient. Destroying the raw materials necessary for creation
would stunt creation itself. This approach was admittedly strategic; Boyle
openly stated that economic appeals “will sometimes convince when more
frankly moral appeals do not.”19 Boyle acknowledged that his approach was
not radical, but rather that it evinced “a conservative strand,” advocating
“a return to the rational roots of intellectual property.”20
Boyle displayed a rare combination: postmodern acuity and political savvy. His analogy to the environmental movement was a brilliant
move. But given the discursive restraints of the time, Boyle was not able
to fulﬁll his ambition completely. He openly acknowledged “the dangers
of embracing too closely a language that can express only some of the
things that you care about.”21 Boyle was fully aware of the contingency of
his economic argument, recognizing that “our concerns with education
and the distribution of wealth, with free speech and universal access to
information, can never be fully expressed in the language of neo-classical
price theory.”22
Today, the space for discussing intellectual property’s distributive
and social eﬀects is expanding. Notably, a vast coalition of hundreds of
intellectual property practitioners, scholars, and activists from around the
world are calling for intellectual property to be approached in the context
of broader societal interests and development-related concerns, and not
just from the narrow lens of economic incentives for innovation.23 As ever,
we are enriched by tradition, but not beholden to it. We are still in need
of “a critical social theory of the information society” for which Boyle’s
work oﬀers a foundation. But since then, the discursive space for crafting
that theory has expanded beyond the narrow conﬁnes of understanding
intellectual property rights as incentives alone.
By foregrounding the important role of “raw materials” in the process
of innovation, cultural environmentalism helped provide a theoretical and
political basis for recognition and recompense for the purveyors of those
raw materials—often indigenous peoples who have cultivated the earth’s
biodiversity and who hold “traditional knowledge” about that biodiversity.
The invention of the public domain helped to foster “the invention of
traditional knowledge” as a political and legal category worthy of rights.
But while theorizing the public domain provided intellectual heft to new
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claims for traditional knowledge protection, it has also proved a stumbling
block. Today, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and more
recently the 2011 Nagoya Protocol to the CBD promote an international
legal regime that would reward traditional knowledge holders for their
role in preserving biodiversity and ancient knowledge—that is, for their
role in preserving the public domain.
But these international legal documents do not expressly recognize
the inventiveness of traditional knowledge, nor the attendant intellectual
property rights claimed by the world’s poor as authors and inventors of
new knowledge. In truth, traditional knowledge is much more dynamic
and innovative—indeed evolving—than the “environmentalism” metaphor, with its connotations of conservation, acknowledges. A legal regime
that recognizes poor people as agents—that is, as the subjects of intellectual property, and not just as the objects of intellectual property, oﬀering
up raw materials for others to transform—is premised on a broader view
of the relationship between intellectual property and development itself.
Here yet another side of intellectual property is revealed: its social and
cultural face, not just its economic aspects. World actors are beginning
to recognize that intellectual property is about more than incentives for
innovation. Just like real property rights, intellectual property rights can
promote freedom and security, potentially enabling knowledge societies
in which the rich and poor alike may cultivate and materially beneﬁt
from their ideas.

viewing the poor a s wardens of “ tr aditional”
knowledge
The invention of the public domain helped lay a foundation for “the invention of traditional knowledge” as a political and legal category worthy
of rights. Boyle’s metaphor for a politics of the public domain, “cultural
environmentalism,” helped focus the world’s attention on the value of
ecological and cultural biodiversity for the process of scientiﬁc and cultural innovation, and on the need to preserve those resources. Although
Boyle oﬀered cultural environmentalism as a metaphor, at points cultural
environmentalism coincides with environmentalism itself. Recall the shamans of Madagascar. In this poverty-stricken nation, medicine men had
developed therapeutic uses for the indigenously grown rosy periwinkle.
Enter Eli Lilly & Company, which transformed this plant and the sha-
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man’s lore into a drug to treat Hodgkin’s disease. At the time, the drug
was valued at some $100 million annually.24 As Boyle pointed out, even a
fraction of the company’s proﬁts would have been a signiﬁcant boost to
the economy of this poor country.25 But through the vagaries of Western
intellectual property law, the people of Madagascar received none of the
proﬁts derived from this new drug. Western intellectual property, as Boyle
explained, was premised on an authorial regime that “values the raw
materials for the production of intellectual property at zero,” yet judges
Eli Lilly’s contribution, reﬁning the shaman’s traditional knowledge, in
the hundreds of millions of dollars.26
For Boyle, the rosy periwinkle symbolized more than just a moral
problem, or a problem of postmodern authorship. The rosy periwinkle,
Boyle wrote, “exempliﬁes the utilitarian failures of the current regime.”27
Absent any reward for their preservation of biodiversity and traditional
knowledge, the people of Madagascar had “chopped down most of their
forests to feed [their] people”28 —an irony Boyle decried. In this context,
the cultural environment was not merely metaphor. Boyle was concerned
about the literal environment, the earth’s forests and all of its abundant
biodiversity, from which medicinal and other cultural knowledge could be
derived. Cultural environmentalism called our attention to the traditional
knowledge of the shaman and other people, often poor, who cultivated
disease-resistant wheat and rice and held the secrets of which plants could
cure our ills. Going further, cultural environmentalism highlighted the
need to preserve diverse cultures, the repositories of such knowledge.
“Who knows what other unique and potentially valuable plants disappear
with the forest, what generations of pharmacological experience disappear
as the indigenous culture is destroyed?” Boyle pointedly asked.29
The trope of the romantic author obscured the contributions of biodiversity and traditional knowledge to innovation. “Who needs a public
domain if you can create out of nothing?” Boyle asked.30 By exposing
how companies such as Eli Lilly did not, in fact, create out of thin air, but
rather often beneﬁted from the rich biodiversity and knowledge found in
the global South, Boyle made the strongest case for preserving the public
domain: the public domain saves lives.
Boyle’s theory of the public domain provided intellectual grounding
to arguments for recognizing the value of the cultural contributions of
indigenous and third-world peoples to innovation. Both the CBD and
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the recent Nagoya Protocol to the CBD promote an international legal
regime that would reward indigenous peoples for supplying the raw materials of innovation and preserving the public domain. Employing the
combined language of environmentalism and economics, the CBD refers to local peoples as “resource managers” and their trade as “species
management,”31 and grants countries sovereign rights of ownership over
genetic resources found within their borders. These rights serve as both
ex post reward for biodiversity conservation and ex ante incentive for
continued conservation. The CBD would grant both sovereignty in biological resources and the right to share in the beneﬁts of patented products
that arise from the appropriation of a country’s biodiversity or traditional
knowledge. Similarly, a draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge seeks to
“protect, preserve and enhance the public domain, which is essential for
creativity and sustained innovation,”32 by similarly requiring patent holders to seek prior informed consent for use of biological materials from the
country of origin and to “equitably share the beneﬁts derived from use
of that biological material.”33 The dual recommendation of both resource
sovereignty and equitable beneﬁt sharing seeks to recognize indigenous
peoples as the wardens of the world’s “raw materials” and to reward them
materially for their role in preserving the public domain.
Whereas this theory of the public domain has served to undergird
claims for traditional knowledge protection, so too has it proved a stumbling block. In the last decade, we have seen indigenous peoples and the
poor, not unlike the Kerala rubber-tree farmer, turning their attention
to appropriating intellectual property to their own ends.34 Today claims
by indigenous people and the poor go beyond equitable beneﬁt sharing;
increasingly, the poor seek to own copyrights, trademarks, and patents
in their own cultural and scientiﬁc innovations.35 Strikingly, the traditional advocates for preserving the public domain have ﬂipped. “Native
peoples once stood for the commons,”36 but with the imbalance of TRIPS
becoming ever more apparent, advocates of the poor are turning their attention to securing aﬃrmative intellectual property rights for their own
cultural and scientiﬁc innovations. Paradoxically, however, the concepts of
“traditional knowledge,” the “public domain,” and “cultural environmentalism” are now proving to be obstacles to understanding poor people’s
knowledge as intellectual property. Claims by native peoples to hold intellectual property are resisted as threats to the public domain, or as the
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false consciousness of neo-liberalism, or as a radical assault on our intellectual property tradition, which encourages and promotes cultivation, not
stewardship.37
We should be wary of these declarations and “the romance of the
public domain” itself.38 Anupam Chander and I have argued that, while
the banner of the public domain is taken up for all of humanity, a binary
view of “intellectual property versus the public domain” may not be to
the beneﬁt of the world’s poor.39 Often, we have explained, the beneﬁts of
an open-access commons go to the richest and the strongest. Diﬀerences
in wealth, gender, and class determine whether one will in fact be able to
convert the riches of the commons into lucrative property. This is what
we call the “romance of the commons: the belief that because a resource
is open to all by force of law, it will indeed be equally exploited by all.”40
Concerns arising from eﬃciency alone obscure the disparate eﬀects of
the commons on the poor. Staying attuned to the distributional eﬀects of
the public domain, in contrast, may require thinking about poor people’s
knowledge in “uncommon property”41 terms, facilitating their capability
to exert greater control over their property and to extract compensation
from their knowledge.
The “cultural environmentalism” metaphor reiﬁes the division between “raw” and “cooked” knowledge, a conceptual separation long fundamental to intellectual property law. Ironically, the cultural environmentalism metaphor has fortiﬁed the very boundary between authors and raw
materials that Boyle himself had begun to tear down. Boyle pulled the rug
out from under the romantic author, exposing the equally important role
of sources and audiences in the process of innovation. He also underlined
the vagaries and cultural bias in intellectual property law’s determinations of who were authors and who (Mr. Moore) or what (his spleen)
were the mere raw materials of scientiﬁc and cultural production. Boyle
recognized the problem of “rewarding a narrow set of contributions to
world culture and science.”42 But he stopped short of advocating reform of
a Western intellectual property tradition that was founded on naturalizing
particular distinctions between nature and culture, idea and expression,
raw material and innovation. Anchoring his argument in the orthodox
language of eﬃciency, Boyle praised intellectual property’s tradition of
striking the proper balance between intellectual property and the public
domain but argued that the Information Age had upset that balance.
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Intellectual property policies could continue to promote innovation, he
argued, if it returned to that balance.43
Poor people beneﬁted from this approach to the extent that their contributions toward preserving the cultural environment were unrecognized
in the past. At the same time, reifying the negative has the perverse eﬀect
of congealing poor people’s knowledge as the object of property, the raw
material from which real intellectual property is derived, and obscures
its status as the subject of property, deserving of the label intellectual
property in its own right.
We must consider how law’s reiﬁcation of the negative invents tradition rather than discovers it. The lines between the inputs and outputs
of innovation are anything but static. At the end of the last century, we
witnessed the migration of many forms of knowledge from the public
domain to intellectual property: university research, business methods,
and even life forms joined the realm of intellectual property. In truth, our
intellectual property traditions are more complex than political campaigns
for the public domain allow us to recognize. Viewed in this light, we may
begin to see how the invention of traditional knowledge as perennially raw
rather than cooked erects a false wall between modernity and tradition.
Worse still, it deprives diverse peoples of the world of their humanity
and cultural creativity. As the Indian eco-feminist and property theorist
Vandana Shiva describes, biodiversity is not simply the bounty “of nature,
guided by nothing but Providence.” Far from it, “commons are resources
shaped, managed and utilized through community control.”44 A quartercentury ago, William Cronon helped give birth to the environmental
movement with a similar observation of the active role played by Native
Americans in cultivating the New England environment, which colonists
had deemed “natural.” “One must not exaggerate the diﬀerences between
English and Indian agricultures,” Cronon wrote.45 As Cronon explained,
“[b]y making the arrival of the Europeans the center of our analysis, we
run the risk of attributing all change to their agency, and none to the
Indians. The implication is not only that the earlier world of ‘Indian’ New
England was somehow static but also that the Indians themselves were
as passive and ‘natural’ as the landscape.” 46 Today, when law deﬁnes the
contributions of the poor as nature rather than culture, the “creativity
of both nature and other cultures is negated.” 47 Boyle underlined “law
and the construction of the Information Society.” 48 Our understanding
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of information and knowledge is not preordained but involves political
choices. Indeed, this is the insight of Shiva’s own political act of deﬁning
as “biopiracy” the “patent claims over biodiversity and indigenous knowledge that are based on the innovations, creativity and genius of the people of
the Third World.”49 “Since a ‘patent’ is given for invention,” she argues, “a
biopiracy patent denies the innovation embodied in indigenous knowledge.”50
I do not claim that our ability to distinguish the inputs and outputs
of innovation is entirely indeterminate. Nor do I advocate for a system
of law that would shift continuously according to the changing political
strength of either the rich or the poor in these matters. But I do call for
legal decision-makers to recognize contingency, bias, and unreasoned
orthodoxy in the legal deﬁ nitions that begin to appear natural. Today
we can see how constructing poor people’s knowledge as raw materials
supports a model of “beneﬁt sharing,” permitting local communities to
perhaps receive some compensation from Western patents derived from
those communities’ resources. But this approach rewards the poor only
as wardens, not also as cultivators. In some cases, when the poor’s innovation is overlooked, beneﬁt sharing may be “the equivalent of stealing a
loaf of bread and then sharing the crumbs.” 51

a truer model: the poor a s cultivators of knowledge
Today the poor seek to learn how to use the tools of intellectual property
to recognize their own cultural and scientiﬁc contributions, not just those
of the West. “Traditional knowledge” is continually being invented. In Mysore, India, the makers of internationally famous silk sarees have begun
oﬀering waterproof sarees. Inlaid marble designers in Agra, home of the
Taj Mahal, who for years peddled “hackneyed tourist designs” to visitors,
now apply their craft to create “stunning dinnerware” to be served in the
ﬁnest Indian and Western homes.52 Traditional people move, intermarry,
share ideas, and modify their skills and products to respond to the shifting
demands of the market and their culture. These activities are not merely
strategic and pragmatic, but are evidence of a healthy and dynamic culture. In short, traditional knowledge is more vibrant and innovative than
is acknowledged by the “environmentalism” metaphor, with its emphasis
on conservation of nature’s raw materials.
Debates over the protection of traditional knowledge, however, often
fail to recognize its dynamic character. “Traditional knowledge” typi-
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cally refers to knowledge handed down from generation to generation.
This knowledge includes such forms of cultural expressions as songs,
dances, stories, artworks, and crafts, as well as “symbols, marks, and
other recurring expressions of traditional concepts.” 53 Agricultural, scientiﬁc, and medical knowledge is also covered.54 It is often believed that
this knowledge has existed for millennia and, remarkably, that it has
remained static over time. We are told that proper authorship cannot be
determined because the knowledge has been passed down through an
oral tradition and was not written down. Even if inscribed, we may not
locate a single author; traditional knowledge is often communally held.
Now mix in the historic conception of indigenous and third-world peoples
as the anti-West: anti-commodiﬁcation, anti-property, and anti-markets.
The result is that, partly because of the diﬃculties of ﬁtting poor people’s
knowledge into Western frameworks and partly because this knowledge
is valued as the opposite of property, the creative knowledge of the poor,
and their capacity for knowledge creation, are often overlooked. Instead,
poor people’s concerns are addressed by stimulating technology transfer,
foreign direct investment, access to Western knowledge, and, at best, equitable beneﬁt sharing. Much less attention is given to how law can tap
the innovation and productive knowledge capacities of the poor.
This paradigm is beginning to change. A recent World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) report on traditional knowledge ﬁnds that,
in fact, “much [traditional knowledge] is not ancient or inert, but is a vital,
dynamic part of the contemporary lives of many communities today.” 55
This ﬁnding should not be surprising. Many of the most ancient monuments survived because they remained in use. Traditional knowledge
techniques also survive in this way, by continuously evolving as humans
innovate around them to meet current needs and solve contemporary
problems. Traditional knowledge, WIPO tells us, “is being created every
day and evolves as individuals and communities respond to the challenges
posed by their social environment. . . . This contemporary aspect is further
justiﬁcation for legal protection.”56
Return to the example of Mysore silk sarees. The “grand old queen”
of Indian silk57 has had a makeover since obtaining a geographical indication, updating its look with trendy new (but, interestingly, natural) colors—
“lilac, ecru, coﬀee-brown and elephant-grey”—and with “contemporary”
designs inspired by temple architecture and tribal jewelry.58 Make no
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mistake: tradition is hard work. As an executive producer of Mysore silk
sarees explained, revamping the designs without losing the sheen of the
silk took “months of painstaking research and trials.”59
Consider another example, closer to home. A San Francisco–based
artist trained in the modernist textile tradition of Ray Eames received
a felt rug from her Iranian-American husband, which he purchased in
1999 on his ﬁrst trip back to Iran after the Revolution. The felt rug, the
product of a seven-thousand-year-old tradition, inspired the designer to
apply her contemporary paintings to the rugs themselves—a collaboration
across cultures and generations. This was an idea that the Internet and
the Creative Commons could not assist. Indeed, the couple embarked on
a four-year journey across Iran to learn more about felt rug making, to
ﬁnd that only a few living felters remain, sprawled all over that country
and unconnected to one another. The couple put the felters in touch with
each other and established an Iranian factory that employed the best of
their techniques, literally reviving an art on the verge of extinction and
creating a proﬁtable market for the rugs both within and beyond Iran.60
Tradition is cultivated, not discovered. The concept of traditional
knowledge, too, is a modern invention. Those studying poor people’s
knowledge warn of the dangers of “overdrawing the distinction between
[traditional knowledge] and modern knowledge.”61 In truth, “no one’s life
is entirely traditional, and no one’s life is entirely modern.” 62 Indeed,
forcing ourselves to see the modern aspects of traditional knowledge also
helps us to view more critically our own romantic notions of Western
intellectual property as “new.” As Boyle demonstrated so well, the line
separating the public domain and intellectual property does not often involve the eureka discovery that the trope of the romantic author suggests.
Developing marketable uses for third-world cultural products is
“ultimately perhaps the most eﬀective way to protect their traditions.”63
Increasingly, third-world artisans recognize that “[e]xcept in a museum
setting, no traditional craft skill can be sustained unless it has a viable
market.”64 And recent activity suggests that many third-world craftspeople
and artisans are more accepting of market strategies and practices than
is generally acknowledged. We see again that commerce and culture are
not necessarily at odds, as demonstrated by the revitalization of Iranian
felt rug making by the introduction of global markets, a process that has
encouraged preservation through commercialization. And vehicles like
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geographical indications help preserve geographical diversity.65 Weavers,
artisans, farmers, and the makers of handicrafts do not have to leave their
skills or homes for city life. If properly identiﬁed, trained, and protected,
they can remain at home while participating in a global industry.
In short, applying principles of intellectual property rights to poor
people’s knowledge will encourage third-world development, and not
just in the defensive sense of resisting TRIPS.66 Partly, the development
interest here is economic, although it is unclear how much monetary
value is at stake.67 In 2000, handicrafts alone were estimated to generate
nearly $3 billion in annual revenue.68 The United Nations estimates that
developing countries lose about $5 billion in royalties annually from the
unauthorized use of traditional knowledge.69 Poor people’s turn to property is surely about economics, but it is about social and cultural values
as well. These claims recognize that the relationship between intellectual
property and development goes beyond GDP. People, rich and poor alike,
want recognition of their creativity and of their contributions to science
and culture. This capacity for innovation, work, and cultural sharing is
part of what makes us human.
WIPO and TRIPS have focused on teaching the poor how to protect
the intellectual property of the West. We need to turn our attention to
helping the poor to use intellectual property to protect their own inventions as well. Only some of the people who hold traditional knowledge
oppose the commodiﬁcation of their knowledge on religious or cultural
grounds; but most are poor, lacking in the infrastructure for production,
and are ignorant of intellectual property laws and commercial knowledge
of marketing and branding. Intellectual property ownership does not
come naturally.
In many cases . . . poor people’s knowledge meets the standard
of novelty that modern IP law demands. . . . The development
dimension lies in helping poor people to master the commercial/legal tools needed to collect the value of their novelty. This
is about entrepreneurship, about ﬁnding clever ways to repackage traditional knowledge into products useful for consumers
in mass markets, and about developing the capacity to produce
and deliver these products in suﬃcient quantity and quality as
to satisfy such markets.70
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Increasingly, indigenous people and those in the third world seek
“training on IP tools and how to use them.”71 The new Indian Geographical Indications Act oﬀers an example. When the act became eﬀective in
2003, few were aware of its implications. Nongovernmental organizations
thus embarked on extensive campaigns to educate local farmers and artisans about geographical indications (GIs).72
The TRIPS agreement oﬀers a foundation for international recognition of GIs. It deﬁnes GIs as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member . . . where a given quality, reputation, or
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”73 “Champagne,” “Tequila,” and “Roquefort” are examples of
the types of goods recognized as GIs. Under TRIPS, member states must
provide legal means to prevent uses of a designated GI that either mislead
the public as to the geographical origin of the good or constitute “unfair
competition” under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.74 In addition,
TRIPS Article 23 mandates that further protection be extended to GIs
for “wines and spirits,”75 which must be protected even in the absence of
consumer confusion.76
Two-tiered protection—a higher level of protection for wines and
spirits and a lower one for everything else—has been a source of continuing conﬂict between Europe and the developing world.77 The conﬂict is
due in part to a perceived inequity in the current TRIPS system, and in
part to the fact that GIs are considered to be where much of the wealth of
poor people lies: in local production methods and cultural goods, from
Darjeeling tea to Mysore silk to basmati rice.78 The patent provisions
of TRIPS have posed clear challenges for developing countries, which
typically lack capital for R&D-intensive breakthroughs or manufacturing capacity. GIs, in contrast, are hailed as the poor people’s intellectual
property rights, tools for ensuring recognition of the knowledge of weavers, farmers, and craftspeople rather than just the high-technology contributions of multinational corporations. The structure of GIs does make
them particularly suited to poor people’s knowledge. First, GIs recognize
collective intellectual property rights; under the Indian GI Act, multiple
associations of artisans may be recognized as the authorized producers
or users of a GI.79 GI applications are also relatively cheap, at least for a
group of artisans working together. Under the GI Act, it costs a modest
ﬁve thousand rupees (a little more than $100) to apply.80
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Although GIs certainly hold promise for the poor, they have limits.
The Indian GI Act protects only those goods or processes whose quality
or reputation is shown to be “due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, with its inherent natural and human factors.”81
GI applications require “proof of origin” and a “historical record” 82 of
continuous use of the goods or process. Registrants obtain the exclusive
right to use the GI,83 and licensing of GIs is prohibited.84
Such requirements and restrictions take a narrow view of traditional
knowledge, linking culture to land. The rule against alienability poses
special concerns. Even if this approach may enable people to remain within
their communities (and preserve the physical environment, as well), what
if they move? What rights do traditional weavers from Mysore have if
they move to North India—or the United Kingdom?85 Of course, there
are good reasons to prevent the alienation of the GI from the particular
geographical community. It prevents the scenario in which a large foreign
corporation hires a member of that community away and then begins to
produce “authentic” work elsewhere, using that GI—and decimating the
livelihoods of the traditional community left behind. At the same time,
such a restriction could stiﬂe opportunities for individuals who remain
within a traditional community not by choice, but because of economic
necessity. People move, intermarry, and change jobs. Culture ﬂows with
them. The GI Act does not recognize this dynamic nature of culture;
instead it ossiﬁes authentic production in today’s localities.
Within a recognized “association,” traditional leaders may impose
their will on members, reifying traditional hierarchies.86 Elizabeth Povinelli notes that cultural rights often lead to the ironic production of authenticity or indigeneity, which conforms to traditional structures from
the past, rather than celebrating cultures as diachronic peoples who are
dynamic and heterogeneous.87
The GIs also pose economic concerns. While GIs protect Darjeeling
tea, for example, they also prohibit the Indian manufacture of Scotch
whiskey, driving up the cost of Scotch in India. It is possible that the poor
may reap greater economic rewards in a system with fewer production
constraints.88 Boyle’s concern about the public domain also applies; at
which point does too much intellectual property impede the very processes of cultural sharing and innovation that law ought to promote,
especially to aid the little guy in cultural production? These economic
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concerns raise an important question of liberal strategy. As critical legal
theorists have aptly warned, we must stand ready to openly question when
and how “rights” might work to the disadvantage of the poor rather than
to the poor’s beneﬁt.89
These concerns notwithstanding, GIs do potentially oﬀer a range of
beneﬁts, from recognizing the innovation of collectives, to preserving
geographic diversity and stimulating some redistribution of wealth. It may
be more important to think of GIs as part of a larger framework in which
the poor learn the secrets of Madison Avenue. If one simply produces
goods, then any successful product will eventually draw stiﬀ competition
from global mass production. But creating a protected brand allows one
to stave oﬀ complete usurpation by mass-produced substitutes. The GI
Act works on this principle. It rewards the local community for having
created a valued reputation and protects that reputation from the forces of
global commerce. It recognizes that consumers everywhere seek authentic
products and that they may care about who produces something, not just
the ultimate product.90 Fair Trade coﬀee, Rugmark carpets, and dolphinsafe tuna, for example, appeal to people’s desire to consume free from the
worry about exploitation in the process of production. In response to the
commercialization of ghetto style by white- owned fashion houses, one
African American company declares to the consumer its ghetto roots by
branding itself “FUBU”—For Us, By Us. Such authenticity marks translate into proﬁts in the marketplace.
The goal is “to help poor people get along in the modern world—to
use modern instruments for managing the ownership of knowledge either to collect on the commercial value of that knowledge or to prevent its
use in a way that its owners consider inappropriate.”91 New organizations
such as Light Years IP are emerging to address this need, specializing in
marketing and branding a developing country’s intellectual property.92
The Danish artists’ collective Superﬂex has pioneered this strategy. The Superﬂex “Supercopy” art collaboration employs what it calls a
“counter-economic strategy” to teach local farmers in the third world how
to convert their biodiversity and traditional knowledge into branded end
products that can eventually compete with the products of global multinationals. In one ongoing collaboration, Superﬂex works with a farmers’
cooperative in Maués, Brazil. This region in the Amazon is famous for
cultivating the guarana berry, prized by the local population for its per-
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ceived medicinal and energy-giving properties. The Dutch multinational
Ambev and Pepsi Co. have successfully marketed global energy drinks
derived from this plant, most notably Ambev’s “Antarctica” drink. The
local Maués farmers complained that the multinationals have formed a
cartel, driving down the price of the guarana berries from $25/kilo to
$4/kilo. So the cooperative is ﬁghting back. In collaboration with Superﬂex, farmers held brainstorming sessions to begin developing their own
product and designing a label for it. One member, for example, suggested
a coﬀee drink called Maués Café, evoking the internationally popular
Nescafé drink.
Eventually, the cooperative decided to manufacture and distribute
a soft drink: Guaraná Power. Members designed a label for the drink,
which comprises a photograph of local farmers aﬃ xed atop the familiar
Antarctica label. Guaraná Power’s marketing slogan? “[O]riginal Maués
guarana for energy and empowerment.”
The Superﬂex collaboration turns on a simple idea: empowerment for
the poor will entail their learning how to control and market their own
knowledge products. In the words of Superﬂex (appropriated from Ani
DiFranco): “Every tool is a weapon if you hold it right.”93 The Maués collective spoke with lawyers about intellectual property rights, raised capital,
paired with a production company in Denmark, and searched for global
distributors for Guaraná Power.94 Superﬂex’s Guaraná Power gallery ﬂoor
reproduces the shop ﬂoor, taking visitors on a journey from producing to
bottling, labeling, refrigerating, and tasting Guaraná Power.
The poor must be recognized as both receivers and producers of
knowledge. Failing to promote poor people’s capacity for creative work
and their participation in global culture and commercial markets hinders
development as freedom. As Sen writes, “the rejection of the freedom to
participate in the labor market is one of the ways of keeping people in
bondage and captivity.”95 In the Knowledge Age, wealth lies not simply in
access to other people’s knowledge (although this is certainly important),
but also in the ability to produce new knowledge and to beneﬁt from this
creation, culturally and economically.
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Bollywood /Hollywood

in may 19 67 t he accl aimed Indian director of The Apu Trilogy,
Satyajit Ray, received a “joyous carillon of a cable”1 from Hollywood: Columbia Pictures would back The Alien. Ray would have a free hand. Both
Marlon Brando and Steve McQueen were keen to play a leading role. Saul
Bass would mastermind the special eﬀects.2 And what luck—Peter Sellers
was in Hollywood at that very moment, playing an Indian in a comedy,
and was anxious to meet Ray for the second time to discuss playing the
Indian philanthropist in the ﬁlm. As Ray later wrote, “With the hum of
the machinery in my ears, I arrived in Hollywood on June 1.”3
By 1967, Satyajit Ray was already widely considered a genius ﬁ lmmaker and the “father of Indian cinema.”4 His ﬁlms, rooted in the lives of
Bengalis in post-Independence India and ﬁlmed in the Bengali language,
depict ordinary lives: children fated to die of poverty, women trapped
in subservient familial roles, a new generation of middle- class Indians
seeking liberation from their elders and the traditions of the past. In his
ﬁrst feature ﬁlm, Pather Panchali,5 Ray brilliantly directed impoverished
Bengali villagers living in the rural countryside in the 1920s. In the ﬁlm a
wrinkled old woman brushes her teeth with her ﬁngers and spits outside
the house door; the main character, a young girl named Durga, succumbs
to illness because of the family’s poverty. The acuity with which Ray cap145
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tures their humanity is lyrical. Countless ﬁlmmakers around the world
fondly recall their ﬁrst viewing of the ﬁlm.
Needless to say, Ray’s ﬁlms (some thirty-seven in all) bore little resemblance to the grandeur of Hollywood cinema—or, for that matter, to
the glitzy, upper-middle-class escapades gloriﬁed by escapist Bollywood
ﬁlms. But a chance correspondence between Ray and his friend Arthur
C. Clarke, the British science-ﬁction writer and author of 2001: A Space
Odyssey, put Ray on a fateful journey across the Atlantic in the hopes of
partnering with Hollywood to create his ﬁrst science-ﬁction ﬁ lm. The
ﬁ lm was to be called The Alien.6 The screenplay would be based on a
short science-ﬁction story titled “Bankubabur Bandhu” (translated as
“Banku’s friend”) that Ray had written in Bengali for his family magazine, Sandesh, a few years earlier. For most ﬁ lms Ray would not even
have considered American backing—but a science-ﬁction ﬁlm like The
Alien would require special eﬀects that Indians could not aﬀord. Indeed,
to this day Bollywood avoids the genre because of prohibitive costs. Ray’s
story revolved around a spaceship that lands in a pond on the outskirts
of a Bengali village. Locals begin worshipping it as a temple, which they
think has risen from the Earth. The alien befriends a young village boy
named Haba, and the story is largely about their friendship, and about the
humorous pranks the alien plays on the local villagers, from reviving a
farmer’s dying crops to pestering a mean farmer by ripening his mango
tree out of season.
Fascinated with Ray’s idea, Clarke put him in touch with an American friend living in Sri Lanka, Mike Wilson. (Clarke was living in Sri
Lanka at the time, as he did for most of his life.) Wilson had just written,
directed, and produced a ﬁlm about a Sri Lankan secret agent—unabashedly named James Banda (this should have been a warning sign to Ray).
Wilson took a keen interest in Ray’s idea and swiftly ﬂew out to Calcutta,
where he propped himself in the renowned director’s apartment for two
weeks until Ray ﬁnished a script. Wilson ﬂew the script to Hollywood
and pressed Columbia Pictures to take up the project. By then Ray had
become uncomfortable with Wilson’s aggressive partnering. Ray traveled
to Hollywood in 1967 to discuss the project with Columbia Pictures, but
his high hopes were quickly deﬂated. For starters, mimeographed copies
of The Alien script were ﬂoating around the Columbia Pictures oﬃces
emblazoned with the legend “Copyright Mike Wilson and Satyajit Ray.”

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 146

2/10/12 2:23 PM

b olly wo od/holly wo od

147

When Ray confronted Wilson, Wilson insisted that he had put himself on
the copyright to protect Ray’s interests. Later, Columbia Pictures asked
Ray whether he had received any of the $10,000 advance they had given
to Wilson for them to share—Ray had not. The relationship between
Ray and Wilson further deteriorated, and Columbia Pictures never made
the ﬁlm.
Still, Ray had not completely ruled out The Alien project when, in
1982, Steven Spielberg’s E.T.: The Extraterrestrial7 premiered. The ﬁlm,
which began as a Columbia Pictures project, bore a striking resemblance
to The Alien. Most telling, in Ray’s words, was that the alien is “small and
acceptable to children and possessed of certain superhuman powers—not
physical strength but other kinds of powers, particular types of vision,
and that it takes an interest in earthly things.”8 Both Ray’s and Spielberg’s
aliens “had a sense of humor, a sense of fun, a mischievous quality. I
think mine was a whimsy,”9 said Ray. Ray’s friend, Arthur C. Clarke, also
immediately saw the resemblance between the two ﬁlms, and he urged
Ray to write to Spielberg and point out the similarities. “Don’t take it lying down,” Clarke advised. But while Ray did later say that “E.T. would
not have been possible without my script of The Alien being available
throughout America in mimeographed copies,”10 he did not pursue the
matter further. E.T.’s release deepened Ray’s dismay over the culture of
Hollywood. Spielberg himself later denied any suggestion of plagiarism,
saying he was in high school when the script had ﬁrst been circulated in
Hollywood. But that is not quite accurate—Spielberg graduated from high
school in 1965, and by 1967 (when Ray visited Hollywood) Spielberg was
already working in Hollywood, to the extent that he released a short ﬁlm
in 1968 through Universal Studios. By 1969, Spielberg was the youngest
director at a major Hollywood studio.11

the bl ack atl antic
As part of his “Black Atlantic” thesis, Paul Gilroy observed how musical
inﬂuences ﬂowed across the African diaspora. In this chapter, I consider
transnational cultural ﬂows inﬂuencing ﬁlms from Bollywood to Hollywood. Just as Gilroy celebrated “the inescapable hybridity and intermixture of ideas”12 with respect to literary and musical works, so too should
we embrace—descriptively and prescriptively—the transcultural ﬂow of
ideas regarding the stories we tell in the movies. This chapter ﬂatly rejects
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those notions of cultural purity and essentialism that would forbid ideas
from ﬂowing from East to West, and vice versa. In so doing I adopt an
explicitly transcultural and intercultural perspective. Culture will and
must be shared widely and freely both across borders and within them.
But in this chapter I consider another view of the black Atlantic,
focusing on claims of copyright piracy and exploitation that lurk in the
shadows of global cultural exchanges. Simply put, free ﬂows of culture are
not always fair ﬂows of culture. Global cultural changes take place against
a backdrop of sharp diﬀerentials in power and knowledge, which aﬀect
the way authors are recognized and rewarded. In this chapter I seek to
highlight how global inequalities combined with long-standing cultural
biases may impede the free and fair exchange of culture.
It is by now a commonplace observation in copyright scholarship that
all creativity is derivative. Yet romantic notions of authorship and originality continue to have a strong hold on the imagination. The ﬂ ip side is
also true: the dramatic image of copyright pirates brashly ripping oﬀ the
masterworks of original creators is equally alluring. One thesis of this
chapter is that cultural stereotypes help feed the myth of the romantic author,
on the one hand, and that of the inglorious pirate, on the other. Cultural
biases buttress the strong copyright claims of some creators—primarily
those in the West who are seen as “creative” and “original”—and undermine claims for cultural dynamism and borrowing made by other creators—primarily those in Asian developing countries, which are thought
to breed cultures of slavish imitation and obedience to tradition. These
myths mask the underlying dynamic nature of innovation, which relies
on transcultural ﬂows of knowledge. More insidiously, these stereotypes
help to mask exploitation of the weak by the strong.
One goal of this chapter is to ﬂip some common perceptions about the
world’s innovators and pirates. A recent spate of copyright suits by Hollywood against Bollywood sounds a familiar theme, denouncing Asians as
imitators and accusing them of ruthlessly copying ﬁlm plots and lifting
scenes from American hits such as Mrs. Doubtﬁre and My Cousin Vinny.13
But claims of cultural appropriation go back far, and travel in multiple
directions. As we have seen, even the revered American director Stephen Spielberg has been accused of lifting E.T. from Satyajit Ray’s 1962
script for The Alien. Later in this chapter I will recount how Disney’s
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The Lion King bears striking similarities to the Japanese anime television series Kimba the White Lion, directed by Japan’s master animator,
Osamu Tezuka.14
Neither Ray nor Tezuka sued the American ﬁlmmakers—and this
chapter is by no means an eﬀort to revive any legal case. This is not a brief.
Rather, my task is to consider copyright’s role in promoting free and fair
cultural exchange within a global marketplace of ideas that is marked by
sharp diﬀerentials in power, wealth, and knowledge. The problem in the
cases I will recount is not that ideas and expression ﬂow across state lines.
To the contrary, copyright law ought to promote cultural exchange, not
stymie it. Yet a free culture ought also to be a fair culture, in which people
around the world are fairly recognized and remunerated for their protectable work. In this chapter I show how cultural stereotypes combined with
actual inequalities across cultures often thwart mutual recognition of
diverse authors and their contributions to our shared culture. In so doing, this chapter considers some of copyright’s blind spots to diﬀerences
in global power, and law’s assumptions about culture and authorship.
I ﬁrst consider the romantic authorial claims of a prime mover in
Hollywood: Disney. While Disney has come to stand for the romantic author deserving of near perpetual copyright protection, in fact this animation giant grew by appropriating the master works of others, from Hugo
to Kipling, which quickly fell into the public domain when copyright
terms were shorter. In other instances, Disney may have ﬂat- out stolen
the copyrighted works of foreign authors.15 Cultural stereotypes of the
Western creator as an “original genius” help to mask Disney’s own cultural borrowings and appropriations.
In stark contrast, Bollywood ﬁ lmmakers are frequently charged as
brashly pirating the screenplays of their Hollywood counterparts. I suggest, however, that while Hollywood ﬁlms certainly inﬂuence the plot of
a number of Bollywood ﬁ lms, many Bollywood ﬁ lms are original, and
those that do appropriate are far from simple copies. In short, culture
does not accurately tell us who is innovative and who is uninspired. At
the same time, culture does play a part in explaining how and why people
appropriate others’ cultural works. Cultural appropriation helps to understand the life of another; putting oneself in another’s shoes reveals both
what makes us similar and how we stand apart.
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Animating this chapter is an understanding of copyright in broader
terms than the traditional, narrow vision of law as merely a tool for incentivizing the innovation of cultural products. Copyright is far more than
that. Copyright governs the creation, distribution, and participation in
culture and art, which John Dewey memorably described as “the most
eﬀective mode of communication that exists.”16 Critics today are appropriately questioning the narrow economic incentive thesis, exploring the
plural motivations that spur creativity.17 In this book, I have argued that
the very essence of culture is sharing meaning with others and promoting mutual understanding. Consequently, we must take participation in
cultural production more seriously, so that our law will not just incentivize
the production of more cultural goods, but also promote global participation in making our cultural world, from music to ﬁlm to stories.
Cultural pluralism—a global culture in which all peoples have an
opportunity to be creative authors of their own lives and of our world—
is both an end in itself, and a means to economic development in the
Knowledge Age. Cultural pluralism is an end of freedom in the sense that
making and sharing meaning with others—from singing together to recounting stories—is fundamentally what human freedom is for. The cultural sphere of life encompasses those joys and relationships that make a
human life truly worth living.18 At the same time, participation in cultural
production today has signiﬁcant social and economic eﬀects. Promoting
the recognition of diverse authors and creators of cultural works fosters
dignity and respect for others as creative intellectuals and as fellow human beings with worthy stories to tell. What’s more, in today’s Knowledge
Age, substantial revenues ﬂow from the production and control of cultural goods exchanged through global markets. Finally, cultural pluralism
promotes mutual understanding through cultural exchanges. As Dewey
eloquently put it, “The art characteristic of a civilization is the means for
entering sympathetically into the deepest elements in the experience of
remote and foreign civilizations.”19 Today, the arts remain central to the
project of fostering mutual understanding of and sympathy for others.
The 2008 Academy Award–winning ﬁlm Slumdog Millionaire20 put people
around the world into the shoes of three impoverished and orphaned
children born in the slums of Bombay. Literature and ﬁlms help convey
tragedy through comedy, humanize those born on far sides of the Earth,
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and reveal what is common in our sentiments and aspirations. As Martha
Nussbaum writes, “We do not automatically see another human being as
spacious and deep, having thoughts, spiritual longings, and emotions.
It is all too easy to see another person as just a body—which we might
then think we can use for our ends, bad or good. It is an achievement to
see a soul in that body, and this achievement is supported by poetry and
the arts, which ask us to wonder about the inner world of that shape we
see—and, too, to wonder about ourselves and our own depths.” 21
Martin Scorsese, for example, recounts seeing Satyajit Ray’s ﬁ lm
Pather Panchali in New York City in the early 1960s: “I was 18 or 19 years
old and had grown up in a very parochial society of Italian-Americans and
yet I was deeply moved by what Ray showed of people so far from my own
experience.” Scorsese “was very taken by the style of these ﬁlms—at ﬁrst
so much like the Italian neo-realist ﬁlms, yet surprising the viewer with
bursts of sheer poetry.”22 Scorsese later helped convince the Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences to award Ray an honorary Oscar. The
Academy ﬁnally did give Ray the honor, in 1991, just before his death at the
age of seventy.23 Ray called the Oscar “the best achievement of my moviemaking career,”24 equating it with a Nobel Prize for ﬁlmmakers. What most
touched Ray is that audiences and critics worlds apart could appreciate his
art. “The most distinctive feature [of my ﬁlms],” said Ray, “is that they are
deeply rooted in Bengal, in Bengali culture, mannerisms, and mores. What
makes them universal in appeal is that they are about human beings.” 25
And yet, much art today is not so transcendent. Hollywood is criticized as being all too parochial in its choice of subjects. Worse still, at the
dawn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, there is still too much art that demonizes
rather than humanizes the other. Heroes are white and villains are black,
Asian, or Middle Eastern. Women are objects, not subjects, still largely
seen as the ultimate trophy in a contest among male protagonists. Bollywood fares no better. Often these ﬁlms depict women as being pure as
the Goddess Sita, long-suﬀering and sexually objectiﬁed (wet saree scenes
are abundant).26 Such problems are not limited to popular culture. Even
great literature is rife with gross imbalances and, indeed, racist mischaracterizations, as we learned with Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the
Wind.27 In short, art can insult, mischaracterize, colonize, and provoke
misunderstanding.
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Copyright relations, too, can upend cultural production and further
the divide between East and West, North and South, rich and poor. That
is, copyright can help to promote either recognition or misrecognition of
global others. The special eﬀects that Satyajit Ray, one of the greatest ﬁlmmakers of all time, sought to include in his science-ﬁction ﬁlm were out
of reach of Indian production budgets; he needed a Hollywood partner.
Yet his encounter ultimately led to disappointment. Indeed, the exploitation of Ray’s copyright from the beginning of the project dissuaded him
from becoming involved in the project altogether. Poor copyright relations
meant Ray’s ﬁlm never got made.
There is a connection between the depiction of Indians in Hollywood
ﬁlms at the time and Hollywood’s treatment of Ray himself. Ironically, on
Ray’s visit to Hollywood in 1967, Peter Sellers invited Ray to watch him on
the set, where he was playing “an Indian in a Hollywood setting” in the
ﬁlm The Party.28 Indeed, Ray had initially tapped Sellers for The Alien29
because he had seen Sellers play an Indian before, in The Millionairess.30
A Hollywood-ﬁnanced movie would need a big-name actor like Sellers to
seal the deal, and Sellers was keen to play a role in The Alien, telling Ray
that a fortuneteller had told him to take the part; it was “fate.”
Yet Sellers evinced a great naiveté about his own role in perpetuating negative stereotypes of Indians abroad. Watching Sellers ﬁlming The
Party, Ray began to question Sellers’s judgment. As Ray recounts, he
witnessed “quite the most tasteless, heavy-handed caricature of an Indian
ever put on the screen.”31 “I was so disgusted that I would in any case have
found it most diﬃcult to work with him,”32 Ray later said of Sellers. A year
later Ray watched a screening of The Party while on tour in Sydney and
took Sellers’s depiction as a personal insult. In The Party, Sellers plays a
two-bit Bollywood actor who is mistakenly invited to an A-list Hollywood
party. At the party, the Indian ogles a big-breasted blonde; she takes a
fancy to him and invites him home. But standing at the door of her apartment, he declines to enter.33 Ray recounts the ﬁlm’s end: “I’m sorry,” says
Bakshi to the girl who has taken a fancy to him and has asked him into
her ﬂat. “I’m sorry, but I must go back to my monkey.” “Monkey!” “Yes.
My pet monkey, Apu.”34 Ray believed the name of the monkey, Apu, was
not mere coincidence (Ray’s celebrated troika of ﬁlms chronicling the life
of one boy, beginning with Pather Panchali,35 is called The Apu Trilogy).
His Hollywood experience, Ray later wrote in a letter, was “the beginning
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of a period of profound uneasiness. . . . I was too deeply disturbed, and for
another—I was in a strange sort of way fascinated by the sinister turn of
events and waited to see which way and how far it would go.”36

holly wood
Examples of global cultural borrowing and appropriation abound. Consider the classic case of the romanticized “author”—Disney. Disney’s
mega-hit animated ﬁlm The Lion King37 has earned over a billion dollars
thus far and is one of the most beloved animated ﬁlms in the Disney canon.
The Lion King musical won several Tony awards and is one of the longestrunning shows on Broadway. What is far less known, however, is that the
ﬁlm has been beset by allegations of piracy from global creators. As we
have already seen, recently Disney paid a hefty settlement to the heirs of
Solomon Linda, the late South African musician who composed the ﬁlm’s
musical hit, “The Lion Sleeps Tonight” (originally titled “Mbube”) in
1939. Linda and his family received virtually nothing for the song until a
Rolling Stone journalist revealed the song’s origins in 2000, together with
the sordid history of exploitation of Linda’s copyright across the “Black
Atlantic,” from Africa to the United Kingdom to the United States.38
But charges of plagiarism had been leveled at Disney well before
the Linda family’s suit. On the heels of the ﬁlm’s release in 1994, wellknown Japanese manga (comic) artists and fans organized public protests
against The Lion King, which bears a striking resemblance to the popular
television series Kimba the White Lion39 by the master Japanese animator
Osamu Tezuka.40 Tezuka has long been hailed as the father of Japanese
anime and the “Walt Disney of Japan.” His well-known anime series
Kimba the White Lion, based on his manga serial Jungle Emperor 41 of the
early 1950s, aired as the ﬁrst color animated television series in Japan in
the early 1960s and circulated widely among animation buﬀs internationally. English and Spanish versions of the series were created in 1966, and
Kimba the White Lion was aired as a syndicated program by NBC in the
United States for more than a decade.42 (Other Japanese anime programs
on American television at that time include Speed Racer and Tezuka’s
own Astro Boy, which aired in primetime on NBC.43) Tezuka reportedly
spent a year researching Africa before penning Jungle Emperor, which he
considered his crowning achievement.44 As one scholar writes, “There is
not a single Japanese who does not know Tezuka and Jungle Emperor.” 45
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(The claim may not be overblown: comics penetrate more broadly in Japan than in the West. It is frequently said that everyone reads comics in
Japan.46) Tezuka’s own admiration for Disney had been great, so much
so that upon hearing the allegations that creators of The Lion King had
copied from Tezuka, the president of Tezuka Productions said the revered
Japanese artist would have been ﬂattered if that were the case.47 (Tezuka
died in 1989, before The Lion King was made.)
Devotees of Tezuka are less sanguine about the similarities, which
are abundant:48
• The basic story plot and setting are the same: an African emperor
lion dies early, leaving a young cub. The son struggles with himself over his responsibilities to lead the animal kingdom. The son
eventually returns from exile and overthrows the evil lion who
has usurped power in the son’s absence.
• Nearly every animal character in Kimba the White Lion has an
analogue in The Lion King. For example, in both versions a baboon serves as an old sage, the henchmen for the evil lion are
hyenas, and the hero lion’s adviser is a parrot.
• The evil lion in Jungle Emperor, “Claw,” is blind in one eye; the
evil lion in The Lion King, “Scar,” has a scar across one eye.49
• In both stories the lion cub doubts his ability to lead his people
and his father comes to him as a vision in the moon to embolden
him.
• The names of the leading lion cubs are similar—Kimba and
Simba.
• Both lion cubs eventually grow up and mate with their childhood
playmate, a lioness cub.
• The setting of the film and the television series is similar—a
rocky terrain, not the more common desert habitat that lions
roam.
• Both Kimba and Simba become vegetarian and eat insects to help
save the other animals.
• A stampede scene during the lion cubs’ early years is a pivotal
moment in the cubs’ lives.
• In both the TV series and the later film, a lightning bolt starts a
forest fire and rain puts it out.
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• Most importantly, there are several scenes of nearly identical cinematic and artistic expression in the films.50
The similarities even inspired a Simpsons parody of The Lion King’s Mufasa, which appears in a cloud and says to Lisa, “You must avenge my
Death Kimba . . . I mean Simba!”51
To be sure, there are diﬀerences between the Kimba series and The
Lion King. Most notably, humans played a signiﬁcant role in the Kimba
story, which considered the beneﬁts of human civilization over the law
of the jungle. Indeed, just as Ray’s original The Alien was inspired by the
Bengal famine of 1943, Jungle Emperor had a particularly local focus on
the costs and beneﬁts to Japan of modernization and Westernization. The
Lion King, in contrast, has no humans or similar themes. Nonetheless,
observers call the similarities “striking.” 52 The San Francisco Chronicle
reported that Tezuka Productions had “received calls of congratulations
from several people who assumed the ﬁrm had licensed the project to
Disney.”53 In 1994, Machiko Satonaka, a well-known Japanese comic artist,
published in a major Japanese daily newspaper an open letter signed by
two hundred Japanese animation artists, who claimed that “[s]imilarities
between The Lion King and Jungle Emperor cannot be dismissed as mere
coincidence,” and that as Japanese who respect Walt Disney, they were
“saddened by such similarities.”54 To the outrage of Tezuka fans, Disney
not only denied lifting any of the plot or characters from Jungle Emperor
or Kimba, but went even further, claiming not to have even heard of
Tezuka or Kimba the White Lion. “Frankly, I’m not familiar with [the
TV series],” stated Rob Minkoﬀ, co-director of The Lion King with Roger
Allers, in response to the allegations.55 Fans in Japan and the United
States were angry, not at Disney’s being inspired by Tezuka’s work, but by
Disney’s failure to acknowledge Tezuka and his inﬂuence. To make matters worse, The Lion King was billed as the ﬁrst Disney animated feature
that presented an original story.56 Former Disney studio chair (now CEO
of Dreamworks Animation) Jeﬀrey Katzenberg called the ﬁlm Disney’s
“ﬁrst cartoon feature not based on a fable or a literary work.” 57 The ﬁlm’s
creators say the story was inspired by Joseph and Moses in the Bible and
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.58
Animation experts and historians have argued that Disney’s claim
of ignorance of Tezuka is likely disingenuous, given the prevalence of
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the master animator’s work in the United States from the late 1960s on
and the frequency of Disney’s own executives’ travel to Japan, including
to Tokyo Disneyland.59 The Lion King’s co-director Roger Allers himself
lived in Tokyo and worked in animation there in the 1980s, during which
time Tezuka was alive and already well known as “Japan’s Walt Disney.”
A remake of Jungle Emperor aired in prime time on Japanese television
contemporaneously.60 Alternatively, some argue that Disney’s purported
ignorance of Tezuka at the very least undermines its claims of superior
knowledge of all things animation.61 Anime historian Fred Patten concludes that at least some people working on The Lion King knew about
Kimba the White Lion.62 Patten surmises that these animators either subconsciously copied, or paid silent homage to, Tezuka’s work with in-group
references to it in The Lion King.63
Few stories of artistic inspiration and cultural appropriation are
simple or unidirectional. Tezuka, who died in 1989 at the age of sixty,
met Walt Disney and describes his own artistic debt to Disney in his autobiography. Tezuka describes the arrival of Bambi 64 to Japan after World
War II, and admits traveling from Osaka to Tokyo and staying in a hotel near the theater so he could see Bambi “over one hundred times.” 65
Subsequently Tezuka licensed the rights to Disney’s Bambi to make his
own adaptation. At a comics festival in Los Angeles in 1978, Tezuka described Jungle Emperor as both an homage and a critique of Bambi, which
Tezuka believed did not suﬃciently consider the possibility of mutual
recognition between animals and humans.66 Perhaps, then, similarities
between Kimba the White Lion and The Lion King derive from their both
being based on Disney’s own Bambi 67 (hence the similarities to Tezuka’s
work may reﬂect the “circle of creativity”). Two or more original works
may have much in common because each borrows from the same works
in the public domain. In this case, both Kimba the White Lion and The
Lion King have their source in Bambi, common folktales, and the story
of Hamlet. In short, as in so many other cases, the search for authorship
of The Lion King may resemble a vain “search for the source of the Nile
and all its tributaries.”68
Notably, in all three cases—The Alien, Kimba the White Lion, and “The
Lion Sleeps Tonight”—new works in the United States appear to have
been derived not from the work of unknown foreign artists, but from the
artistic expressions of great masters: Ray, Tezuka, and Linda, respectively.
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Ray was already an internationally recognized and award-winning ﬁlm
director by the time he made the acquaintance of Hollywood. Tezuka,
the creator of yet another well-known anime classic, Astro Boy (recently
remade by Hollywood in 2009), created Japan’s ﬁrst television animation
studio in 196169 and is often referred to as the “Godfather of Anime,” as
well as “Japan’s Walt Disney.” The creator of more than seventy titles
and 150,000 pages during his lifetime, Tezuka was the subject of a retrospective at the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco in 2007 (the ﬁrst ever
such exhibit outside of Japan), titled Tezuka: The Marvel of Manga.70 And
Linda’s original composition, “Mbube,” was recorded and had become
Africa’s ﬁrst pop hit.71
These stories resemble the case in which Italian director Sergio Leone
took in broad daylight the copyrighted work of Japanese ﬁlmmaker Akira
Kurosawa, another great auteur of the twentieth century (Kurosawa, too,
received an Oscar for lifetime achievement).72 Kurosawa’s ﬁ lms document well the mutual inﬂuence of global artists. Kurosawa himself was
highly inﬂuenced by the American Westerns of John Ford, as well as the
literature of Shakespeare and Dostoevsky. In oﬀering his own perspective
on the Western in ﬁlms like Seven Samurai and Yojimbo, Kurosawa transformed the genre. Yul Brynner, who starred in the Hollywood adaptation
of Seven Samurai,73 The Magniﬁcent Seven,74 identiﬁed Seven Samurai as
“one of the great Westerns of all time, only it was made by the Japanese,
in the Japanese medium.” 75 Many sought permission to remake Kurosawa’s works, but when Leone copied Yojimbo 76 and remade it as A Fistful
of Dollars 77 without permission, Kurosawa protested. In a letter to Leone,
Kurosawa wrote of A Fistful of Dollars, “It is a very ﬁne ﬁlm, but it is my
ﬁlm. Since Japan is a signatory of the Berne Convention on international
copyright, you must pay me.” An out-of-court settlement determined that
Kurosawa would receive 15 percent of Fistful’s worldwide receipts, with a
guarantee of around $100,000.78 Ironically, the reworking of the American Western by a Japanese director not only recast the Western itself, but
also inspired the creation of another genre, the “Spaghetti Western,” for
which Leone is most well-known. Furthermore, some remakes such as
The Magniﬁcent Seven and A Fistful of Dollars became iconic ﬁlms themselves and made stars of actors like Steve McQueen and Clint Eastwood,
both of whom became icons of American manliness.
There are many charges that Bollywood has appropriated Hollywood
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hits in broad daylight—what one observer wryly describes as “(re)making
hay while the sun shines.” 79 But examples of allegations against Hollywood for similar activity are less familiar. What about our conceptions
of originality and romantic authorship leads us to more easily view some
cultures as creative and original, and others as appropriators and copiers?
Disney has long been considered the epitome of the romantic author: a
wholly “original” genius. But the world’s most famous copyright owner
has often made a fortune by mining the works of past creators that have
passed into the public domain. “There would hardly be a Disney at all if
not for the works by Rudyard Kipling, H. C. Andersen, Victor Hugo, and
Robert Louis Stevenson, all of whom make it possible for Disney to make
animated features of wolf-boys, mermaids, hunchbacks, and Long John
Silver,”80 Eva Hemmungs Wirtén reminds us. Wirtén criticizes Disney’s
hypocrisy for beneﬁting from iconic works that quickly fell into the public
domain under old copyright laws with short copyright terms, while holding its own works tightly and nearly into perpetuity. If current law had
governed when Disney made The Jungle Book, 81 the corporation would
have had to either wait another forty years before releasing the ﬁ lm or
negotiate permission from Kipling’s heirs.82
My point is not that Disney erred in producing new works based on
the old. To the contrary, this is a natural part of the creative process and
should be encouraged. Enabling individuals in the present to interact
with cultures of the past leads to rich rewards for all cultures, ranging
from fostering communities with shared values to allowing current generations to critically reconsider the values of the past. At the same time,
we ought to reconsider biases in our understanding that lead us to more
readily recognize some creators as original thinkers and others as slavish
imitators. Walt Disney and the Disney Corporation have been romantically embraced as epitomizing creativity and originality. Yet some have
accused Disney of plagiarism, not of works in the public domain, but of
foreign copyrighted work. Furthermore, we ought to pause and consider
how cultural stereotypes may lead copyright law to misrecognize altogether some “foreign” authors whose contributions to world culture are
more readily ignored—or at least not granted attribution and royalties.
How do diﬀerences in power and knowledge aﬀect people’s willingness to share culture? Global inequalities render some more vulnerable
to exploitation of their rights. Fear of exploitation may discourage people
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from sharing and distributing their knowledge, be it music and literature
or local knowledge of the medicinal properties of plants. The University of
California, Berkeley, historian of science Abena Dove Osseo-Asare documents how those with knowledge of traditional medicine in Ghana, for
example, have kept that knowledge close for fear of being exploited.83
Modern global copyright law must confront this reality of diﬀerence in
the world and explore creative legal tools that would incentivize people
to share across cultures, class divides, and colonial histories. Promoting
fairness among global creators makes for good innovation policy, fosters
free speech, and encourages better cultural and social relations. Modern intellectual property law ought to be attentive to crafting rules that
promote the ethical extraction of knowledge. In our global Knowledge
Economy, both economic and human development depend on fair cultural
exchanges in global markets.
Considerations of global justice and fairness may shed light on our
traditional understanding of incentives themselves within copyright law.
We have come to believe that property rights in intellectual creations
are there simply because they incentivize creative activity. But there is
an older understanding that ﬂows out of notions of unfair competition
and more visceral feelings of justice. It is now commonplace that in fact
people create without exclusive property rights—as evidenced by opensource software, fan ﬁction, and user-created mash-ups. But behavioral
economists have identiﬁed a natural sense of justice that may lead people
to “irrational” decisions if they feel that they are being treated unfairly.84
Even the premise of the “intellectual property as incentives” thesis can
be understood as responding to the “vulnerability” of the creator in the
absence of intellectual property rights, given the often high costs of production and the typically low costs of copying.85 Studies show it is not
necessarily true that individuals will refuse to create without incentives,
but it may well be the case that creators will not innovate or share if they
are continually treated unjustly in an unregulated marketplace.
The next section examines some of the dynamics of cultural borrowing in the other direction, from Hollywood to Bollywood. Stereotypes of
Asian “pirates” permeate and Bollywood itself is plagued with a reputation
for mimicry, not creativity. But sometimes the claims of piracy may be
overblown. Furthermore, global borrowing by Bollywood from Hollywood
must be understood in the context of cultural hegemony and resistance.
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Bollywood is the world’s largest ﬁlm industry,86 and Bollywood ﬁlms are
“the most-seen movies in the world.”87 Some one thousand ﬁlms are produced annually in Bombay and other major ﬁlm centers in India; Bollywood ﬁ lms enthrall moviegoers not only all over India and among the
Indian diaspora, but also “in such unlikely places as Russia, China, the
Middle East, the Far East, Egypt, Turkey, and Africa.”88 The industry earns
more than $2 billion annually.89 Handsome dancing heroes like Amitabh
Bachchan and Shahrukh Kahn and Ms. Universe–worthy starlets from
Aishwarya Rai Bachchan (“the world’s most beautiful woman”90) to Madhuri Dixit shake their hips and entertain literally billions. In 2001 when
U.S. troops drove the Taliban out of Kabul after the September 11 attacks,
the ﬁrst ﬁlm to play in that city was a Bollywood epic.91
Cinema was born in India, in Bombay, roughly contemporaneously
with its birth in other parts of the world. In 1896 the ﬁrst “cinematographe” show premiered on the Indian subcontinent at the Watson’s Hotel
in Bombay, just three months after a premier in Paris. “The marvel of the
century” proclaimed the Times of India.92 But only British elites attended
the premiere, because the hotel barred Indians. Shows were ﬁrst screened
to Indians a week later at the Novelty Theatre in Bombay. Later, Bombay
also became the site of one of the ﬁrst ﬁ lms made in India. Bombay’s
position as a gateway for commerce and trade created by the British East
India Company made it a natural portal for the reception of ﬁlm technology. The city’s own access to capital and vibrant creative culture of theater
groups and writers made it fertile ground for the eventual development
of a full-ﬂedged indigenous ﬁlm industry,93 now oft-referred to as “Bollywood” (though the city has now shed its British name of Bombay in
favor of the Indian “Mumbai”).
The visionary idea of an indigenous Indian ﬁlm industry came from
the early and inﬂuential ﬁlm pioneer Dhundiraj Govind Phalke. In 1910 he
watched the ﬁlm Life of Christ in a Bombay theater and had a transformative experience. “While the life of Christ was rolling before my physical
eyes, I was mentally visualizing the Gods, Shri Krishna, Shri Ramachandra, their Gokul and Ayodhya,” Phalke recounts, continuing: “I was
gripped by a strange spell. I bought another ticket and saw the ﬁlm again.
This time I felt my imagination taking shape on the screen. Could this
really happen? Could we, the sons of India, ever be able to see Indian im-
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ages on the screen?”94 Phalke openly linked the creation and sustenance
of an indigenous ﬁlm industry with nationalism and self-determination.
Home Rule depended on Indian support of this industry, Phalke said.95
In 1913 his ﬁrst ﬁlm, Raja Harishchandra,96 debuted in Bombay. The story
was based on the Indian epic poem the Mahabharata, and the ﬁlm was
advertised as “the ﬁrst ﬁlm of Indian manufacture.”97 The ﬁlm was silent;
sound and music did not arrive to the Indian cinema until 1931. But its
focus on Indian stories had a profound and lasting inﬂuence.
The organization and structure of the Indian ﬁlm industry in Bombay
are distinct from those of the mega–production studios in Hollywood.
Unlike Hollywood, where big motion picture studios ﬁnance everything
from production to ﬁlm distribution, Bollywood is a fragmented industry.
Independent entrepreneurs ﬁnance Bollywood ﬁlms, while others pay for
the rights to distribute and exhibit them. During World War II, illicit war
proﬁteers looking to invest their black-market fortunes began an unholy
alliance between the underworld and Bollywood. Mobsters still serve as
a signiﬁcant (though declining) source of the ﬁnancing for Bollywood
ﬁlms, creating instability, lawlessness, and violence in the industry. Mob
inﬂuence even aﬀects the artistic content of the ﬁ lms. Some consider
Bollywood’s inclination to remake Hollywood hits—rather than experiment with original stories—to be a direct result of maﬁa pressure for
sureﬁre hits.98
On paper, Indian copyright law is not much diﬀerent from the law of
Western countries. Indian copyright law traces its origins to the British
Empire. The ﬁrst copyright laws developed in India under British rule
substantially paralleled Britain’s copyright law of 1911. India’s ﬁrst copyright act after Independence, the Copyright Act of 1957, retained many of
the prior provisions. India’s most recent amendment to its Copyright Act,
in 1999,99 brought the law in line with the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).100 Despite the laws on the books,
however, the lack of enforcement of copyright laws is a continuing complaint and source of strain on India’s trade relationship with the United
States, prompting the United States to place India on the Section 301
“watch list” for lax enforcement of copyright.
For its own part, Bollywood appears to be of two minds about copyright. On the one hand, Bollywood ﬁlmmakers rely on copyright law to
protect against video piracy. Pirated DVDs of Bollywood ﬁlms are freely
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available in India and abroad, with resulting losses to the industry that
some claim are at least $80 million a year.101 With the advent of cable television, pirated copies of ﬁlms have been shown on television, sometimes
on the very day the ﬁlms were released in movie theaters. Still, enforcement of copyright claims is lax because such claims remain a low priority
for the police and the courts.102
In contrast to Bollywood’s stance against video piracy, many charge
that the industry has not been respectful of the copyright claims of artists
within or outside of the industry. Actors, directors, and writers frequently
work without any written contracts. Scripts are few and far between, and
directors develop ﬁlms on the ﬂy. Musicians have been particularly vocal about the unjust appropriation of their work, claiming, “Plagiarism
is routine.”103 One Bollywood director, when scolded for such copying in
the industry and when asked “Where is your artistic skill?” replied, “My
skill is knowing what to steal.”104
In recent years, since 2000 when the Indian government granted
industry status to Bollywood, ﬁ lmmakers have been able to seek more
secure sources of funding, from banks, foreign investors, and India’s
own corporate titans such as the $8 billion Tata Group and the $13 billion
Reliance Industries. In 2011 Indian billionaire Anil Ambani of Reliance
Industries invested some $825 million in Steven Spielberg’s DreamWorks
SKG Studios.105 The huge sums now available within India for investment
in Bollywood could potentially transform the Indian ﬁlm industry. Recall,
for example, that Ray initially reached out to Hollywood because he lacked
the technology and funds necessary to make a successful science-ﬁction
ﬁ lm—indeed, Indians have continued to avoid this genre of ﬁ lms and
others, including animation, for the same reasons. New sources of funding oﬀer new creative opportunities.
Major Hollywood studios, including Warner Bros., Sony Pictures,
Twentieth Century Fox, and Disney, are also now investing in Bollywood.
This comes as no surprise—Hollywood has long sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to tap into the vast ﬁlm market of India, where movies are as
much a national pastime as cricket. Strikingly, Hollywood, which controls
a whopping 80 to 90 percent of the European ﬁlm market, has failed to
penetrate the Indian market with its own ﬁlms. Hollywood ﬁlms make
up only 10 percent of the Indian ﬁ lm market.106 This surprisingly low
level of penetration is the result of neither quotas nor nationalist cen-
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sor boards. Hollywood ﬁ lms simply do not seem to appeal to Indian
moviegoers. Hollywood ﬁ lms released in India with straight-up dubbing
have ﬂopped.107 As one Bollywood director puts it, “Hollywood ﬁlms are
considered ‘dry’ here.”108
Hollywood’s new strategy? Invest in Bollywood ﬁlms instead. In 2009,
Warner Bros. released Chandni Chowk to China,109 only the third Bollywood/
Hollywood collaboration in history. But the ﬁ lm, starring Bolly wood
megastar Akshay Kumar, was a box- oﬃce ﬂop. A comedy about an Indian vegetable seller from New Delhi’s Chandni Chowk neighborhood
who ends up in China (Hollywood’s ambition appeared to be to tap two
of the world’s largest moviegoing markets with this one ﬁlm),110 it did not
draw anywhere near the audiences that Hollywood had hoped it would.111
Hollywood executives recognize that Indian movie audiences are
growing quickly; indeed, before the recent global economic downturn,
Indian domestic box-oﬃce returns were growing at a rate of 15 percent,
compared to a 2 percent growth rate in the United States during the
same period.112 One result of such new alliances, of course, is that more
Bollywood proﬁts will now ﬂow back to the West rather than remain at
home. Another result of American alliances is increased pressure on
Bollywood to clean up its act with respect to copyright. Hollywood began
paying close attention to Bollywood several years ago, with the success
of Mira Nair’s Monsoon Wedding113 and Aamir Khan’s Lagaan,114 which
in 2002 was nominated for an Oscar for Best Foreign Film. The attention has not all been positive, as Hollywood directors soon realized that
Bollywood has been appropriating ideas from Hollywood in their own
ﬁlms. Bollywood adaptations include Deewana115 (similar to Sleeping with
the Enemy 116), Akele Hum Akele Tum117 (resembling Sleepless in Seattle118),
Chachi 420 119 and Aunty No. 1120 (both similar to Mrs. Doubtﬁre), and Ghajini121 (an homage to Memento122). But these resemblances do not always
violate copyright. Indian copyright law, like copyright law everywhere,
protects original expression but not ideas. Directors of Indian ﬁlms based
on Hollywood hits claim their ﬁ lms are “inspired” by the ideas in the
Hollywood ﬁ lms, but that their own expression of the idea is unique.
The ﬁ lm Chachi 420, for example, is similar to Mrs. Doubtﬁre only in
plot (an estranged father dresses as a nanny to spend more time with his
child), but no original expression is taken from the Hollywood ﬁlm. Says
Bollywood director Subhash Ghai: “There are only 36 plots in the world
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drama, and you can make 36,000 stories out of those. So stories don’t
change; science changes, times change and values change.”123
The critical and box oﬃce success of Slumdog Millionaire, in particular, has piqued Hollywood’s interest in Bollywood once more.124 Though
Slumdog Millionaire was not technically a Bollywood movie (the ﬁ lm’s
director, Danny Boyle, is British), it succeeded internationally by employing typical Bollywood themes of urban poverty and corruption, staged
with Indian actors, Bollywood-style melodrama, and stop-action dance
numbers set to the music of acclaimed Bollywood musical director A. R.
Rahman. Again, however, the attention has meant a spate of copyright
claims by Hollywood against Bollywood. Recently Hollywood ran ads in
the Times of India warning Bollywood not to go through with a rumored
Indian version of The Curious Case of Benjamin Button.125 The actual similarities between the recently released Bollywood ﬁlm Paa and Benjamin
Button are trivial.126 The ﬁ lm Benjamin Button is adapted from a 1922
short story of the same name written by F. Scott Fitzgerald, which tells
the tale of a man who ages backward. Paa, in contrast, is a literal story
of a boy with progeria, the disease many believed inspired the Benjamin
Button story, but which is never expressly mentioned in Fitzgerald’s tale
or the Hollywood version of it. Paa trades largely on the gimmick of having Bollywood’s most famous actor, Amitabh Bachchan, play the child
aﬄicted with progeria, while his real-life son, Abishek Bachchan, plays
the child’s father.
Recently, the Delhi High Court threw out another case, by Warner
Bros. against the producers of the Bollywood ﬁ lm Hari Puttar: A Comedy of Terrors,127 ﬁ nding the ﬁ lm bore little resemblance to the Harry
Potter series.128 This was not a copyright case but a trademark dispute.
Warner Bros., which owns a trademark in Harry Potter, argued that the
name Hari Puttar was confusingly similar to the Harry Potter mark and
threatened to dilute the famous original mark. But the Delhi High Court
ultimately agreed with the defendants that the name, which referred to
a Punjabi boy whose full name was Hariprasad Dhoonda (“Hari” is a
common short form for Hariprasad and “Puttar” means son in Punjabi),
would not likely be confused with J. K. Rowling’s famous boy Potter.
Notably, the court found that the diﬀerence in the class, language, and
exposure of the audiences for the Potter ﬁlms and the Puttar ﬁlm were
relevant, supposing that “an illiterate or semi-literate movie viewer, in
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case he ventures to see a ﬁlm by the name of Hari Puttar, would never be
able to relate the same with a Harry Potter ﬁlm or book. Conversely,” the
court continued, “an educated person who has pored over or even browsed
through a book on Harry Potter or viewed a Harry Potter ﬁlm, is not likely
to be misled . . . for, in my view, the cognoscenti, the intellectuals and
even the pseudo-intellectuals presumably know the diﬀerence between
chalk and cheese or at any rate must be presumed to know the same.” 129
But a settlement for $200,000 in the summer of 2009, awarded
to Twentieth Century Fox from the Bollywood producer of Banda Yeh
Bindaas Hai,130 accused of stealing from My Cousin Vinny,131 seems to
have sent a strong signal to Bollywood. Now two Indian producers have
bought the rights to the two Hollywood ﬁlms they want to copy (including a license from Orion Pictures to remake the Hollywood ﬁlm Wedding
Crashers132), a move largely unheard of before. Many in Bollywood welcome
the idea of paying royalties to Hollywood.133 The acclaimed musical director A. R. Rahman, who composed the original music for Slumdog Millionaire and scores of Bollywood ﬁlms, opined that “it’s high time everyone
cleaned up his act and people started getting fair to creative people.”134
Bollywood ought to play by the rules: remakes that take original,
protectable expression and that are not fair use should be licensed. Yet
we may also ask whether claims of piracy by Bollywood may not at times
be overblown, if not also partially misconceived. Consider the following:
1. The most inf luential films in post-Independence Indian cinema
are not remakes. Of the top-ten-grossing Bollywood films in 2008,
only one or two are remakes of Hollywood hits. The top-grossing
Ghajini, starring Aamir Khan, has a plot nearly identical to the
American film Memento; another, titled Race,135 admits inspiration from the 1998 Hollywood film Goodbye Lover.136 But most of
that year’s blockbuster films were not expressly or obviously derivative of earlier American works (for example, Singh Is King and
Jodhaa-Akbar—with the latter, starring Hrithik Roshan and Aishwarya Rai Bachchan, the sixteenth-century love story between the
great Mughal emperor, Akbar, and a Rajput princess, Jodha).137
Indeed, the most influential Hindi films have had expressly Indian storylines: Devdas (1935, remade in 2002, about star-crossed
lovers torn asunder by class differences); Mother India (1957, in
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which a poor peasant woman, Radha, raises two sons and overcomes her difficulties against all odds); Guide (1965, the story of
a clever village tour guide mistaken for a holy man); Sholay (1975,
marking the advent in Hindi films of the “angry young man”
who grows up in poverty and avenges the murders of family
members killed by underworld bandits); and Lagaan (2001,
chronicling how Indian villagers in nineteenth-century India
rose up against crippling colonial taxation).138
2. Remakes are common in both Hollywood and Bollywood. Bollywood is not alone in turning to remakes as a guarantor for financial success. Hollywood, too, equally driven by concerns for the
bottom line, frequently turns to remaking classics, local and
global. As mentioned earlier, in 2009 Hollywood offered an official remake of Osamu Tezuka’s Astro Boy. Recall, too, that remakes may themselves later become iconic “classics,” from The
Magnificent Seven to A Fistful of Dollars. These and even more
recent examples also challenge the conception that it is only
American culture that influences the rest. Clearly Asian film has
had a strong influence on Hollywood as well. To take another
example, Martin Scorsese’s Academy Award–winning film The
Departed (starring Leonardo DiCaprio and Matt Damon) was a
remake of the Hong Kong crime film Mou Gaan Dou (2002),
known by the English translation Internal Affairs.139 The Departed
won the Oscar for Best Picture in 2006. And the 2002 Hollywood horror film The Ring is a remake of the 1998 Japanese
horror film Ring.140
3. Learning through pastiche. Writers, musicians, and filmmakers
practice their craft, and eventually develop their own voice, by
adapting existing works. Today, new technologies from digital
video recorders to the Internet make the art of filmmaking accessible even to the poor in the developing world, democratizing not
only broader consumption of cultural goods, but cultural production as well. Notably, indigenous film industries have grown
through the fruitful combination of cheap technological infrastructure and a rich creative heritage—often Bollywood films—
from which to adapt more local stories. Nigeria now boasts one
of the world’s largest film industries (earning it the nickname
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“Nolly wood”), largely through perfecting this very modus operandi, that is, by combining cheap video technologies and “a
creative history of appropriation and localization of Bollywood
films.”141
The Indian scholar Lawrence Liang describes a similar phenomenon in India, where an alternative film industry has
emerged in the unlikely small town of Malegaon, located some
eight hours away from Mumbai. Several years ago a local entrepreneur in this town of predominantly migrant Muslim loom
workers found himself with a case of empty videocassettes.
Deciding the cassettes would be more valuable with content
on them, he made a “local” version of a well-known Bollywood
film.142 The concept took off and now the town is famous for a
fledgling film industry that thrives on making local adaptations
of Bollywood hits. Where the Oscar-nominated film Lagaan
focused on oppressive taxes under the British Raj, for example,
the Malegaon adaptation confronts issues of local access to city
services.143 Far from criticizing the Malegaon copy, Aamir Khan,
the director of Lagaan, has praised the use of “video theaters
as a film school.”144
4. Copying requires creativity. Imitation is often a more creative act
than we recognize. Take again the example of the fledgling Malegaon film industry. Liang lauds the creativity of the poor, who
remake Bollywood films but on shoestring budgets of a mere
$1,000 per film.145 One film, for example, reshot a helicopter
scene in a Bollywood movie using a plastic toy helicopter that cost
less than a dollar. The Malegaon example, Liang argues, suggests
that the “creativity that goes into the making of the remakes lies
as much in the way that the film is made, as in the content of the
film.”146
5. “Indianized” Hollywood films have minimal effect on the market
for the originals because Indian audiences do not otherwise see the
Hollywood films. Bollywood filmmakers often seek to retell a
Hollywood film story, but in a way that appeals to Indian audiences. Usually this is done by “adding emotions,” family relationships, and an extra hour of song and dance numbers. Bollywood
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film writer Anjum Rajabali emphasizes the difference in genres
this way: “Relationships! That seems to be the primary criteria
when Indianising a subject. Lots of strong, close, intense relationships that will have interesting moving stories/graphs of their
own. Adding family is one important thing. That is why I think
subjects like James Bond, detective stories, westerns and the like
don’t work as they are here. Who were James Bond’s parents?
Does Clint Eastwood of The Good, The Bad, & Ugly love anyone?
What about his brothers or sisters?” 147
Perhaps this overstates cultural differences between India
and the United States. More persuasively, Indian directors argue
they are offering a remake because Indians are simply not going
to see the original Hollywood film. The Indianized remake,
then, allows these audiences “to see a great story in their own
language.”148
6. Bollywood remakes stave off Hollywood cultural imperialism. Perhaps more controversially, copyright law may give some consideration to the ways in which local adaptations of dominant, global
cultural works from Hollywood enable local communities to resist cultural hegemony and talk back to the dominant Hollywood
culture. Recall that women, gays, and minorities in the United
States and elsewhere actively remake dominant cultural stories
from Harry Potter to Star Trek through writing and sharing practices (such as fan fiction) so as to bring their own subjectivity to
bear on the traditional tales.149 The process of “Indianizing” a
Hollywood film is a similar practice.
Some argue that Bollywood should make its own original stories
and not engage with those of the West. But as Liang argues, they assume
that poor countries can aﬀord to “disavow the global,” which he says they
cannot. “[I]n many countries,” writes Liang, “the very question of what
it means to be modern has always been deﬁned in relation to an idea of
the global.”150 Thus, for countries to be modern, they have no choice but
to engage with the West. At the same time, viewing Western ﬁlms forces
poor audiences “to confront their physical and cultural marginality every
time they attend the cinema,” writes Liang.151 Preparing local adaptations
of Hollywood ﬁlms, by contrast, allows Indians to experience a “global”
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story or phenomenon, but on more locally relevant and palatable terms.
The nationalist vision that inspired Indian ﬁlm pioneer Phalke thus continues to play a role in Bollywood’s continued success. Phalke’s concern
was for the psychology of a nation that sees itself represented on-screen.152
The message? A white English boy cannot always be the hero.

copyright and a sian values
The current legal claims against Bollywood echo a long-standing meme
about Asians as copiers, and Asian culture as one more suited to imitation than innovation. In the inﬂuential book by William P. Alford, To
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Oﬀ ense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese
Civilization (1995), Alford attributes the long absence of intellectual property law in China to the country’s unique civilization and Confucian
values. “Lying at the core of traditional Chinese society’s treatment of
intellectual property was the dominant Confucian vision of the nature
of civilization and of the constitutive role played therein by a shared and
still vital past,” Alford writes, continuing: “Only through encountering
the past—which provided unique insight into the essence of one’s own
character, relationships with other human beings, and interaction with
nature—could individuals, guided by nurturing leaders, understand how
properly to adhere to those relationships of which they were a part.” 153
Alford concludes that this understanding of the moral foundation played
by the past confounded intellectual property protection in China: “The
indispensability of the past for personal moral growth dictated that there
be broad access to the common heritage of all Chinese.”154 Alford points
out that Chinese engagement with the past did not necessarily mean
lack of originality in new works.155 Yet he still contends that “interaction
with the past is one of the distinctive modes of intellectual and imaginative endeavor in traditional Chinese culture.” 156 He concludes that, “in
the Chinese context,” use of the past “was at once both more aﬃrmative
[than in the West] and more essential.”157 Alford describes as “Confucian”
scholars’ “disdain for commerce” and the idea that they “wrote for ediﬁcation and moral renewal rather than proﬁt.”158
But let us examine these claims further. Is the past not just as important for self-understanding beyond China’s borders? And are Chinese
scholars really unique in their altruistic desire to create knowledge for others? In fact, cultural stereotypes have the eﬀect of buttressing arguments
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for strong copyright (Westerners are proﬁt maximizers who will only
create for monetary reward) and weakening arguments for limits (Westerners are relationally unconnected and have no need to access the past).
In contrast, those who value community, shared meaning, and knowledge
creation to beneﬁt the public are cast as foreign and premodern.
Civilizational views about copyright are misleading because they elide
the plural values in all cultures, which rightfully recognize the values of
innovation and participation, as well as of shared meaning and common
heritage. The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has highlighted how cultural
stereotypes about Asians have been wrongly used to justify a denial of
human rights in Asian countries. As Sen points out, the mistaken idea
that Asians do not value human rights is voiced by authoritarian Asian
leaders and skeptical Westerners alike. In so doing, Westerners inadvertently buttress Asian authoritarians. More perniciously, civilizational
rhetoric elides plural, critical traditions committed to freedom, rationality,
equality, and tolerance that have long been present in Asian histories. As
Sen demonstrates, Asian nations, religions, and traditions are rife with
conﬂicting and diverse views on these topics.159 He points out, for example,
that scholars often cite Confucian values when considering China, but
seldom invoke Buddhist philosophy. Great Indian leaders such as Ashoka
and Akbar championed and practiced pluralism in governing their vast
empires long before those values were adopted in the West. As Sen concludes, “so-called Asian values that are invoked to justify authoritarianism
are not especially Asian in any signiﬁcant sense.”160
Something similar is true in the case of copyright and so-called Asian
values. As one scholar has recently argued, Chinese commitments to
access to knowledge are inﬂuenced by Buddhist enlightenment philosophy, not just Confucian commitment to tradition and authority.161 Read
in this light, the focus on public access to knowledge may be understood
as part of a larger endeavor to promote enlightenment and freedom, not
just as obedient acquiescence to authoritarian elders. Recognition of each
culture’s plural traditions and values is crucial because it oﬀers a more
critical lens with which to assess our own societies. If access to shared
culture is understood only as being fed by authoritarian values, we will
naturally reject a robust public domain in the name of freedom. But if
we understand diverse motivations, including those stemming from universal concerns for enlightenment and access to knowledge, then such

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 170

2/10/12 2:23 PM

b olly wo od/holly wo od

17 1

commitments cannot easily be cast aside. Furthermore, claims that intellectual property laws are more “foreign” on some soils than others
understate the extent to which intellectual property is something we must
all be taught—it does not come naturally. Indeed, today in the United
States copyright industries expend great eﬀort and money to teach (or
indoctrinate) young children about the wrongs of piracy. And American
university academics continue to resist encroaching norms that pit the
pursuit of knowledge for the beneﬁt of the public against the stepped-up
eﬀorts of university technology transfer oﬃces to teach researchers to
patent their inventions.
Some have suggested that China now has an “innovation deﬁcit”162
and needs to develop its own creative industries. While rates of innovation
may indeed vary across the world, this may reﬂect a variety of factors,
including access to knowledge, capital, education, and markets. These
varying rates may also reﬂect culture, but we should be careful not to
paint culture with too broad a brush, identifying one group as natural
innovators and another as natural copyists. In fact, there is a great deal
of creative activity taking place in Asia, not just in ﬁlm, but in every area
from computer gaming to fashion. For example, Farmville, “the most
popular game on Facebook,” with over 45 million unique monthly players, admittedly “rips oﬀ Happy Farm, a hugely popular online game in
China.”163 Each season, fashion industry buyers from the United States
and Europe travel to Tokyo, whose youth are “trailblazers of street fashion”
and “the envy of Western designers,” “to buy up bagfuls of the latest hits.
The designs are then whisked overseas to be reworked, resized, stitched
together and sold under Western labels.”164 If innovation and progress are
our ultimate goals, we must take greater care to recognize how diﬀerences
in global power and knowledge, combined with cultural stereotypes, aﬀect
the production and distribution of culture today.
The eﬀects of today’s global copyright laws extend well beyond incentives
to create. Copyright law implicates mutual recognition or misrecognition
of others. Furthermore, this law determines who will beneﬁt from the
wealth deriving from knowledge production today. In short, copyright
law has both dignitary and distributive eﬀects. Arguments to buttress
the intellectual property rights of Western creators typically presume
these creative professionals are more deserving of protection than others

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 171

2/10/12 2:23 PM

17 2

b olly wo od/holly wo od

because their creations are “original,” while those of developing (especially
Asian) countries are derivative. But this distinction overlooks the extent
to which much of human creativity is derivative (recalling Paul Gilroy’s
description of culture as “routes,” not “roots” 165). More importantly, the
distinction elides the extent to which all humans are creative and active
producers of knowledge of the world. Cultural stereotypes about originality and piracy do a disservice to our understanding of the universal aspects
of human creativity and the ways in which power may upend the ultimate
goals of promoting cultural exchange and mutual understanding. We
need to take into account the ways in which actual global inequalities,
combined with long-standing cultural biases, may impede the free and
fair exchange of culture.
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An Issue of Life or Death

thembisa mkhosana ha s aids. If she lived in the West, this diagnosis would likely not be life-threatening. Advances in antiretroviral treatments today mean that patients who can aﬀord to pay for the treatments
can live a healthy, full, and long life with the disease. But Thembisa, a
mother of two living in a village on the outskirts of Cape Town, South
Africa, will likely die from her illness. While miracle medicines exist, she
cannot aﬀord them. She is hardly alone. Few in Africa, where the majority
of HIV/AIDS patients in the world live, have the resources to buy the most
eﬀective antiretroviral medicines on the free market. The medicine that
Thembisa needs to live costs $10,000 a year, a price that neither she nor
her government can aﬀord.
Thembisa has been lucky until now. Since 2003, when she was ﬁrst
diagnosed with the disease, she has been treated at a Doctors Without Borders clinic. Born out of relief eﬀorts by French physicians in Biafra and a
cyclone in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1970, Doctors Without Borders has long provided medical help in the aftermath of tsunamis, wars,
and pandemics. Today it treats over a hundred thousand HIV-positive
patients in the developing world, administering ﬁrst- and second-line
antiretroviral treatments. Thembisa initially responded well to these treatments. They enabled her to go back to work and, most importantly, care
for her two children. But now she has developed resistance to the drugs.
17 3
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Indeed, most AIDS patients develop resistance within ﬁve years of starting these treatments. And while third-line ARV treatments are available
in Europe and the United States, they are not available in South Africa,
where few could aﬀord them.
Why does Doctors Without Borders oﬀer only the ﬁrst- and secondline retrovirals and not the third-line antiretroviral treatments that might
save Thembisa? The ﬁrst-line and second-line drugs cost a relatively small
$80 per person annually. They are out of patent, while the third-line (and
fourth-line and ﬁ fth-line) drugs remain in patent—that is, the drugs
are still under the control of companies, which have not yet oﬀered the
medicine under terms that would bring continued treatment within her
reach. The result is that while AIDS is a treatable, chronic condition in
the developed world, in the developing world, second-line treatments are
the end of the line. The World Health Organization antiretroviral therapy
guidelines oﬀer a grim suggestion in cases like Thembisa’s: “If a patient
has exhausted all available antiretroviral . . . treatment options . . . it becomes reasonable to stop giving ARVs and to institute an active palliative
and end-of-life care plan.”1 Thembisa’s caregivers from Doctors Without
Borders feel defeated. “Seeing a patient you have been treating since 2003,
and now this patient is failing on her second combination, you feel you
are a failure,” says Mpumi Mantangana. Thembisa’s only concern is her
family. “I know that I’m going to die,” she says, but “who is going to look
after my children?”2
Not too long ago, an HIV-positive diagnosis was tantamount to a
death sentence—for people in the East and the West, in the South and
the North. The drug companies that perfected the antiretroviral therapies
invested princely sums to ﬁnd these miracle cures. To justify their investment, they rely on the promise of a patent—the twenty-year exclusive
right to make, use, and sell an invention that is novel, non-obvious, and
useful. The patent allows the drug company to charge high sums for the
medicine, and thereby recoup its enormous investments in scientists and
drug trials, while also turning a proﬁt for shareholders and investing in
research toward future breakthrough drugs. Thus patents have saved
countless lives, including Thembisa’s thus far.
But this structure has its limits. Indeed, the evidence is mounting
that in crucial ways patents fail to promote the health of people in the
developing world, and in some cases in the developed world as well.3
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First, the exclusive patent right allows a monopoly on the production of
the drug, which generally leads to higher prices for the cure. The enormous diﬀerences in price—$80 per annum compared to an annual per
person cost of $10,000 in the case of Thembisa’s medicines—creates vast
inequities between those who are wealthy enough to purchase the cure
(or to have one purchased for them by their government), and those who
must suﬀer, often knowing that a cure exists but lies beyond their means.
Some will say that Thembisa cannot be worse oﬀ for the patent because but for the patent, there would be no drug that she was struggling
to obtain. But this denies that patents are but one among many alternatives for stimulating and rewarding innovation, including prizes and
subsidies. Furthermore, drug companies often beneﬁt from enormous
public investment, including basic research conducted in universities
and research supported by nonproﬁt foundations and governments. I will
explore these points further in this chapter.
Second, patents do save lives, but primarily only the lives of those who
are willing and able to pay. In truth, drug companies do not target entire
populations of developing countries. To the contrary, they quite openly
identify a market in only a small portion of a developing country’s population. One major Western drug company calculates the eﬀective drug
market in India to be seventy to eighty million people—that is, less than
10 percent of that country’s population. An anonymous pharmaceutical
executive put it in these terms: “There could easily be 70 to 80 million
people [in India] who can aﬀord expensive medicines, just as they go out
and buy expensive cars, branded clothes and consumer goods. . . . That
is equal to the size of a UK or a Germany.”4
The third point is related to the second: the patent system skews innovation to serve rich-country markets. The result is that Western drug
companies are not producing the medicines most needed in the developing world, where few can aﬀord to pay. As a 2006 World Health Organization study showed, intellectual property is not a signiﬁcant factor
in contributing to innovation for diseases that disproportionately aﬀect
developing countries, such as malaria and tuberculosis. A Lancet study
concluded that only 1 percent of the 1,556 drugs developed in the last
twenty-ﬁve years targeted so-called neglected diseases such as malaria and
tuberculosis, even though these diseases account for over 10 percent of the
global disease burden.5 Indeed, these diseases have earned the name “ne-
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glected diseases” because so little of the world’s proportion of R&D dollars
is dedicated to them.6 Global diseases are generally categorized as Type I
(diseases spread evenly through the developed and developing worlds);
Type II (diseases that are predominantly in the developing world but on
which a substantial proportion of R&D sums are spent—the sole example
here being AIDS), and Type III (diseases for which 95 percent of the global
burden falls in the developing world, and little if any global R&D funds
are spent).7 As a recent World Health Organization report on patents and
incentives concluded, “There is no evidence that the implementation of
the TRIPS agreement in developing countries will signiﬁcantly boost
R&D in pharmaceuticals on Type II, and particularly Type III diseases,”8
explaining that “[i]nsuﬃcient market incentives are the decisive factor.” 9
The failure to develop an AIDS treatment for children serves as a
glaring example of this lacuna in the incentive theory underlying patents. There are 2 million children with HIV in the world and 90 percent
of them live in sub-Saharan Africa. Without treatment, a third of those
children with the virus will die before their ﬁrst birthday. And in fact,
few if any have access to treatment, not simply because treatments are
unaﬀordable, but also because Big Pharma has not found it proﬁtable to
develop pediatric treatments for this primarily poor group.
Fourth, patents only incentivize drug production in countries that
already have the necessary technical capacity and capital investment for
breakthrough research. Indeed, in countries with lesser technical capacity,
patents may impede their ability to gain technical knowledge by copying
more advanced industries abroad. Simply put, the elusive promise of a
patent will not spur the creation of new treatments if a country lacks
technical know-how. Thus patents in the developing world not only inhibit
technology transfer to poor countries; they also engender dependence on
developed countries and their drug companies—companies that, as we
have seen, are not particularly interested in serving the populations of
the developing world.
Fifth, the economic incentive theory does not justify worldwide recognition of a patent. In Thembisa’s case, for example, the existence of U.S.
and European patents was enough to spur the creation of drugs that could
save her life. Under the incentive theory, the incentives existed for these
drugs to save European and American lives. The fact that Thembisa’s life
has been saved thus far is only incidental. So why don’t the companies
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that hold the patents on the third-line treatments donate the medicines
to the world’s poorest nations at cost? Are they really hoping to make
money from these people? There are some likely reasons that companies
have been slow to oﬀer their drugs at a fraction of the cost they charge
in the wealthier parts of the world. First, as we have seen, drug company
executives hope to proﬁt by catering to the small markets of the very rich
in these places. Second, these executives worry that low prices in the developing world will call into question monopoly prices in the developed
world. Moreover, they are concerned about grey-market reimportation of
the cheaply produced drugs into richer countries. Yet the hope of catering
to a sliver of the developing world market ought not to prevent the use of
mechanisms such as compulsory licenses for generic drug production
to service the majority of the poor. In fact, the creation of generic drug
markets for the poor ought not signiﬁcantly impact the bottom line of Big
Pharma, which derives only 5 to 7 percent of its proﬁts from this part of
the world. The grey-markets concern is a valid one—but, as we shall see,
the World Trade Organization has begun to craft creative solutions to this
problem (requiring generic drugs made for developing world markets to
be distinctively labeled, for example).
Patents are a question of life and death. In the developed world, eﬀective markets spur the investment of billions of dollars in R&D, leading
to the creation of breakthrough drugs. As a 2006 World Health Organization report on intellectual property and public health concluded, “Intellectual property rights have an important role to play in stimulating
innovation in health-care products in countries where ﬁnancial and technological capacities exist, and in relation to products for which proﬁtable
markets exist.” But in the developing world, patents actually impede the
distribution of drugs to the poor. In the words of one observer: Innovation is meaningless if newly developed products remain out of reach.
Furthermore, patents do little to spur cures for the ills that aﬀect the poor;
neither do patents incentivize domestic production where local industry
lacks technological capacity, basic research, and the capital required for
breakthrough innovation. That is, according to the same World Trade
Organization report, in developing countries “the fact that a patent can
be obtained may contribute nothing or little to innovation if the market
is too small or scientiﬁc and technological capability inadequate.”10
In 2005 the Nobel Prize–winning relief organization Doctors With-
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out Borders put the matter more starkly, warning the WTO that when
monopoly pricing takes medicines fully out of the reach of the poor, patents can kill.11 The result? We have a global patent system that works some
of the time and in some parts of the world. But in critical humanitarian
and economic respects, our patent system is broken.

patents, participation, and development
These are powerful critiques of the economic incentive theory of patents:
Patents fail to incentivize research that addresses poor people’s diseases;
patents oﬀer little incentive for R&D in poor countries, which lack basic
technological capacity; the patented drugs produced by multinationals
are priced out of reach of the poor; and ﬁnally, Big Pharma will not allow
generic drug production in the developing world, even though doing so
would not adversely aﬀect its incentives. But there are additional critiques
of our current patent system that we may articulate and consider, critiques
that expand our response to Thembisa and her tragic situation beyond the
success or failure of intellectual property rights as incentives.
In this book I have emphasized cultural participation as both a means
and an end of development. Producers of music, art, and scientiﬁc innovations today seek economic development in the sense that they are
asking for fair remuneration for their intellectual production from global
markets. At the same time, participation in the production of the world’s
knowledge is an end in itself. All human beings seek to “think for themselves,” to apply their ingenuity to better their own lives and the lives
of those around them. This is what development is for. Amartya Sen’s
agency- oriented conception of development as freedom recognizes that
individuals in the developing world do not simply wish to sit back and
be the “beneﬁciaries of cunning beneﬁt programs,” but rather seek to
enhance their capacity to live a life that is happy and fulﬁlling, to care for
themselves, and to interact with others, near and far.
Patents are crucial to realizing this vision of participatory democracy and development. At the most basic level, patents on medicines affect individuals’ capacity to live “a human life of normal length,” which
Nussbaum places at the very top of her list of central human capabilities.
Health without fear of dying prematurely is the essential foundation on
which a full life can be built. With access to eﬀective and aﬀordable
medicines (themselves spurred by patents), Thembisa can care for her

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 178

2/10/12 2:23 PM

an issue of life or de ath

179

children and be a productive participant in her community and national
economy. But let me be clear: we are not interested only in Thembisa’s
potential contributions, seeing her as a means and not an end, or simply
in the economic costs to society of her illness. The “[e]conomic eﬀects of
the AIDS epidemic are important not so much on their own but primarily because of their consequences on human lives and happiness and
freedoms,” Sen reminds us.12 Most importantly, we must be concerned
when patents impose signiﬁcant costs on Thembisa’s happiness, thwarting her hopes of raising her children and living a full and independent
life of her own making.
It must be acknowledged that patents are not the lone culprit in keeping medicines from the poor. The point is often made that a vast majority
of essential drugs are oﬀ patent, and yet these remedies nonetheless fail to
get distributed to the destitute because of poor mechanisms for delivery
and use of the drugs, inadequate treatment facilities, and lack of patient
education. Yet we cannot ignore the role of patents. As I have detailed,
the eﬀects of patents on the poor’s access to medicines range from neglecting diseases of the developing world like malaria and tuberculosis to
ratcheting up the costs of medicines so that they are simply out of reach.
Patents are constitutive of cultural democracy and development in
another fundamental way. Patent law is a critical tool for structuring a
society’s capacity to innovate. Nations have long understood that their
patent policy has helped determine the success or failure of their indigenous creative industries and the social welfare of their people. Indeed, for
most of world history patent systems were tailored to the developmental
needs of each nation, with even many European countries enacting weak
patent laws in their early days in order to borrow and copy freely from
more advanced nations abroad. Switzerland, for example, protected its
successful watch-making industry with patents in mechanical inventions,
while simultaneously seeking to copy and learn from the more advanced
German chemical industry by excluding patents in chemical products.13
India famously overhauled its patent laws in 1970 after a 1959 study concluded that the old law, a remnant of colonial days, “has failed in its main
purpose, namely, to stimulate invention among Indians” and “to secure
the beneﬁts thereof to the largest section of the public.”14 The study, led
by a commission under Supreme Court Justice Rajagopal Ayyangar, concluded that the inherited British patent law—which recognized sixteen-
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year patents in most inventions, including pharmaceutical drugs—was
remarkably unsuited to a newly independent India, which lacked the
technological know-how to spur indigenous scientiﬁc industry, and whose
population was too poor to pay the high prices for medicines that such
a patent regime engendered. The Ayyangar report found that the main
beneﬁciaries of the old patent law were foreigners, not Indians—indeed,
91 percent of patents owned in India by the end of 1958 were held by
foreigners.15
Notably, the report’s main recommendation, that India retool its patent law to weaken patent protection—particularly with respect to food and
drug products—in order to stimulate indigenous industry and facilitate
cheaper medicines for all, drew largely from the actions of many European governments at the time. Germany, the report noted, recognized
patents in chemical processes but not products—thus allowing multiple
companies to produce the same drug product. Observing that European
countries of the time enacted patent laws that promoted their own industrial and social interests, the Ayyangar report concluded that India
ought to do the same. In particular, the report recommended amending
the patent law by:
1. Defining with precision those inventions that should be patentable and by rendering unpatentable certain inventions for
which the grant of patents would retard research or industrial
progress or be detrimental to national health or well-being;
2. Expanding the scope of “anticipation” so as to comprehend
not merely what is known or published in this country, but also
that which is known or published outside India;
3. Providing remedies for the injustices that India, like other
countries, experiences from foreign-owned patents that are
not employed within the country, but which are held either to
block the industries of the country or to secure a monopoly
of importation;
4. Including special provisions regarding the licensing of patents
for inventions relating to food and medicine; and
5. Offering remedies for other forms of abuse resorted to by patentees, to secure a more extended monopoly or a monopoly for a
longer duration than what the statute grants.16
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The Indian Patent Act of 1970 adopted many of the Ayyangar report’s
suggestions. The crucial distinction made in the Indian Patent Act of 1970
was to recognize patents in pharmaceutical processes but not products.
So long as a company could develop an alternate way of producing a drug,
it was legal. In addition, process patents were relatively short—ﬁve years
from the date of grant or seven years from the date of ﬁling, whichever
was earlier—and an automatic “licence of right” was to be available three
years after the grant of the patent. This legal framework, along with government investment into laboratories, allowed Indian pharmaceutical
companies to reverse- engineer nearly every drug produced by foreign
multinational companies. A booming generic drug industry in India ensued. Competition from generics in turn drastically lowered drug prices
and facilitated access to medicines for the poor—not just in India, but also
in poor export markets, from Asia to South America to Africa. Because
India had been one of the few countries with the ability to manufacture
generics not only for its domestic population, but also for other developing countries, competition from India’s generic producers lowered prices
dramatically throughout the developing world. Over a ten-year period,
the introduction of Indian generics in Africa reduced the price of AIDS
treatments from $15,000 to $200 annually, bringing life-saving treatment
within the ordinary person’s reach. Indian pharmaceutical companies
quickly became “the pharmacy of the developing world.” Doctors Without
Borders estimates that over 80 percent of the antiretrovirals it prescribes
to over 100,000 patients in the developing world are generics made in
India. Indeed, by 2005, India had the fourth largest pharmaceutical industry in the world, from which it earned $3 billion annually.17 As Tanuja
Garde concludes, the Indian Patent Act of 1970 “arguably achieved the
goals of the Ayyangar Report’s recommendations: the number of licensed
drug manufacturers in India increased from 2,237 in 1969–70 to around
16,000 in 1992–93,” and “while multinational corporations enjoyed about
80–90 percent of the pharmaceutical market around 1970, by 1993, Indian ﬁrms accounted for over 60 percent of the market.”18
The nation-speciﬁc approach to intellectual property was premised on
the conventional wisdom that strong intellectual property rights are beneﬁcial for countries that are primarily producers of knowledge—that is,
the developed world. Similarly, this conventional wisdom recognized that
intellectual property rights would not beneﬁt the developing world, which
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was primarily a net importer of knowledge. Thus, developing countries
followed a minimalist approach to intellectual property in the interest
of promoting their ability to borrow and build on the knowledge of the
developed world. Indeed, in the case of copyrights even the United States
took a minimalist approach to intellectual property protection during its
ﬁrst hundred years. It was in our best interest to freely copy the knowledge
of the richer parts of the globe—we could not have so quickly built our
own knowledge industry had the rules been otherwise. In India’s case, its
ability to produce generics and to learn through this process has helped
to lay the foundation for several of its pharmaceutical companies to become global players today. The United States is now the biggest market
for Ranbaxy, India’s largest pharmaceutical company. Most of Ranbaxy’s
production is either drugs licensed from foreign pharmaceutical companies or generics of oﬀ-patent drugs. India’s second largest pharmaceutical
company, Dr. Reddy’s, similarly found success by providing cheap generics to developed world markets as well as to developing world governments
seeking to address their public health woes. The formula was simple, and
it worked: minimalist intellectual property regimes allowed developing
countries to stand on their own feet, develop indigenous knowledge and
industry, and meet the needs of their own people without being dependent on foreigners.
But this conventional wisdom about intellectual property and development was turned on its head at the end of the last century. In 1995, with
the establishment of the World Trade Organization, intellectual property
rights were for the ﬁrst time considered an international trade issue, and
came to be governed by a new international law, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property, otherwise known as the TRIPS
agreement. The TRIPS agreement imposed, for the ﬁrst time in history,
high minimum standards for intellectual property protection that all
members of the WTO were required to recognize and enforce, on pain of trade
sanctions. The upshot is that today 90 percent of the world’s countries
must follow a one-size-ﬁts-all approach to intellectual property, regardless of the country’s level of development. The agreement represents a
radical departure from a centuries-old approach that had allowed countries to develop intellectual property rules conducive to their particular
developmental needs.
Among other things, the TRIPS agreement now requires its members
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to recognize patents in all areas of technology, including in processes and
products, for twenty years (the only exception being for the least developed
countries, which have until 2016 to implement patents in drug products
if they had no such law in the past). Thus, whereas countries such as India were free to make generic drugs prior to 2005—to serve India’s own
population and much of the developing world’s populations, as well—the
legality of much of India’s past generic production is now uncertain. And
while the TRIPS agreement provides for compulsory licenses to address
public health needs and in the case of national emergencies (which I will
describe shortly), the procedures required to exercise such options are
sometimes onerous, and the political pressure on nations not to issue
compulsory licenses is immense.
There are some salutary aspects of this situation. As the incentives
for India’s pharmaceutical industry likely shift to promoting the creation
of new, innovative drugs rather than generic versions of existing drugs,
the Indian pharmaceutical industry may move more into knowledge production, not just its circulation (although Indian companies have not had
any successful breakthrough invention thus far). But the hope that this
industry may better address developing world diseases may be overly
optimistic. Indian pharmaceutical companies will face the same market
pressures as Western pharmaceutical companies: to produce drugs for
the markets that can pay the largest sums—which has historically meant
developed world markets.
In immediate terms, the added delays and demanding criteria for
creating generic versions of new drugs will mean that AIDS patients who
develop resistance to older drugs will not have cheap access to newer AIDS
drugs as they become available. In fact, Thembisa and tens of thousands
of poor people like her who beneﬁted from India’s patent law prior to
2005 may be unable to access such drugs for the period of the patent,
that is, twenty years.
This tragic result illuminates how tying countries’ hands in this
way—and in particular, tying the hands of developing countries—thwarts
democratic participation and development in the most fundamental
sense. First, a one-size-ﬁts-all approach to patent protection conﬂicts with
nations’ particular constitutional and fundamental normative commitments. The Indian Patent Act of 1970, for example, reﬂected more than
just a utilitarian calculus regarding good innovation policy. More funda-
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mentally, the law bore in mind a national, democratic commitment to the
principle of access to medicines for all. As Indira Gandhi articulated it,
Indians envisioned a nation in which “medical discoveries would be free
of patents and there would be no proﬁteering from life or death.”19 Today
nations have much less room than ever before to adjust their intellectual
property laws to promote their democratically deliberated interests and
commitments.
Nevertheless, a number of countries are courageously striving to be
TRIPS compliant without compromising democracy at home. One way
countries can still seek to meet their basic constitutional and fundamental
obligations is by adopting stringent patenting standards; another is utilizing the “ﬂexibilities” or exceptions built into the TRIPS agreement, especially those allowing for compulsory licensing to promote public health.
India, for example, which recognizes a “right to life” in article 21 of its
constitution, has recently witnessed a spate of high court cases that pit
its new TRIPS-compliant patent law against this constitutional commitment. Thus far, the high courts have sided with the constitution, reading
limitations in the new patent law in light of that country’s constitutional
commitment “to provide easy access to the citizens of this country to life
saving drugs and to discharge the Constitutional obligation of providing
good health care to its citizens.” 20 Brazil and Thailand have eﬀectively
used compulsory licensing to meet the needs of their respective national
health programs (I will discuss their eﬀorts shortly). Yet despite working within the TRIPS framework, these countries have been sued by
multinationals and pressured and threatened by Western governments
for defending the rights of their citizens against Big Pharma. In short,
the “one-size-ﬁts-all” approach to patent law threatens democracy itself.

from market failure to mor al failure
The current international regime governing access to medicines must
be fundamentally reconsidered. The ﬁrst step, which the World Health
Organization and other international actors have recently begun, is to reevaluate whether patents really are the best or even a good comprehensive
innovation policy. As we have seen, the evidence suggests grave limits to
relying solely on patents to promote innovation that beneﬁts rich and poor
alike. In the next section I outline some important alternative innovation
policies that may do a better job of promoting medical research relevant to
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the poor, and which ought to facilitate generic drug production enough to
bring medicines within reach of the poor. In this section I consider how
the very means for evaluating the eﬀectiveness and justness of our patent
regime must also expand beyond simply calculating outputs.
We have been here before. In 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared that property rights could not stand in the way of the health
and well-being of the poor. In State v. Shack, a farmer employed migrant
workers for his seasonal needs, housing them at a camp on his property.
Defendant Tejeres sought out a migrant worker who needed the removal
of twenty- eight sutures. Shack, an attorney, sought to discuss a legal
problem with another migrant worker. Tejeres and Shack insisted on
delivering their aid and information to the workers in the privacy of the
workers’ living quarters. When they entered the property, however, the
owner called on a state trooper to evict them. The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the owner’s rights in his land could not “stand between
the migrant workers and those who would aid them.”21 Memorably, the
court declared: “Property rights serve human values.” 22
State v. Shack sits ﬁ rmly in the property law canon. It represents
property law’s “social enlightenment”—the recognition that in a complex
and increasingly interconnected society, property rights will inevitably
conﬂict with other vital interests, from the property rights of others, to
health, to speech, to civil rights. And like landlord/tenant cases such as
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., which responded to the civil rights
struggles of the previous decade, Shack paid heed to social facts about the
plight of migrant farmworkers. The court in Shack was openly moved by
governmental recognition of the poor living and social conditions of the
nearly one million migrant farmworkers arriving as seasonal workers
to the United States. The court noted that private property rights could
not be used to prevent this “highly disadvantaged segment” of society,
which was “rootless and isolated . . . unorganized and without economic
or political power,” from accessing the assistance to which the state held
they were entitled.23
Fast-forward thirty years: in the new millennium, the world’s attention has again turned to poverty and social relations between the ﬁrst and
third worlds. Today, the Internet and digital technology enable information to trespass legal and technical barriers, and social workers such as
Doctors Without Borders seek to bring medicines to those suﬀering from
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AIDS and other illnesses in the third world. Again, property rights would
stop them, although this time they are copyrights and patents rather than
rights in land. And again, we witness a social movement articulating
fundamental rights to health and well-being—and the tragedy of property
rights thwarting them. This movement has gathered pace since poor countries signed onto TRIPS in 1995, which, again, requires all WTO member
states to recognize patents in everything from medicines to seeds.
Today, estimates are that approximately ten million people die needlessly every year because they cannot access existing essential medicines
and vaccines. The WTO has recognized this humanitarian crisis and, to
its credit, has declared that the TRIPS agreement must be interpreted
in a way to protect public health and promote development. Recognizing
“the gravity of the public health problems aﬄicting many developing and
least- developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics,” 24 in November 2001, with
the commencement of the “Development Round” of World Trade Organization negotiations, member countries adopted the groundbreaking
“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.” The “Doha
Declaration” unequivocally holds that patent rights cannot trump the
rights of millions of people to health and dignity, or the rights of states
to meet the humanitarian needs of their peoples. Signiﬁcantly, it clariﬁes that TRIPS “does not and should not prevent members from taking
measures to protect public health.” 25
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health comes closest to
oﬀering a State v. Shack for intellectual property. Aﬃrming that TRIPS
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner . . . to
protect public health and . . . to promote access to medicines for all,”26 the
Doha Declaration began a process of social enlightenment of intellectual
property. With it, the WTO announces that intellectual property, too,
serves human values. The declaration acknowledges that incentives are
necessary to stimulate pharmaceutical production because they enable the
drug companies to recoup their research and development costs, but it also
recognizes that the strict patent regime imposed by TRIPS—twenty-year
terms on patents in all technologies—will lead to hikes in the prices of
drugs and limited access to life-saving treatments for the poorest people.
The Doha Declaration reaﬃrms that developing countries can exercise
ﬂexibilities built into the TRIPS agreement to meet the public health
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needs of their citizens, in particular highlighting that any member state
has a right to grant compulsory licenses on medicines—essentially reverting that country’s patent law to pre-TRIPS days—so as to allow the
production or importation of cheap generic drugs. The declaration assures
that each member state has “the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licenses are granted”—stipulating that this includes but is
not limited to cases of national or medical emergency—and there is no
exhaustive list as to which diseases can be treated.27
Furthermore, the Doha Declaration recognized that not all countries were equally positioned to issue compulsory licenses. Noting “that
WTO members with insuﬃcient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face diﬃculties in making eﬀective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement,” the Doha Declaration
recognized that the least developed nations are dependent on other countries, like India, for the supply of cheap generic drugs.28 The declaration
directs the TRIPS Council to ensure that countries can use compulsory
licenses not only to produce drugs, but also to import them, and a subsequent amendment to the TRIPS agreement in 2005 sought to promote
just this sort of endeavor (although the eﬀectiveness of this amendment
is as yet unclear, as I will discuss shortly).29
The Doha call for limiting patent holders’ rights in drugs to accommodate public health crises cannot be explained by traditional law and
economics analysis. The Doha Declaration permits compulsory licenses
to correct a moral failure, not a market failure. If only economics are considered, there is no failure: medicines are already reaching those needy
people willing and able to pay. According to such logic, it is perfectly ﬁne
that nearly the entire continent of Africa is priced out of some drugs.
But the Doha Declaration makes a diﬀerent assessment, arguing that
intellectual property holders’ rights do not include the ability to preclude
access to essential medications for millions.
I oﬀer State v. Shack as an important precedent, but not as a perfect analogue. Furthermore, I recognize that in intellectual property law
circles there is understandable discomfort with the property metaphor.
Property rights are relative in theory but absolute in the popular consciousness. Even so, today intellectual property rights may be limited in
theory, but they are succumbing to a more absolutist conception in fact.
The social movement to limit intellectual property rights to serve human
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values confronts the increasing absolutism of intellectual property rights.
The movement also calls attention to the need to analyze intellectual
property in various contexts: when a life depends on immediate access
to essential medicines, for example, twenty-year patents are perpetual.
Most importantly, the social movement to bring essential medicines to
the poor harbors all the same basic insights of Shack: it recognizes that
the poor are disparately aﬀected by intellectual property rights, that there
is a real and growing conﬂict between the fundamental right to health
and claims of intellectual property, and that intellectual property rights
may be respected without sacriﬁcing other fundamental values. To that
end, and as mentioned earlier, the Doha Declaration clariﬁes that TRIPS
allows for each member state to grant compulsory licenses in the event
of a national emergency or a public health crisis—that is, the right of a
state to impose a license on an essential drug for a “reasonable royalty”
to the patent owner.
Unfortunately, in the decade since the adoption of the Doha Declaration, several ﬁrst-world members of the World Trade Organization
have taken actions against the spirit of the agreement, threatening the
ability of developing countries to reconcile their TRIPS obligations with
their constitutional and democratic commitments to the health and wellbeing of their people. The United States and the European Union have
entered into bilateral free trade agreements with developing countries
that impose intellectual property obligations more stringent than those
in TRIPS (called “TRIPS-Plus”). In addition, countries such as Brazil and
Thailand, which have exercised compulsory licenses wholly consistent
with the TRIPS agreement, have nevertheless been criticized and threatened with trade sanctions for doing so. In the face of such pressures, it is
worth reviewing some of the strategies available to developing countries
seeking to improve access to medicines post-TRIPS.

s tr ategies for promoting global public he alth
Patents have proven to be a poor mechanism for distributing and delivering drugs that treat common diseases, such as AIDS or cancer, to those
too poor to pay. Patents have also proven to be inadequate tools for spurring research into what are known as neglected diseases, such as malaria
and tuberculosis, which predominantly aﬄict the poor. As the economist
Jagdish Bhagwati puts it, the market-based intellectual property system
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has thus far failed because in poor countries there is “need but no eﬀective demand,” where demand is deﬁned as willingness and ability to pay.30
What tools are available to help address the gaps in access and incentives
produced by the current legal and policy environment?
Access-Enhancing Tools
Compulsory licenses. The Doha Declaration recognizes that countries have
the “right to grant compulsory licenses,” and “the freedom to determine
the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”31 In fact, the declaration simply reaﬃrmed nations’ rights already outlined in the TRIPS
agreement. In particular, article 31 of the TRIPS agreement allows member states to grant compulsory licenses to authorize the making of generic
drugs in the event of “national emergency” or “extreme urgency,” or in
the context of “public non- commercial use” 32—that is, where a government distributes medicines under a national health policy. In all three
cases, TRIPS requires governments to ﬁrst engage patent holders, for a
reasonable amount of time, in negotiations over drug pricing. Yet this
requirement may be waived at the discretion of the member state.33 Notably, and contrary to popular perception, the TRIPS agreement does not
limit states’ use of compulsory licenses to any particular diseases, such
as HIV/AIDS or malaria. Neither does TRIPS direct that compulsory
licenses may be used only to access “essential” or “life-saving drugs.”
To the contrary, member states have broad ﬂexibility to use compulsory
licenses to meet their public health needs as they themselves determine
these needs. The declaration reaﬃrms “the right of WTO Members to
use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
ﬂexibility for this purpose.”34
In 2007 the Thai government sought to exercise these ﬂexibilities to
meet its obligations under its national health plan. Thailand’s national
health scheme covers 80 percent of its total population—that is, some 63
million people. Like most low- and middle-income countries, Thailand’s
number one killer is not AIDS, but heart disease. Using the discretion
aﬀorded to its government under TRIPS, Thai authorities issued a compulsory license on the antiplatelet drug clopidogrel, which is used to treat
heart disease. With the compulsory license, the drug price fell from two
dollars a pill to two cents per pill—a savings of 99 percent. This is far
lower than any discounted price the government would have been able to
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negotiate with the patent owner. Thailand also issued compulsory licenses
to authorize generic production of the heart medication Plavix and the
AIDS drug Kaletra. Uproar from Western governments ensued. Critics
argued that compulsory licenses ought to be limited to AIDS drugs alone.
But in fact no such limitation exists under TRIPS. In fact, the World
Health Organization has recognized heart disease as the leading cause
of death for adults, with 80 percent of these deaths occurring in lowand middle-income countries. The Thai government was simply acting
to meet the public health needs of the Thai people. Furthermore, Thai
democracy is itself at stake—Thailand’s constitution guarantees citizens
an “equal right” to receive health services. Thus while a small minority
of Thai citizens can and do pay the monopoly drug prices charged in the
developed world, the vast majority of the nation’s people must depend on
the state for their health care, including medicines.
For such compulsory licenses to be eﬀective, of course, there must be
a generic drug industry ready to make the drug. In the case of clopidogrel,
there was robust competition among generic drug makers in India, because India did not recognize drug patents when the drug was introduced
in 1987. As a result, more than forty Indian ﬁrms were producing the
drug in 2007, and ﬁerce competition among them forced the drug price
down dramatically.35 The scope for continued generic production of new
drugs introduced after 2005 remains unclear because of international
patent obligations. But as we will see, governments like India and Brazil
have nonetheless sought to limit new patents by adopting high patentability standards as well as procedures for contesting patent applications,
all within the framework of TRIPS. The leaders of these countries hope
to exclude from patentability those innovations that are not truly novel
and thus preserve room for continued generic drug production, albeit on
a more limited basis.
Brazil has also taken a lead in using or threatening to use compulsory licenses to provide access to medicines for its citizens. The Brazilian
government is recognized the world over for its public health program to
combat AIDS—the state provides free treatment to all who need it. An
estimated 600,000 Brazilians are infected with AIDS, and the nation’s
program is credited with maintaining the life of some 170,000 AIDS
patients annually. But the government has only been able to meet the
public health needs of its citizens through the repeated use or threat of
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compulsory licenses on patented AIDS drugs. In recent years the country’s president has himself issued a compulsory license on AIDS drugs
in the hopes of treating aﬄicted Brazilian patients.
Some express the concern that compulsory licensing will adversely
aﬀect pharmaceutical companies’ incentives. Generic drug prices available under compulsory licenses are certainly far lower than specially negotiated prices with drug companies would be. Yet studies suggest that
the incentive eﬀect of compulsory licenses on drug companies is in fact
negligible because proﬁts from poor populations in countries such as
Thailand and Brazil rarely enter into Big Pharma’s expected proﬁt calculations in the ﬁrst place. By and large, Big Pharma ignores these markets
altogether, catering only to the rich minority populations in these places.
As James Love, an advocate for global access to medicines, argues, there is
little to no incentive eﬀect of using compulsory licenses “where consumption of high priced patented medicines [is] basically zero.” 36 This was the
case for Plavix in Thailand—the drug simply was not available to those
under the national health scheme—and has been the case for AIDS drugs
in Thailand, Brazil, and South Africa. Love concludes, “In these and in
countless other cases, the harm from the lack of access is huge, and the
incentive eﬀects are incredibly small. These empirical realities are quite
important in evaluating the trade-oﬀs.”37
It is important to note here that compulsory licenses are in fact a common tool used in the context of patents even in the developed world; they
are by no means limited to use by the developing world. The U.S. government has famously issued compulsory licenses—from the early twentieth
century when it broke the Wright Brothers’ patent in the airplane in order
to build ﬂeets of planes during World War I, to the beginning of the new
millennium when it threatened to break the pharmaceutical company
Bayer’s patent in the medication Cipro during the anthrax scare. Notably,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently opened the door even further to compulsory licenses with its 2006 opinion in the case of eBay v. MercExchange.
The Court in that case held that a ﬁnding of patent infringement does
not automatically demand an injunction to stop infringement. In cases
where equity demands it, a compulsory license may be the better remedy.
In the United States, compulsory licenses have been invoked to balance
the equities and further the public interest, even where incentives and
markets would be substantially aﬀected.
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Compulsory licenses for least developed countries. TRIPS Article 31(f)
requires that compulsory licenses be used for the supply of a country’s
“domestic market” only.38 Yet as the Doha Declaration recognized, the
least- developed countries could not take advantage of the compulsory
licensing provisions in TRIPS because they lack the manufacturing capability to produce generics in their home countries. As mentioned earlier,
in 2003 the WTO temporarily resolved this conundrum through a waiver
agreement allowing countries such as India to use compulsory licenses for
export markets as well. But the waiver (now an amendment to the TRIPS
agreement) has so far largely failed to move drugs to the poorest countries—indeed, to date it has only been invoked one time. In 2007 Rwanda
issued a compulsory license to import an AIDS drug manufactured by a
Canadian pharmaceutical company; per the waiver’s procedural requirements, Canada also issued a compulsory license to produce and export
the drug. Such cumbersome procedures—requiring both the exporting
and importing countries to issue compulsory licenses—have stalled the
eﬀective use of this tool by some of the countries that need it the most.
High patentability standards and progressive procedures. The success
of compulsory licensing depends on having countries that can produce
generic drugs. The Indian Patent Act of 1970 allowed India to produce
generic drugs for its own population and for the rest of the developing
world. But the introduction into all WTO countries of TRIPS standards,
which went into eﬀect in 2005 in all but the least developed countries,
puts considerable pressure on generic drug industries in countries like
India. Since that date, India has had to recognize patents in novel and
nonobvious processes and products in all ﬁelds of technology. In amending
its patent law in 2005 to be TRIPS compliant, however, Indian legislators
wisely introduced progressive provisions into its law—both substantive
and procedural—that maximize their ability to reject non-novel patents,
thus opening the door to future generic medicines. For instance, one
important substantive provision in India’s new patent law is section 3(d),
which prohibits a practice pejoratively known as “evergreening,” where
drug companies seek to extend the life of current patented products by
seeking to patent slight modiﬁcations to existing drugs. A common evergreening practice, for example, is to seek a patent on a salt form of a drug.
Salt forms typically have no added therapeutic value, but they do extend
the shelf life of a drug. Brazil has a similar provision against evergreen-
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ing in its new patent law, and recently both Brazil and India have rejected
patents on various “new” ﬁrst- and second-line HIV treatments, arguing
that the patent applications showed no improved therapeutic eﬀect.
An important procedural addition to India’s amended patent law is its
provision for both pre-grant and post-grant opposition to a patent. Notably,
“any person” can challenge either a patent application before it is granted,
or a patent after it is granted. Brazilian patent law has similar provisions.
These procedural rules have opened the door for civil society groups such
as patients’ rights advocates to directly challenge patents that aﬀect millions of lives. The combination of the anti- evergreening provision and
pre-grant opposition has led to some notable successes in both India and
Brazil. A recent case brought by a coalition of AIDS patients to the Delhi
Patent Oﬃce resulted in a statement by the patent oﬃce that it must “give
a strict interpretation of patentability criteria” because a decision in this
matter “shall aﬀect the fate of people suﬀering from HIV/AIDS for want
of essential medicine.” 39 In 2007 Novartis sought an Indian patent in
imatinib mesylate, a salt form of imatinib, a cancer drug that sold under
the brand name Gleevec. There, too, a plaintiﬀ group representing cancer patients challenged the law under section 3(d), and in June 2009 the
Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board rejected the patent, holding
that Novartis was unable to show increased “eﬃcacy” in the salt form. An
Indian high court also held that the new patent act must be interpreted
in such a way as to uphold India’s constitutional right to health.
Improved technical assistance. The Doha Declaration extends the date
of implementation to 2016 for the world’s least developed countries. If
such countries have not already recognized patents in pharmaceutical
drugs, they have until 2016 to enact legislation recognizing such patents.
Despite this safety hatch, however, the United States and other countries
have pressured some least developed countries to hasten their adoption
of patents for drugs.40
An important step for preserving access to medicines in these poorest
countries of the world is for intellectual property authorities, particularly
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), to provide balanced
“technical assistance” to the developing and least developed countries
regarding how they can tailor their intellectual property systems to promote local developmental needs while still complying with TRIPS. The
new patent laws in Brazil and India, with their anti- evergreening and
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patent opposition procedures, may serve as models for progressive patent
legislation in this regard.
Leveraging publicly funded research to promote the public interest. Eight
years ago, several Yale University students turned an insight into a tool
that could promote access to medicines for millions. They recognized that
a patent held by Yale University on a crucial AIDS drug could be used as
leverage to force downstream pharmaceutical companies to ensure access
to the drugs in poor countries. The students’ insight was this: universities,
which are openly dedicated to serving the public interest, are important
players in the access-to- drugs dilemma. As a matter of fact, university
research is essential to drug development. A U.S. Senate committee report
in 2000 found that university research was “instrumental” in developing
ﬁfteen out of the twenty-one drugs considered by experts to have had the
highest therapeutic impact.41
Recognizing that research universities with patentable knowledge
were a powerful tool, the students launched a student movement known
as Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, or UAEM. As part of this
movement, they also developed an even more powerful tool—called the
Equitable Access License (EAL)—that universities can use to negotiate access rights for the poor when they sell or license their patents in upstream
research to private drug companies, which in turn use this knowledge
to develop medicines. The EAL proposes that universities license their
knowledge to private companies in exchange for an agreement that third
parties can engage in generic drug production in developing countries,
regardless of those countries’ patent laws or whether the owner of the
drug ﬁles a patent in those countries. Just as in the copyright ﬁeld lawyers have shown how, through the use of Creative Commons licenses,
copyright owners can donate portions of their works to the public (for
example, for noncommercial use), UAEM encourages universities to use
licenses to enable generic drug production in the developing world, much
as was done prior to TRIPS.
Rolling back TRIPS. The TRIPS agreement has a distasteful history. It
is now well known and accepted that the TRIPS agreement was not freely
negotiated between the developing and developed world, but rather was a
result of coercion and a WTO bargaining process that lacked transparency
and favored a privileged few. A common critique of the agreement—that
intellectual property rights disproportionately favor knowledge-rich coun-
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tries and disfavor knowledge-poor countries—is bearing out in the ﬂows
of cash from the developing world to the developed world after TRIPS
was signed. In 1999 alone, well before full compliance with TRIPS was
mandatory, the developing world paid some $7.5 billion more in royalties
and license fees than it received. In short, TRIPS triggered a massive
transfer of wealth from poorer to richer states. Worse still, “TRIPS-plus”
standards imposed by bilateral free trade agreements impose intellectual
property obligations on countries well beyond those set out in the TRIPS
agreement, obligations that have cut signiﬁcantly into the ﬂexibilities
provided in TRIPS. Brazil, for example, was pressured into recognizing
drug patents even before 2005, the deadline given it by the TRIPS agreement, and its government spent approximately $420 million in higher
drug prices between 2001 and 2005 because of the preponement. Not surprisingly, Brazilian civic groups are challenging the validity of this law.42
Innovation- Centered Tools
Thus far I have considered mechanisms for promoting access to existing
medicines under the current international patent system. But access is
only part of the problem of our current exclusive reliance on patents for
promoting innovation. The patent system has also failed to incentivize
socially beneﬁcial innovation where there are no eﬀective markets—that
is, where the poor have a need but are unable to pay to meet it. As more
and more economists, philosophers, and legal experts have come to recognize this glaring gap in global innovation policy, highlighting the world’s
“missing knowledge,” alternatives to patents for promoting socially beneﬁcial innovation are emerging.
Prizes. Government-awarded prizes would be funded by taxpayers in
the developed world and would be targeted to addressing pressing social
needs, such as the need to cure the neglected diseases of the poor. Prize
systems have several immediate beneﬁts over patents. First, R&D for drug
innovation would be delinked from drug price. Government-sponsored
prizes would incentivize innovation and compensate drug companies for
conducting research and holding clinical trials as part of their eﬀorts to
treat neglected diseases. Such a system may prove cheaper than the patent
system, because the prize would be calculated to reward social beneﬁt in
terms of lives saved or enhanced, unlike a patent system that arbitrarily
allows drug owners to charge monopoly prices for the period of the patent,
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regardless of social cost or beneﬁt. Second, payment would not fall on the
sick themselves (a double burden on the sick poor) but would come from
better-oﬀ citizens in the developing world. While some would object, arguing that prizes create a tax on the rich to beneﬁt the poor (and worse still,
that this tax is to beneﬁt foreigners), this is in fact not unlike the current
patent system, where R&D is largely funded by citizens in the developed
world. Third, prizes help to more closely direct innovation that is socially
beneﬁcial and addresses unmet needs—unlike patents, which currently
skew incentives to favor therapies for the rich (like cures for baldness)
over other therapies. Finally, prizes are a good tool for promoting access
to medicines. Unlike patents, which create exclusive rights and monopoly
prices that few can aﬀord, developers of new drugs under a prize system
would receive a lump-sum reward and no exclusive rights to control price,
leaving the medicines themselves to be free for generic production and
thus facilitating widespread access to them. Medicines developed under
a prize regime would be owned by the people.
Granted, there are serious concerns about prizes, and some areas
in which prizes do not signiﬁcantly present an improvement over the
patent system. Both patents and prizes, for example, introduce potential
redundancy of eﬀorts among competing ﬁrms, whereby too many ﬁrms
work toward the same goal, but with the possibility of only one winner.
The question of how to reward follow-on inventors is also diﬃcult under
both patent and prize systems. But these hurdles may be overcome. The
legal scholars William Fisher and Talha Syed suggest, for example, capping the number of ﬁrms permitted to work simultaneously on a disease
treatment.43 Finally, there is the diﬃcult question of what research to
incentivize with a prize. The patent system does not require state coordination of innovation—private companies determine what to research.
Surely we ought to be concerned about the myopia of states with respect
to directing innovation too closely. But a prize system alongside a patent
system would at least help states direct innovation toward social causes
that are clearly both desirable and overlooked by the current patent system.
Patent pools. I have mentioned the lack of pediatric AIDS drugs because Big Pharma sees no eﬀective market for them—yet another example
of what the World Health Organization calls the “missing knowledge”
that gets passed over by the market-based intellectual property system.
Patents pose a further burden in such cases because follow-on creators are
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stymied by the existence of patent thickets, where overlapping patents in
the underlying technology exist and must be overcome in order to develop
a pediatric drug. In the case of a patent thicket, even if a subsequent drug
developer sought to license technology from one or two patent holders,
they would still face potential lawsuits from several other patent holders
—and thus may back down from their eﬀort completely. To address such
patent thickets with respect to AIDS therapies and pediatric doses, in
particular, UNITAID, a French health funding agency, has established a
patent pool of the key pharmaceutical companies holding AIDS treatment
technologies. With the aid of groups such as Doctors Without Borders,
UNITAID has publicly asked nine companies to contribute patents for
twenty- one products and their combinations into a pool to facilitate research for ﬁ xed-dose therapies and pediatric treatments. Like in a typical
patent pool, relevant patent holders agree to license their technologies to
both facilitate innovation and generate revenue. Royalty fees go to a pool
manager, who divides the proceeds among the pool members. Thus far,
the U.S. National Institutes of Health and Gilead Sciences have donated
patents to the pool.
A Health Impact Fund. A recent proposal by philosopher Thomas
Pogge and economist Aidan Hollis seeks to enhance pro-poor medical
care through a market-based solution. Their proposed Health Impact
Fund would create a fund from donations from world governments—ideally, every government would contribute .03 percent of their gross national
income to the fund. Firms that register a patent with the fund agree to
sell their drug globally at cost, in exchange for a share of the fund, for a
limited period, in proportion to the drug’s assessed health beneﬁt. The
guaranteed beneﬁts from the fund would serve as a market incentive to
Big Pharma to develop novel drugs for the poor; at the same time, the
fund’s commitment to at-cost distribution would provide access to the new
medicines for the poor. While the Health Impact Fund has been widely
praised and is getting serious attention in global circles, some concerns
about the fund remain, including whether the potentially high costs of
the fund are the best way for nations to spend their money.
In 1952 Jonas Salk developed the world’s ﬁrst safe and eﬀective polio vaccine. Today it seems unthinkable to innovate without the promise of a
patent, but just sixty years ago, one of the most important humanitarian
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innovations of the twentieth century was the result of the tireless commitment of Salk, a medical researcher at Pennsylvania State University who
labored single-mindedly for seven years with the sole purpose of playing
a signiﬁcant role in the eradication of a global plague. That year polio had
reached its height in the United States, aﬀecting some 52,000 people. The
most famous victim of the disease was President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who initiated an organization focused on developing a cure for the disease.
What inspired Salk’s innovation was not the dream of a property right,
but rather an eleemosynary interest in applying his ingenuity to bettering humankind. When a television news reporter asked him whether he
owned the patent in the vaccine, a mystiﬁed Salk replied, “Who owns the
patent? The people do.” Salk could not imagine claiming an exclusive
right on knowledge so important to humanity, replying, “Could you patent the sun?” Since then, hundreds of millions of people have received a
polio vaccine, and today, the disease has been largely eradicated.
Our theories of innovation and creativity matter. Our two-dimensional
theory of intellectual-property-as-incentives has, in just several decades’
time, come to inﬂuence the way many scientists and artists alike engage
the world. Standing in sharp relief from the public commitment and
meaningful work of Salk sixty years ago, today many do not think twice
about the claims from Big Pharma that they will not innovate at all, or
worse still, that they will not share their drugs in markets like Thailand
that issue compulsory licenses. We need to probe these incentive arguments on their own terms. In fact, the evidence shows that patents oﬀer no
incentive for developing drugs for neglected diseases that predominantly
aﬄict the poor. Additionally, compulsory licenses in developing countries
do little harm to innovation, because drug companies do not sell to those
markets in the ﬁrst place. But the problem lies much deeper than this. The
legal philosopher Seana Shiﬀrin condemns a legal system that condones
a situation where “talented people ransom their talents, withholding their
creative products in order to demand greater compensation.” Shiﬀ rin
asks whether a legal system that acquiesces to such immoral demands
is not itself unjust.44
A one-size-ﬁts-all patent system for drugs in the developing world
is unjust on additional grounds, beyond incentives. Patents that impede
access to the poor thwart both local democracy and human development.
Nations must have the freedom to democratically construct patent poli-
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cies to meet their humanitarian needs. For centuries countries had this
freedom—nations from Germany to Switzerland took advantage of their
freedom to ignore patents and copy freely knowledge that came from other
parts of the globe. Indeed, the self-determination to construct one’s own
patent law reﬂects more than a simple utilitarian calculus to promote
indigenous innovation. Patent policy aﬀects the ability of a country to
stand on its own two feet, independent of foreign knowledge and industry.
Economists call the millions of people who need a drug but cannot
aﬀord it “dead weight loss.” But the millions who die needlessly because
of the patent system are more than an ineﬃciency in the system. This
loss of human lives fundamentally thwarts human development at the
most basic level. Furthermore, lack of access to essential medicines is
patently unjust because it is preventable. Wholly unlike physical property,
which will naturally lose its value if overrun by large numbers, the unique
property of knowledge is that its value is not diminished by greater use—far
from it, the knowledge value only grows as it is used by more people, in
additional, diﬀerent ways. As Thomas Jeﬀerson wrote so eloquently centuries ago, “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine, as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me.”45 We must both adopt alternative mechanisms for
developing and distributing medicines to the poor (including prizes), and
fully support the use of compulsory licenses by developing countries to
treat their sick poor. Patent law cannot draw the line at rectifying market
failure. Our law must contend with moral failure as well.
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The soundtrack to the ﬁ lm became a surprise hit, selling millions of copies. Lomax’s daughter searched for months for Carter to share the spoils,
ﬁnally appearing on the doorstep of his humble home in Chicago with a
royalty check for $20,000 “and a platinum CD bearing his name.” Carter
“took his ﬁrst- ever plane ride to Los Angeles with his family” to attend the
Grammy Awards that year, where the soundtrack for O Brother, Where Art
Thou? won album of the year. By the time Carter died, he had received
nearly $100,000 in royalties. Dennis Mclellan, “James Carter, 77; Singer
in Chain Gang Found Fame,” L.A. Times, Dec. 8, 2003.
2 1. H. Koivunen and L. Marsio, “Ethics and Cultural Policy,” D’Art Topics in
Arts Policy no. 24, April 2008, available at http://www.ifacca.org/topic/
ethics-in- cultural-policy (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
22. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 18 (1999).
23. A recent submission to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights by the Yale Law School Information Society Project (ISP) argues
that “take part in” highlights that “participation is the essence of the right.”
Moreover, it is a “right of everyone to take part in culture,” which “requires
the elimination of discriminatory barriers, and special measures to prevent
barriers of geography, language, poverty, illiteracy, or disability from blocking full and equal participation.” See “Access to Knowledge and the Right
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to Take Part in Cultural Life,” Submission by the Information Society Project at Yale Law School to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 41st sess., November 3–21, 2008, at 2–3.
See, e.g., Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
states: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientiﬁc advancement and its
beneﬁts. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientiﬁc, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, art. 27, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, Dec. 12,
1948. See also International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights art. 15, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing “the right of everyone . . . [t]o beneﬁt from the protection of moral and
material interests resulting from any scientiﬁc, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”); see also Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994) (declaring rights to artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies, traditional medicines and health practices). A November 2005 document elaborating on
the meaning of this provision in the ICESCR concludes: “intellectual property is a social product and has a social function.” See also U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 17 at 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17, Jan. 12, 2006 (“The
right of everyone to beneﬁt from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientiﬁc, literary or artistic production of
which he or she is the author”).
Sen, Development as Freedom at 4.
Academics are just now beginning to pay greater attention to the links
between culture and development. See, e.g., Culture and Public Action
(Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton, eds., 2004).
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Miﬄin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
Manohla Dargis and A. O. Scott, “How the Movies Made a President,” N.Y.
Times, Jan. 16, 2009. Cf. Russell Robinson, “Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms,” 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2007).
Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism 25 (Amy
Gutmann, ed., 1994).
Salman Rushdie, “Excerpts from Rushdie’s Address: 1,000 Days ‘Trapped
Inside a Metaphor,’” N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1991 at B8 (excerpts from speech
delivered at Columbia University).
For other challenges to identity politics, see generally Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (2001) (arguing that Internet communities breed factionalism);
Elizabeth A. Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition 17, 33 (2002) (expressing
concern that communities may conform themselves to rigid legal deﬁnitions, stiﬂing cultural dynamism); K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authen-
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ticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in
Multiculturalism 149, 162–63 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1994) (asking whether,
identity politics does not replace “one kind of tyranny with another”);
Susan Moller Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?,” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 7 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1994) (arguing that multiculturalism does not promote the best interests of women and children).
Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy 105 (2000).
Arjun Appadurai, “The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition,” in Culture and Public Action, 59, 62–63 (Vijayendra Rao and
Michael Walton, eds., 2004).
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A PoliticalPhilosophical Exchange 8 (Joel Golb et al., trans., 2003).
U.N. Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Aﬀairs, Understanding Knowledge Societies, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/66 (2005), available at http://unpan1.un.org/
intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN020643.pdf (last visited
Aug. 9, 2011) at 141, 150.
Malan, In the Jungle at 3.
Id. at 7. Malan powerfully describes the universal allure of this song (at 16):
“We’re talking a pop song so powerful that Brian Wilson had to pull oﬀ
the road when he ﬁrst heard it, totally overcome; a song that Carole King
instantly pronounced a ‘motherfucker.’”
Chander and Sunder, “The Romance of the Public Domain” at 1351–54
(describing reasons that developing world companies might ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to exploit resources from their home states to sell globally).
In 1999, developing countries paid some $7.5 billion more in royalties and
license fees than the royalties and license fees they received. See id. at 1354.
Madhavi Sunder, “Intellectual Property and Development as Freedom,” in
The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and Developing Countries (Neil W. Netanel, ed., Oxford University Press, 2008).
To see Mr. Saidullah explain the inspiration for his amphibian bicycle,
watch http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REx9rMDbqRg (last visited Aug.
9, 2011).
Daniel Kahneman et al., “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics,” 59
J. Bus. S285, S299 (1986) (“A realistic description of transactors should include the following traits. [1] They care about being treated fairly and treating others fairly. [2] They are willing to resist unfair ﬁrms even at a positive
cost. [3] They have systematic implicit rules that specify which actions of
ﬁrms are considered unfair”).
See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiﬀrin, “Intellectual Property,” in A Companion
to Contemporary Political Philosophy 661 (Robert Goodin et al., eds., 2007)
(“once a work is created . . . it is often relatively easy and inexpensive for
others to copy and use the work. This makes it easy for competitors [and
consumers] to ‘steal’ a work and undercut the creator’s price. This vulnera-
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bility may deter creators from generating intellectual works.”). (Emphasis
mine.)
See Pam Samuelson, “Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical
Perspective,” 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 319–27 (2003) (detailing historical focus
of copyright law, since the Statute of Anne, on public access to knowledge).
I thank Martha Nussbaum for raising this issue.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,” 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2005).
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, “Density and Conﬂict in International Intellectual
Property Law,” 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1021 (2007). Raustiala expresses the
concern that human-rights-based claims for intellectual property “will
serve to wall oﬀ still more from the public domain” (at 1033). He cautions
that “the risk is that the language and politics of human rights, as it ﬁlters
[sic] into the language and politics of IP rights, will make it harder for governments to resist the siren songs of those seeking ever more powerful
legal entitlements” (at 1037).
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (2008).
For the argument that most subject areas of law should ignore distributional consequences in favor of direct redistribution through the tax system, see generally Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare
(2002).
Mike Miller, “At 85, Pete Seeger Still Hammers Out Justice,” Reuters, May
12, 2004.

chapter 4. everyone’s a superhero
1. Paula Smith, “A Trekkie’s Tale” (1974), reprinted in Camille Bacon-Smith,
Enterprising Women: Television Fandom and the Creation of Popular Myth
94–95 (1992).
2. See Jed Rubenfeld, “The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality,” 112 Yale L.J. 1, 8 n.34 (2002) (oﬀering examples of retellings from
a diﬀerent character’s perspective, including Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern Are Dead, a play on Hamlet; Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso
Sea, a play on Jane Eyre; and Henry Fielding’s Joseph Andrews, a play on
Pamela).
3. Pat Pﬂieger, “Too Good to Be True: 150 Years of Mary Sue,” paper presented
at the American Culture Association conference (March 31, 1999), available
at http://www.merrycoz.org/papers/MARYSUE.HTM (last visited Dec. 18,
2005).
4. Wikipedia, “Mary Sue,” available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Sue
(last visited April 30, 2009).
5. Keidra Chaney and Raizel Liebler, “Me, Myself & I—Fan Fiction and the
Art of Self-Insertion,” Bitch Magazine 52 (Winter 2005).
6. Cheryl Harris, “A Sociology of Television Fandom,” in Theorizing Fandom:

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 221

2/10/12 2:23 PM

222

7.
8.

9.
10.
1 1.

12.
13.

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

notes to page s 107 – 9
Fans, Subculture and Identity 41, 42 (Cheryl Harris and Alison Alexander,
eds., 1998).
See Justin Hughes, “‘Recoding’ Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests,” 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923, 940–66 (1999).
See Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Things,”
in The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective 3, 30 (Arjun
Appadurai, ed., 1986).
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Miﬄin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
John Fiske, Television Culture (1990).
Yvonne Fern, Gene Roddenberry: The Last Conversation 107 (1994) (quoting
Roddenberry: “One of the things Star Trek says is that when the future
comes, we will have successfully dealt with all of those issues of race and
sex and class, and we will have evolved”).
BBC UK, “Black History Month: 1969,” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
1xtra/bhm05/years/1969.shtml (last visited June 16, 2006).
“In his role as Sulu, [George] Takei challenged convention by being one of
the ﬁrst Asian American television icons to speak without an accent, without exotic costume, without any of the burden of the stereotypes that encumbered earlier TV portrayals. In doing so, he helped to make the idea of
‘Asian as normal’ possible.” Jeﬀ Yang, “Out, Beyond the Stars,” S.F. Gate,
Nov. 10, 2005, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?f=/g/a/2005/11/10/apop.DTL (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). Takei observes
that his role served another purpose, to counter images of Asians as the enemy during the Vietnam War: “On the 6 o’clock news, every night you saw
people with the same kind of face that I have wearing black pajamas, who
were being shot up, who were being characterized as the hoard that was
dangerous in the jungles of Vietnam.” That was followed by this counterbalancing image of Sulu, something that never existed in American media.
Asian Week, Sept. 23, 1994 at 11.
BBC UK, “Lt. Uhura,” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/cult/st/original/
uhura.shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2005; the kiss “essentially takes place oﬀscreen, because of the network’s concerns about upsetting viewers in the
southern states”).
StarTrek.com, “Deep Space Nine Cast,” available at http://www.startrek
.com/startrek/view/series/DS9/cast/69054.html (last visited June 16,
2006).
Star Trek.com, “Voyager Cast,” available at http://www.startrek.com/
startrek/view/series/voy/cast/69079.html (last visited June 16, 2006).
Children Now, Fall Colors: 2003–04 Prime Time Diversity Report at 11,
available at http://www.childrennow.org/index.php/learn/reports_and
_research/article/216 (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 1.
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Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 3. The Children Now report does not break down roles according to
the intersection of race and gender.
Id. at 2.
See Media Action Network for Asian-Americans, “A Memo from MANAA
to Hollywood: Asian Stereotypes,” available at http://www.manaa.org/
asian_stereotypes.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2005). See also David L. Eng,
Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America 15–19 (2001)
(describing the feminization of the Asian-American male in the U.S. cultural imagination); Gina Marchetti, Romance and the “Yellow Peril”: Race,
Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction 2 (1993) (noting that
Asian men are depicted as either “rapists or asexual eunuch ﬁgures,” while
Asian females are depicted as “sexually available to the white hero”); Darrell Y. Hamamoto, Monitored Peril: Asian Americans and the Politics of TV
Representation 6–31 (1994) (discussing how racist images have been imposed on Asian Americans on television); Peter Kwan, “Invention, Inversion and Intervention: The Oriental Woman in the World of Suzie Wong,
M. Butterﬂy, and The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert,” 5 Asian
L. J. 99 (1998).
Dana E. Mastro and Bradley S. Greenberg, The Portrayal of Racial Minorities on Prime Time Television, J. Broad. & Elec. Media 690, 691 (2000).
One website community titled “DeadBroWalking” hosts a “people of color
deathwatch,” with entries critical of the representation (or absence) of
minority characters in popular media, available at http://community.live
journal.com/deadbrowalking (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki, The Entman-Rojecki Index of Race
and Media (2000), http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/210758.
html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
Elizabeth Grauerholz and Bernice A. Pescosolido, Gender Representation
in Children’s Literature: 1900–1984, 3 Gender and Soc’y 113, 118 (1989).
Meg James, “Ruling on Pooh Is a Setback for Disney,” L.A. Times, May 3,
2003 at C1 (“At the peak of Winnie the Pooh’s popularity in the late 1990s,
it brought in more than $1 billion in revenue annually to Disney and companies it licensed to produce Pooh products”).
As one fan explains on a Winnie-the-Pooh FAQ, available at http://www
.lavasurfer.com/pooh-faq4.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2011): “every character
in ‘Winnie-the-Pooh,’ and ‘The House at Pooh Corner’ are boys except
Kanga. There are references to other female characters, namely some of
Rabbit’s friends and relations, but none of them have any speaking parts.”
For an image of Kanga, see http://us.penguingroup.com/static/packages/
us/yreaders/pooh75/characters/kanga.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). Of
Kanga, the publisher of the Winnie-the-Pooh books explains, “She displays
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many maternal attributes, such as: wanting to Count Things, making sure
that there are enough watercress sandwiches to go round, telling you what
to do, giving baths, and knowing how to play a joke.” Id.
The self-insertion in the original is quite vivid. The stories are told to
“you,” as if they recount the adventures of the reader (Christopher Robin)
himself in the Hundred Acre Wood. See, e.g., A. A. Milne, Winnie the Pooh
(1924) at 2: “Was that me?” Said Christopher Robin in an awed voice,
hardly daring to believe it./ “That was you.”
Christine Schoefer, “Potter’s Girl Trouble,” Salon.com, Jan. 12, 2000, available at http://archive.salon.com/books/feature/2000/01/13/potter/index
.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2011): “The world of everyone’s favorite kid wizard is a place where boys come ﬁrst.”
Non-whites in the Harry Potter novels are speciﬁcally identiﬁed by race,
while whiteness is assumed for all others. Keith Woods, “Harry Potter and
the Imbalance of Race,” PoynterOnline, July 15, 2005, available at http://
www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=58&aid=85445 (last visited Dec. 24, 2005).
Kelley Massoni, “Modeling Work: Occupational Messages in Seventeen
Magazine,” 18 Gender & Soc’y 47 (2004).
See, e.g., Hassan Fattah, “Comics to Battle for Truth, Justice and the Islamic Way,” N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2006 at 8. (“For comic book readers in
Arab countries, the world often looks like this: superheroes save American
cities, battle beasts in Tokyo and even on occasion solve crimes in the
French countryside. But few care about saving the Arab world.”)
See Jerry Kang, “Trojan Horses of Race,” 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1549–53
(2005) (describing the cognitive process of internalizing bias from violent
crime news).
Mark Watson and Mary McMahon, “Children’s Career Development: A Research Review from a Learning Perspective,” 67 J. Vocational Behavior 119,
124 (2005) (citing S. L. O’Bryant and C. R. Corder-Bolz, “The Eﬀects of
Television on Children’s Stereotyping of Women’s Work Roles,” 12 J. Vocational Behavior 233 [1978]).
Paul E. McGhee and Terry Frueh, “Television Viewing and the Learning
of Sex-Role Stereotypes,” 6 Sex Roles 179 (1980).
Ann Beuf, “Doctor, Lawyer, Household Drudge,” 24 J. of Commc’n 142,
144 (1974).
Glenn D. Cordua et al., “Doctor or Nurse: Children’s Perception of Sex
Typed Occupations,” 50 Child Dev. 590, 591 (1979).
Rebecca S. Bigler et al., “Race and the Workforce: Occupational Status,
Aspirations, and Stereotyping Among African American Children,” 39
Developmental Psychol. 572 (2003).
Sheila T. Murphy, The Impact of Factual Versus Fictional Media Portrayals
on Cultural Stereotypes, 560 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 165 (1998).
Minn. Advisory Comm’n to the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Stereotyping
of Minorities by the News Media in Minnesota 35 (1993), available at http://
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www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/mn1203/mn1203.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2011;
providing 2003 update to 1993 study); see also Camille O. Cosby, Television’s Imageable Inﬂuences: the Self-Perceptions of Young African-Americans
25 (1994).
Amber McGovern, “Neutralizing Media Bias Through the FCC,” 12
DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol’y 217, 242 (2002), citing Carolyn A. Stroman, “Television’s Role in Socialization of African-American Children and
Adolescents,” 60 J. Negro Educ. 314, 315 (1991).
Wikipedia, “Nichelle Nichols,” available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Nichelle_Nichols (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
See, e.g., TA Maxwell, “The Mary Sue Manual,” Nov. 6, 2003, available
at http://www.ﬁctionpress.com/s/1440163/1/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2011);
Melyanna, “The Trouble with Mary,” TheForce.Net, July 1, 2002, available
at http://fanﬁc.theforce.net/articles.asp?action=view&ID=33 (last visited
Aug. 9, 2011). For a remarkable electronically scored personality test variant, see “The Original Fiction Mary-Sue Litmus Test,” available at http://
www.ponylandpress.com/ms-test.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
Fiona Carruthers, “Fanﬁc Is Good for Two Things—Greasing Engines
and Killing Brain Cells,” 1 Particip@tions (May 2004).
Speaking of disciplining the consumption of texts, the French theorist
Michel de Certeau observes: “By its very nature open to plural reading, the
text becomes a cultural weapon, a private hunting reserve, the pretext for
a law that legitimizes as ‘literal’ the interpretation given by socially authorized professionals and intellectuals.” Michel de Certeau, The Practice of
Everyday Life 171 (Steven Rendall, trans., 1984).
See generally Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1963).
Pﬂieger, “Too Good to Be True.”
Sonia K. Katyal, “Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in
Fan Fiction,” 14 J. Gender, Race, & Justice 463 (2006) (arguing in favor of
permitting slash fan ﬁction in order to allow recoding of texts).
Shoshanna Green et al., “Normal Female Interest in Men Bonking: Selections from The Terra Nostra Underground and Strange Bedfellows,” in Theorizing Fandom: Fans, Subculture and Identity 41, 42 (Cheryl Harris and
Alison Alexander, eds., 1998).
Neva Chonin, “If You’re an Obsessed Harry Potter Fan, Voldemort Isn’t the
Problem. It’s Hermione Versus Ginny,” S.F. Chron., Aug. 3, 2005 at E1.
“Potter Translations Withdrawn,” May 1, 2003, http://www.news24.com/
News24/Entertainment/Abroad/0,2–1225–1243_1354257,00.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2005). See also Pogrebin, “Dissipate,” available at http://www
.ﬁctionalley.org/authors/pogrebin/dissipate01a.html (last visited Aug. 9,
2011; two minor South Asian female characters from Harry Potter visit
India).
Manjira Majumdar, “When Harry Met Kali,” Outlook (India), July 7, 2003,
available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?220651 (last visited
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Dec. 29, 2010). The ﬁctional characters include Professor Shanku, a protagonist in science-ﬁction stories by Satyajit Ray. See Wikipedia, “Professor
Shanku,” available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor_Shanku (last
visited Dec. 27, 2010). Potter also meets historical ﬁgures, such as Satyajit
Ray’s father. Priyanjali Mitra, “Bengali Babu,” Indian Express, Apr. 20,
2003, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content
_id=22323 (last visited Dec. 27, 2010).
The letter asserted copyright, character merchandise, trademark, and fraud
claims. Urmi A. Goswami, “Illegally Cashing in on Harry Potter,” Economic Times (India), Apr. 3, 2003. The book included stills from the ﬁ lm
Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone.
See Judge Posner’s list of cartoon characters in Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360
F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004); DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696
F.2d 24, 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (assuming Batman to be copyrightable);
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753–55 (9th Cir. 1978) (Mickey
Mouse et al.); Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir.
1940) (Superman); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73
F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1934) (Betty Boop).
Cartoon characters seem to have received greater protections than literary
characters; see Leslie A. Kurtz, “The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional
Characters,” 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 429, 451 (1986). Even the setting—the world
created by a writer devoid of its speciﬁc characters—will likely be subject to
copyright. Thus, pupiling Hogwarts with newly invented characters is not
enough to escape Rowling’s copyright claim.
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2002).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1978).
Campbell v. Acuﬀ-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
Id. at n.6B.
Id. at 593–94.
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Miﬄin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271.
Mattel Inc v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003).
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2nd Cir. 1998).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 n.14.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the
signiﬁcance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
ﬁnding of fair use”); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110
(2d Cir. 1998) (noting that commercial use weighed against fair use, but
nonetheless holding that the advertisement at issue was fair use). A popular misconception holds that noncommercial use is legally required. While
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not required, noncommercial use is a factor weighing in favor of fair use.
Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 651, 654 (1997) (“Fan ﬁction should fall
under the fair use exception to copyright restrictions because fan ﬁction
involves the productive addition of creative labor to a copyright holder’s
characters, it is noncommercial, and it does not act as an economic substitute for the original copyrighted work”). Furthermore, copyright owners
might be less likely to sue authors of noncommercial fan ﬁction.
Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright §12.2.1.1(a), 12:38 (3d ed. 2005) (“by
far the great bulk of decisions ﬁnding fair use have involved commercial,
rather than noncommercial, uses”).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
Writing fan ﬁction helps many amateur writers to develop their craft, occasionally leading to commercial success through book contracts for original
stories. John Jurgensen, “Rewriting the Rules of Fiction,” Wall St. J., Sept.
16, 2006, at P1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB11583600
1321164886- GZsZGW_ngbeAjqwMADJDX2w0frg_20070916.html (last
visited Dec. 29, 2010).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
William F. Patry and Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in
the Wake of Eldred, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1639, 1644–45 (2004) (complaining
that this factor “fails to distinguish between a use that impairs the potential market for the copyrighted work by criticizing it from a use that impairs the copyrighted work’s market or value by free riding on the work”).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
See Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964) (holding that the amount copied should be no more than
necessary to conjure up the original).
Rebecca Tushnet, “Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,” 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 651, 680 (1997) (describing disclaimers in
fan ﬁction as “[r]itual”).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
AnneRice.com, available at http://www.annerice.com/fa_writing_archive
.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006). (Emphasis added.)
Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright at §12.2.1.1(b), 12:31. Others are optimistic
that there are alternatives for the bulk of intellectual properties, but this
seems more far-reaching than Goldstein, who after all limits his claim to
satire, as that term has come to be understood in law. See, e.g., Justin
Hughes, “‘Recoding’ Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests,” 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923, 969–72 (1999).
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Decl. at 1, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Miﬄin Co., 136
F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01 CV-701- CAP).
Toni Morrison, Decl. at 1, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Miﬄin Co., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 1357, (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01 CV-701- CAP).
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87. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Decl. at 1, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Miﬄin Co.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 CAP (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01 CV-701).
88. Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience “Recoding”
Rights, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 805, 836 (1993). (Emphasis added.)
89. Rosemary J. Coombe, “Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue,” 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1853, 1879
(1991).
90. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983) (“all works are to some extent based
on works that precede them”). (Emphasis in original.)
9 1. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey 52 (1988); Henry Louis
Gates, Jr., Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the “Racial” Self 236 (1987)
(describing the black writer as “he who dwells at the margins of discourse,
ever punning, ever troping, ever embodying the ambiguities of language”
and engaged in “repetition and revision . . . repeating and reversing simultaneously . . . in one deft discursive act”).
92. Henry Jenkins, Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture
35 (1992).
93. Gates, Figures in Black at 240.
94. De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life at 29.
95. Constance Penley, Brownian Motion: Women, Tactics, and Technology, in
Technoculture 135, 155 (Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, eds., 1991).
96. See Madhavi Sunder, “Cultural Dissent,” 54 Stan. L. Rev. 495, 555–67
(2001).
97. Jane Austen, Persuasion 162–63 (Bantam Classic ed. 1984).
98. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, “The Romance of the Public
Domain,” 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1331, 1351–52 (2004) (explaining why few corporations based in developing countries have successfully commercialized
traditional knowledge for a global consumer market).
99. Kelley Massoni, “Modeling Work: Occupational Messages in Seventeen
Magazine,” 18 Gender & Soc’y 47, 50. To take another well-known example,
BET (Black Entertainment Television) emerged as a music television alternative to MTV and VH1, only to be bought by MTV’s and VH1’s owner,
Viacom. Lynette Clemetson, “Chief of BET Plans to Broaden Programming
Appeal,” N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2006 at E1.
100. USPTO registration #1179067 purports to give Marvel and DC exclusive
rights to the name in the marketing of “publications, particularly comic
books and magazines and stories in illustrated form.” Todd Verbeek,
“Super-Heroes® a Trademark of DC and Marvel,” available at http://briefs
.toddverbeek.com/archives/SuperHeroes_a_Trademark_of_DC_and_Marvel
.html (Jan. 30, 2004); Editorial, Set Our Super Heroes (trademark symbol)
Free, L. A. Times, Mar. 26, 2006 at M4.
101. See 74 Am. Jur. 2d Trademarks and Tradenames § 31 (2005).
102. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. The Court bolstered the point with literary sup-
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111.
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port: “‘People ask . . . for criticism, but they only want praise.’ S. Maugham,
Of Human Bondage 241 (Penguin ed. 1992).”
Bruce P. Keller and Rebecca Tushnet, “Even More Parodic Than the Real
Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited,” 94 Trademark Rep. 979, 996 (2004).
The move coincides with a concerted push by leading comic book publishers to oﬀer readers more diverse heroes. DC Comics recently introduced
the new Blue Beetle, “aka Jaime Reyes, a Mexican American teenager in El
Paso,” and Batwoman, whose alter ego is a lipstick lesbian socialite named
Kathy Kane. And Marvel celebrated the nuptials of two of its most popular
black superheroes, Storm and Black Panther. George Gene Gustines,
“Straight (and Not) Out of the Comics,” N.Y. Times, May 28, 2006 at B25.
In the meantime, new creators are stepping up to ﬁll the void in the industry. See, e.g., Hassan M. Fattah, “Comics to Battle for Truth, Justice, and
the Islamic Way,” N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2006, at A8 (reporting the Kuwaiti
publisher Teshkeel Media’s plans to publish “‘The 99,’ a series of comic
books based on superhero characters who battle injustice and ﬁght evil,
with each character personifying one of the 99 qualities that Muslims
believe God embodies”); Virgin Comics, available at http://www.facebook
.com/pages/Virgin- Comics/12117873474 (last visited Aug. 9, 2011; introducing a Bangalore-based comics series seeking to “tap into the vast library
of mythology and re-invent the rich indigenous narratives of Asia”).
See Siddharth Srivastava, “When Spiderman Speaks in Hindi,” Asia Times
Online, June 23, 2004, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South
_Asia/FF23Df03.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2010).
BBC News, “New-Look Pooh ‘Has Girl Friend,’” Dec. 9, 2005, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/entertainment/4512770.stm (last
visited Dec. 29, 2010).
Will Pavia, “My, Christopher Robin, You’ve Changed,” The Times (Britain),
Dec. 9, 2005, at 5.
Marco R. della Cava, “Disney Lets Girl into Winnie’s World,” USA Today,
Dec. 7, 2005 at 1D.
Susan Dominus, “A Girly- Girl Joins the ‘Sesame’ Boys,” N.Y. Times, Aug.
6, 2006 at B1. (“The feminist-minded parent might not only applaud the
decision to make a more high-proﬁle female character, but wonder why on
earth it took so long”).
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Miﬄin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Marcus, J., concurring).
“‘Gay Batman’ Artist Gets ‘Cease & Desist,’” Artnet.com, Aug. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/artnetnews/artnetnews8
–18–05.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2010).
Justin Hughes, “‘Recoding’ Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests,” 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923, 940–66 (1999). See also William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner, “Indeﬁnitely Renewable Copyright,” 70 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 471, 486–88 (2003) (arguing that the value of a copyrighted work may
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decrease if individuals were free to create derivatives of the copyrighted
material, but conceding that the works of Shakespeare, for example, do not
seem to suﬀer from the proliferation of derivative works).
113. See, e.g., Frank Miller, Batman: The Dark Knight Returns (1986).
114. James Cliﬀord, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century
43 (1997); Sunder, Cultural Dissent at 519.
chapter 5. can intellectual property help the poor?
1. Interview with V. C. Vivekanandan, Professor, Nalsar Univ. of Law, in
Hyderabad, India (Dec. 28, 2004).
2. Interview with V. K. Unni, Professor, Nalsar Univ. of Law, in Hyderabad,
India (Dec. 30, 2004).
3. Id.
4. The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act,
No. 48, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India), hereinafter GI Act. The GI Act
became eﬀective in 2003; see also id.
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Arts.
22–24, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (2004), hereinafter TRIPS.
6. See “Pochampally Paves the Way for Local IP Protection,” Econ. Times,
Dec. 19, 2004.
7. See Anupam Chander, “The New, New Property,” 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715 (2003)
(discussing the allocation of property rights in Internet domain names).
8. James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of
the Information Society xiv (1996).
9. James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain,” 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33, 69 (Winter/Spring
2003).
10. See generally James Boyle, “Foreword: The Opposite of Property?,” 66 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 1 (Winter/Spring 2003).
1 1. See generally Poor People’s Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in
Developing Countries (J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler, eds., 2004).
12. Id. at back cover.
13. Boyle, “Foreword” at 1.
14. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, “Density and Conﬂict in International Intellectual
Property Law,” 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1021, 1036 (2007) (commenting that
protections for geographical indications in the global South may “exacerbate an already troubling erosion of the public domain”).
15. James Boyle, “Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors,” 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 177 (1997).
16. Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens at xii.
17. Id. at 142 (“If one has the slightest concern for distributional justice in
one’s criteria for property regimes, this regime must surely fail”).
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18. Id. at xiv.
19. James Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the
Net?,” 47 Duke L.J. 87, 114 (1997). In Shamans, Software, and Spleens at 127,
Boyle wrote: “Whether I am right or wrong about the distributional eﬀects,
I think it can be convincingly demonstrated that an exclusively authorcentered regime will have negative eﬀects on eﬃciency. In many ways, this
may be the more important point to make. To condemn a system as unfair
is one thing; to argue that it does not work, that it may sometimes actually
impede innovation, is another.” (Emphasis in original.)
20. James Boyle, “A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property,” 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0009, 11, available at http://www.law
.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2004DLTR0009.pdf (last visited
Aug. 9, 2011).
2 1. Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens at xiv.
22. Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property” at 115.
23. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva Declaration on the
Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf (last
visited September 14, 2011). The Geneva Declaration states that intellectual
property law’s mandate should “not only be to promote eﬃcient protection
and harmonization, but also to promote fairness, development and innovation.” The WIPO General Assembly responded to the call, voting that same
month to incorporate a “development agenda” into its intellectual property
law and policy. World Intellectual Property Organization, “Proposal by
Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for
WIPO,” WO/GA/31/11, (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ga_31/wo_ga_31_11.pdf (last visited September 14, 2011). The proposal was joined by a group of ten other countries,
which called themselves the “Friends for Development.” World Intellectual
Property Organization, “Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda
for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11,”
IIM/1/4 (Apr. 11–13, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/ edocs/mdocs/
mdocs/en/iim_1/iim_1_4.pdf (hereinafter Elaboration of Issues). The countries were Bolivia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Iran, Kenya,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Venezuela.
24. Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens at 128. For other helpful analyses of
the rosy periwinkle controversy see Shayana Kadidal, “Plants, Poverty, and
Pharmaceutical Patents,” 103 Yale L.J. 223, 224 (1993); Srividhya Ragavan,
“Protection of Traditional Knowledge,” 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 1, 8
(2001).
25. See generally Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens at 128.
26. Id. at 126 (emphasis omitted).
27. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 128.
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29. Id. at 128–29.
30. Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain” at 52.
3 1. Darrell A. Posey, Indigenous Knowledge and Ethics: A Darrell Posey Reader
161 (Kristina Plenderleith, ed., 2004); see also United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, Principle 22, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26
(Aug. 12, 1992) (“Indigenous peoples and their communities, and other
local communities, have a vital role in environmental management and
development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States
should recognize and duly support their identity, culture, and interests
and enable their eﬀective participation in the achievement of sustainable
development”).
32. Treaty on Access to Knowledge 2, May 9, 2005, available at http://www
.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
33. Id. at art. 4(1)(b)(iii).
34. See Michael F. Brown, Who Owns Native Culture? 55 (2003) (observing that
many indigenous “lawyers and activists believe that intellectual property
holds the key to heritage protection”). See generally Madhavi Sunder,
“Property in Personhood,” in Rethinking Commodiﬁcation 164 (Martha M.
Ertman and Joan C. Williams, eds., 2005).
35. See Brown, Who Owns Native Culture?, at 43–68 (chronicling eﬀorts by
Australian aboriginals to assert collective copyright in native designs);
id. at 69–94 (describing eﬀorts to use trademark and the right of publicity
to combat perceived misuse of traditional symbols, such as the image of
the revered Indian leader Crazy Horse on malt liquor); id. at 95–143 (noting
indigenous responses to ethnobotany patents).
36. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, “The Romance of the Public
Domain,” 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 1335 (2004).
37. See, e.g., Brown, Who Owns Native Culture?, at 8 (“The readiness of some
social critics to champion new forms of silencing and surveillance in the
name of cultural protection should trouble anyone committed to the free
exchange of ideas”).
38. Chander and Sunder, “The Romance of the Public Domain” (discussing
how “the romance of the public domain” works to the detriment of poor
communities).
39. Id. at 1335.
40. Id. at 1332.
4 1. Id. at 1354.
42. Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens at 119.
43. See, e.g., id. at xiii (bemoaning intellectual property ownership by corporations that is “so expansive that they make it much harder for future
independent creators to actually create”); and at 142 (citing “the utilitarian
failures of the current regime”).
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44. Vandana Shiva, Protect or Plunder? Understanding Intellectual Property
Rights 47 (2001).
45. William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of
New England 127 (1983).
46. Id. at 164.
47. Shiva, Protect or Plunder? at 50.
48. This is the subtitle to Boyle’s Shamans, Software, and Spleens (emphasis
added).
49. Shiva, Protect or Plunder? at 49 (emphasis added). Shiva writes: “Terra nullius has its contemporary equivalent in ‘Bio-Nullius’—treating biodiversity
knowledge as empty of prior creativity and prior rights, and hence available
for ‘ownership’ through the claim to ‘invention.’”
50. Id. at 50.
5 1. Id. at 64.
52. Maureen Leibl and Tirthankar Roy, “Handmade in India: Traditional Craft
Skills in a Changing World,” in Poor People’s Knowledge at 69.
53. J. Michael Finger, “Introduction and Overview,” in Poor People’s Knowledge
at 1, 30.
54. Id.
55. World Intellectual Property Organization, “Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge” 6, available at http://www.wipo.org/freepublications/en/
tk/920/wipo_pub_920.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Aruna Chandaraju, “Modern MYSURU,” The Hindu, Mar. 3, 2005, available at http://www.hindu.com/mp/2005/03/05/stories/2005030500860100
.htm (last visited September 14, 2011).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For a more detailed account of the couple’s eﬀorts see “Peace Industry,”
available at http://www.peaceindustry.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2007).
6 1. Finger, “Introduction and Overview” at 31.
62. Id.
63. Liebl and Roy, “Handmade in India” at 70.
64. Id. at 67.
65. Pedro Echeverria, Letter to the Editor, Fin. Times, July 5, 2004 at 10 (“Better protecting geographical indications would allow for the localization of
productions in the framework of trade globalization.”); see also Rosemary
J. Coombe, “Legal Claims to Culture in and Against the Market: Neoliberalism and the Global Proliferation of Meaningful Diﬀerence,” 1 L., Culture
& Human. 35, 46 (2005) (warning that geographical indications may be
unduly used to limit competition and exacerbate existing inequalities
within groups).
66. See, e.g., Liebl and Roy, “Handmade in India” at 56 (“The full potential of
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the role craft traditions can play in the development process, and speciﬁcally in the generation of income . . . has only recently begun to be
appreciated”).
Graham Dutﬁeld argues that “estimating the full value of [traditional
knowledge] in monetary terms is diﬃcult if not impossible” because it “is
often an essential component in the development of other products”; many
products derived from traditional knowledge never enter modern markets
and thus are not included in GNP calculations; the replacement cost of traditional knowledge would be “quite high”; and the spiritual value of some
traditional knowledge cannot be quantiﬁed. Graham Dutﬁeld, Developing
and Implementing National Systems for Protecting Traditional Knowledge: A
Review of Experiences in Selected Developing Countries 7 (2000). Cf. Graham
Dutﬁeld, “Legal and Economic Aspects of Traditional Knowledge,” in International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 504–5 (Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman,
eds., 2005) (suggesting that “the global value added to rice yields by use of
[Indian] landraces can be estimated at $400 million per year”), with Stephen B. Brush, “Farmers’ Rights and Protection of Traditional Agricultural
Knowledge” 17 (Int’l Food Policy Research Inst., Working Paper no. 36,
2005) (noting there is “no estimate of value or widely accepted method to
estimate the value of crop genetic resources developed by farmers”).
Liebl and Roy, “Handmade in India” at 56 (“Crafts show tremendous potential in terms of employment generation and poverty alleviation in India.
Handicrafts provide a livelihood, albeit modest, to large numbers of poor
people in India, and especially to the rural poor”). A recent United Nations
Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) symposium
concluded, for example, “the industries of the imagination, content, knowledge, innovation and creation clearly are the industries of the future . . .
they are also important contributory factors to employment and economic
growth.” Id. at 53.
Coenraad J. Visser, “Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for Traditional Knowledge,” in Poor People’s Knowledge at 213.
Finger, “Introduction and Overview” at 35.
Id. at 19.
See Jasper Vikas George, “Geographical Indications and India,” IMC India
(Apr. 3, 2005, 7:24 PM), available at http://india.indymedia.org/en/2005/
03/210197.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2011; urging Indians to seek GI protection of traditional knowledge).
TRIPS at art. 22(1).
Id. at art. 22(2).
Id. at art. 23.
Id. at art. 23(1) (prohibiting use of the GI when the product does not originate “in the place indicated by the geographical indication . . . even where
the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is
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used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as ‘kind,’ ‘type,’
‘style,’ ‘imitation’ or the like”). The designation “Napa Valley Champagne,”
for example, even when truthful as to the indication of the product’s origin, would be impermissible under the heightened level of protection mandated by TRIPS for wines and spirits.
77. A handful of India’s submissions in the WTO relating to TRIPS since
2000 show this. See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Communication from Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, the European Communities and Their Member States, Georgia,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan,
Romania, The Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand
and Turkey, IP/C/W/353 (June 24, 2002) (focusing on “protecting all geographical indications equally”); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposal from Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic,
Egypt, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela, IP/C/W/247/
Rev.1 (May 17, 2001) (“The TRIPS Agreement does not provide suﬃcient
protection for geographical indications of products other than wines and
spirits”); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Communication from India IP/C/W/196 (July 12, 2000) (proposing that
“additional protection for geographical indications must be extended for
products other than wines and spirits”).
78. GI status for basmati rice is controversial because its production is not
limited to any particular geographical region in India. Countrywide recognition may also qualify, however. The European Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce, for example, upheld Greece’s GI in feta cheese after a decadelong
battle with other European countries. Stéphanie Bodon, “The EU Feta
Debate Concludes,” Managing Intellectual Property, MIP Week, Oct. 31,
2005, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/1258169/Search/
The-EU-Feta- debate- concludes.html?Home=true&Keywords=feta&Brand
=Site (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). India and Pakistan jointly agreed in 2008
to register together for a GI in basmati. See “India, Pakistan to Protect
Basmati Right Together,” Business Standard, Nov. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-pakistan-to-protect
-basmati-right-together/339640 (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
79. The Indian GI Act deﬁnes “geographical indication” in relation to goods
as an “indication which identiﬁes such goods as agricultural goods, natural goods or manufactured goods as originating, or manufactured in the
ter ritory of a country, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given
quality, reputation or other characteristic of such goods is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin and in case where such goods are
manufactured goods one of the activities of either the production or of
processing or preparation of the goods concerned takes place in such territory, region or locality, as the case may be.” Geographical Indications of
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Goods (Registration and Protection) Act § I-2(1)(e), No. 48, Acts of Parliament, 1999.
The cost to renew a GI is 3,000 rupees. The Geographical Indications of
Goods (Registration and Protection) Rules, 2002, The First Schedule, 4A.
Once approved, GIs and all producers and authorized users of the GIs are
listed in a national register. Geographical Indications of Goods Act § II-5–
6. Registration lasts for ten years and is renewable “from time to time” for
periods of an additional 10 years. Id. § III-18.
Id. § III-11(2)(a).
Geographical Indications of Goods Rules § Form GI-1, available at http://
www.ipindia.nic.in/girindia/Form_GI1.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
Geographical Indications of Goods Act § IV-21(1-b).
Id. § IV-24.
See Liebl and Roy, “Handmade in India” at 65 (asking “[a]nd what happens
when a weaver from another part of India moves to Kanjeevaram,” famous
for its silk sarees?).
See Coombe, “Legal Claims to Culture, in and Against the Market.” See
also, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, “Cultural Dissent,” 54 Stan. L. Rev. 495, 504
(2001) (urging assurance that “legal eﬀorts to counter globalization and
modernization do not buttress the hegemony of cultural elites and suppress eﬀorts by cultural dissenters to gain autonomy and equality within
their cultural context”); Madhavi Sunder, “Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire,” 4 J. Gender, Race & Just. 69, 70 (2000)
(discussing “the new centrality of struggles over discursive power—the
right to create, and control, cultural meanings”).
See Elizabeth Povinelli, “At Home in the Violence of Recognition,” in Property in Question: Value Transformation in the Global Economy 185, 185–206
(Katherine Verdery and Caroline Humphrey, eds., 2004) (describing pressure on indigenous peoples to present their communities as “a synchronic
structure” that comports to legal requirements for land based on colonial
notions of authentic diﬀerence). See generally Rosemary J. Coombe et al.,
“Bearing Cultural Distinction: Informational Capitalism and New Expectations for Intellectual Property,” in Intellectual Property Law: Articles on
Crossing Borders Between Traditional and Actual 193, 193–213 (F. Willem
Grosheide and Jan J. Brinkhof, eds., 2005); Cristina Grasseni, “Packaging
Skills: Calibrating Cheese to the Global Market,” in Commodifying Everything: Relationships of the Market 259–286 (Susan Strasser, ed., 2003)
(describing commodiﬁcation of tradition in the context of local cheese
production in Europe).
Comm’n on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property
Rights and Development Policy 90 (2002). Cf. Kal Raustiala and Chris
Sprigman, “Eat, Drink and Be Wary: Why the U.S. Should Oppose the
WTO’s Extending Stringent Intellectual Property Protection of Wine
and Spirit Names to Other Products,” Findlaw, Dec. 12, 2002, available
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90.
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92.

93.
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at http://writ.news.ﬁndlaw.com/commentary/20021212_sprigman.html
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011; highlighting free-speech concerns posed by
heightened GI protection).
See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication 334 (1997) (describing
his own “loss of faith” in rights as always producing positive outcomes
for the disempowered). In this work, Kennedy advocates a critical stance
toward the discourse of rights but does not abandon rights altogether.
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Productions).
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19. John Dewey, Art as Experience 332 (1934).
20. Slumdog Millionaire (Warner Independent Pictures, 2008).
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22. Robinson, Satyajit Ray 360 (quoting Scorsese).
23. See TheOscarSite.com, Satyajit Ray (1921–1992), available at http://theoscar
site.com/whoswho7/ray_s.htm (last visited June 14, 2010).
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Tejaswini Ganti, Bollywood: A Guidebook to Popular Hindi Cinema 189–90
(2004) (citing Azmi).
27. Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (Pocket Books, 2008).
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-humans-play-key-roles (last visited Dec. 29, 2010); see also Robert W.
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Jungle Emperor (Tezuka Productions Ltd., 1997).
See Fred Patten, “Simba Versus Kimba: The Pride of Lions,” in The Illusion
of Life 2: More Essays on Animation 275, 285–89 (Alan Cholodenko, ed.,
2007); Shinobu Price, “Cartoons from Another Planet: Japanese Animation as Cross- Cultural Communication,” 24 J. Am. & Comp. Cultures 153,
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Key to the Globalization of Culture,” 8 Int’l J. Cultural Stud. 281, 284–85
(2005).
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See Burress, “Uproar over The Lion King” (quoting the president of Tezuka
Productions: “If Disney took hints from ‘The Jungle Emperor,’ our
founder, the late Osamu Tezuka, would be very pleased by it”).
For a fuller comparison, see Patten, “Simba Versus Kimba” at 291–96.
See generally Jungle Emperor.
See generally “Kimba the White Lion vs Lion King,” available at http://

201111 Pass 3 press.indd 239

2/10/12 2:23 PM

240

5 1.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
6 1.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.
70.

7 1.

notes to page s 155 – 5 7
www.youtube.com/watch?v=-S0nnCTlcIM (last visited Aug. 9, 2011);
“Lion King–An Overview on Kimba and Interesting Facts,” available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72AVvgRNf2Q (last visited Aug. 9,
2011).
“The Simpsons: Round Springﬁeld” (Fox Broadcasting Co., Apr. 30, 1995).
See Burress, “Uproar over The Lion King.”
Id.
See Kuwahara, “Japanese Culture and Popular Consciousness” at 45
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See, e.g., Patten, “Simba Versus Kimba” at 298–99.
Id. at 299.
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Id. at 306.
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Patten, “Simba Versus Kimba” at 281.
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the Pridelands, is a rocky ledge that resembles the outcropping that Bambi’s father stands on. A parent dies in both movies, though it is a father in
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